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Jan KlabbersThis epilogue takes stock of the volume and sketches some of the ramifications: if the vacuum assumption (i.e. international organizations only interact with their member states) no longer holds, assuming it ever did, then what? The author proposes that international organizations are better seen as political and economic actors in their own right. They may be given a function upon establishment, but usually develop a certain autonomy. This renders them closer to administrative agencies and offers a more realistic foundation on which to build further legal thought – and thus might be able to take third parties into account.
This chapter sets the tone for the volume, by demonstrating that international organizations law has traditionally been constructed around the fundamental assumption that the only legally relevant dynamic is the relationship between the organization and its member states. The law, in other words, has grown up in a vacuum, illustrated by the absence of clauses granting international organizations legal personality under international law (until well into the second half of the twentieth century) and illustrated by the absence of explicit treaty-making competences. International organizations were never expected to interact with others than their own member states; as a result, today’s international organizations law has a hard time accommodating third parties.
International organizations have always been exclusively seen as vehicles for their member states, exercising delegated powers. This book demonstrates that this picture is seriously outdated: international organizations address a wide variety of social actors, and this needs to be reflected in the way we think about international organizations. The book provides an overview, in distinct chapters, about the sort of actors international organizations engage which; provides empirical examples; investigates potential winners and losers of such interaction, and aims to find ways to come to terms with the realization that international organizations are not solely member state-driven. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This chapter addresses the role of, and prospects for, interdisciplinary scholarship in the law of international organisations. It argues that collaboration between scholars only works when those scholars share similar intuitions and sensibilities, and more generally adopts a broad approach: scholarship in the law of international organisations is at its best when informed by insights from a wide variety of academic disciplines. Yet (and this is often a problem) it should remain recognisably legal scholarship, if only because political and economic developments inevitably are channelled through law and legal procedure. Inter-disciplinarity means more than bowing to insights from International Relations scholarship, and should be driven by curiosity rather than theory or method.
It has been nearly four decades since Felice Morgenstern delivered her ‘Lauterpacht lectures’ and published them in book form as Legal Problems of International Organizations. The book serves as something of an informal litmus test for international organization lawyers: one of those classic texts that one simply must have read at some point. Why some books acquire this status and others do not remains mysterious, something sociologists of science may wish to investigate in order to come to a general hypothesis, but in Morgenstern’s case the answer seems fairly straightforward, and consists of two, maybe three, elements.
Any organization normally determines, by express rules or otherwise, the participants in its operation and the manner of their participation. The determination should be designed to further the aims and purposes of the organization and the effectiveness of its work. This means that, beyond the enumeration of the categories of participants which may be admitted, the basis of the contribution that can be made by each needs to be considered and the principles governing admission to participation refined accordingly.
I was glad to have been invited to deliver the Hersch Lauterpacht lectures; very glad indeed for the opportunity it has given me to pay homage in a small way to someone whom I remember with respect, affection and gratitude. In preparing the lectures I was able to appreciate, once again, the great impact he had on my development and career, teaching me by example to question and to seek constructive answers related to the evolution of the law. And I say ‘evolution’ purposefully because in all his work he was aware that the world was changing too rapidly for any other approach to be valid. If I show less confidence in the future than he perhaps might have done, it may be because I do not have the same degree of courage as he did, or because the twenty-five years since his death have provided little ground for faith. I do share his conviction that any approach to the future must be based on law and on the moral precepts underlying it.
During the formative period of international organizations, attention was largely1 focused on their “internal” law, i.e. on their functions, powers and procedures under their constitutions and other rules. The assumption that international organizations do not have a common denominator encouraged such introspection. However — to misapply a famous quotation — no organization is an island, entire of itself. For their dealings with the outside world, whether in the sphere of public international law or in that of private law, the internal rules of organizations are relevant but not sufficient.2
The functions of many international organizations include the establishment of standards of conduct for purposes other than the internal functioning of the organization. With the major exception of the European Communities — which are so different that they have to be left out of account here — the organizations in question do not have legislative authority in the sense of having the power to make the standards legally binding on all addressees. The powers of organizations like I.C.A.O., W.H.O. and W.M.O. to make technical regulations,1 or of organizations like O.E.C.D, or the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission to take decisions, come closest to such authority; however, even these powers are accompanied by qualifications — the possibility of refusal by opting out or by notification of inability to comply; the requirement of unanimity; or the recognized need for Members to meet national constitutional requirements before complying — which ensure, in effect, that no State is bound against its will. It is thus appropriate to apply to the entire subject a statement originally made with respect to one of its features, namely that “the great debate of State sovereignty versus world community pervades every aspect of it”.2
Nearly a quarter of a century has passed since the death of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. At the time of his death, public international organizations were beginning to outnumber States, but no one foresaw the potential, both for growth and for variety, of that form of international activity; this may explain why he did not devote any major work to the place of international organizations in international law. At present, a considerably larger total of States is much more heavily outnumbered by the total of international organizations; a proportion of three to two is probably an unduly conservative estimate.