With the narrowing space between international trade and domestic policy, the topic of women’s empowerment1 is increasingly becoming part of mainstream discussions in global governance circles. Indeed, renewed attention is now being paid to how international trade policies may impact gender equality.2 Recently, multiple studies have demonstrated that trade policy is not gender-neutral.3 Trade policies create both ‘losers’ and ‘winners’, as they benefit some and leave others behind.4 The distributional outcomes of trade can vary between women and men, since they play different roles in society, markets, and the economy, and they enjoy different opportunities.5 Hence, if trade policies are designed without taking into account their impact on gender powers and opportunities, these policies can magnify the existing gender gaps.6

The Caribbean women’s rights agenda has been framed by the broader agenda of international platforms for action ‘adapted to national and regional priorities’. Yet the Caribbean feminist agenda is hardly present in international trade discussions and negotiations. The chapter will examine the development of gender equality/feminism in the Caribbean and its intersections with trade; highlight and examine the current feminist agenda in the Caribbean; and ultimately consider whether and if so how that agenda manifests itself in domestic and regional policy and practice in the Caribbean. It will do so against the backdrop of broader efforts internationally to mainstream gender and will make recommendations about how the Caribbean should approach trade and gender in the future.

State-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) – that is, entities in which a government or the State has some form of direct or indirect ownership or control – occupy an increasingly important share of the global economy and international commerce. SOEs commonly operate like, and therefore can be considered in much the same way as, any other enterprise in either national or international markets. However, to the extent that they are controlled by a State, SOEs may pursue government policy objectives, rather than, or in addition to, the strictly commercial interests of the enterprise itself.2 Moreover, a State’s investment in an SOE can create incentives for the State to give preferential treatment to the SOE when compared to other economic actors. Given these dynamics, the presence of SOEs in a given market potentially generates a range of issues for governments and for actual or potential competitors of the SOE.

Introduction

A recent WTO proposal presented by the small Caribbean island of Antigua and Barbuda on behalf of some small states, aimed at ensuring greater fairness and participation by all in the process of setting genuinely international standards for the regulation of financial services, has brought to the fore an issue that has been silently brewing in the midst of services negotiations at the WTO. The question of how to ensure that the international regulation of financial services becomes an inclusive process for small developing states has in recent years assumed paramount importance in securing their economic growth and viability within the multilateral trading system.

One of the great ironies of the post-Cold War period of globalisation has been that while it has been associated with trade and economic liberalisation, it has also been coupled with the creation of a number of standardsetting bodies which have in turn spawned a multiplication of what are essentially plurilateral standards and regulations. These international standards, to the extent they existed in the past, did not involve small developing states which were outside the global process of integration.

However, many of these small developing states which have now developed not inconsiderable export-oriented offshore financial services sectors are faced with implementing increasingly complex external regulations as part of their integration into the multilateral system and the WTO. While small developing states have almost invariably been excluded from the process of formulation of international financial standards and regulations, they have, by and large, been unwilling objects of international regulatory authorities.