These guidelines update the 2013 “Updated US Public Health Service (PHS) Guidelines for the Management of Occupational Exposures to Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Recommendations for Postexposure Prophylaxis,” hereafter referred to as the 2013 PHS Guidelines.1,2 The availability of new medication options, new information on the window of detection for different human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) tests, and the risk of transmission from people with undetectable viral loads prompted this update. The primary intended audience for these recommendations remains anyone involved in the provision of HIV post-exposure management to healthcare personnel (HCP).

The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention assembled a working group of representatives from federal agencies in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) who identified the priority topics for update and conducted systematic literature reviews to formulate recommendations (see Appendix). All recommendations were reviewed by the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) at public meetings, and by a non-consensus forming panel of external experts. New evidence-based recommendations are developed using the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development, and Evaluation (GRADE) framework and classified according to the HICPAC recommendation scheme when evidence supported recommendation development.3,4 Other recommendations in this document are classified as good practice statements according to the criteria set forth by GRADE.5 The working group solicited additional feedback on recommendations from relevant agencies, subject-matter experts, and the public.

Recommendations that have changed since the 2013 PHS guidelines include:

• new antiretroviral drug regimens for post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP);

• a shortened duration of post-exposure follow-up HIV testing;

• elimination of routine laboratory tests for antiretroviral drug toxicity; and

• considerations for PEP for HCP with exposures to source patients with undetectable viral loads.

Important strategies in the principles of exposure management remain: primary prevention strategies; the prompt reporting and management of occupational exposures; adherence to recommended HIV PEP regimens when indicated; the role of expert consultation in management of exposures; and follow-up of exposed HCP.

We examined the association between influenza vaccination policies at acute care hospitals and influenza vaccination coverage among healthcare personnel for the 2021–22 influenza season. Mandatory vaccination and masking for unvaccinated personnel were associated with increased odds of vaccination. Hospital employees had higher vaccination coverage than licensed independent practitioners.

Data from the National Healthcare Safety Network were analyzed to assess the impact of COVID-19 on the incidence of healthcare-associated infections (HAI) during 2021. Standardized infection ratios were significantly higher than those during the prepandemic period, particularly during 2021-Q1 and 2021-Q3. The incidence of HAI was elevated during periods of high COVID-19 hospitalizations.

Data reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Healthcare Safety Network (CDC NHSN) were analyzed to understand the potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on central-line–associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs) in acute-care hospitals. Descriptive analysis of the standardized infection ratio (SIR) was conducted by location, location type, geographic area, and bed size.

Background: The Targeted Assessment for Prevention (TAP) strategy is a quality improvement framework created by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to facilitate the reduction of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs). TAP facility assessments are a component of the TAP strategy and are completed by staff across the facility to help identify perceptions of and target infection prevention gaps. We have described the gaps most commonly reported by facilities completing TAP facility assessments for catheter-associated urinary tract infections (CAUTIs) and central-line–associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs). Methods: TAP CAUTI and CLABSI assessments were completed by acute-care facilities across the nation, with CDC technical assistance, from December 2014 to August 2019. Similar questions across 2 versions of CAUTI assessments and 3 versions of CLABSI assessments were combined. Analysis was limited to facilities with ≥10 assessments. Infection prevention gaps were defined as ≥33% respondents answering Unknown, ≥33% respondents answering “no,” or ≥50% of respondents answering “no” and “unknown” or “never” and “rarely” “sometimes” “unknown.” The analysis was completed at the facility level, and the gaps most commonly reported across facilities were identified. Results: In total, 1,942 CAUTI assessments from 42 facilities in 12 states and 1,623 CLABSI assessments from 29 facilities in 11 states were included for analysis. The mean numbers of assessments per facility were 46.2 for CAUTIs and 56.0 for CLABSIs. Across both CAUTIs and CLABSIs, commonly reported perceptions about infection prevention gaps included lack of physician and nurse champions for prevention activities, failure to conduct competency assessments, and inconsistency in select device insertion practices (Fig. 1). For CAUTIs, lack of practices to facilitate timely removal of urinary catheters were also commonly reported, with one-third of facilities reporting inconsistency in use of alerts for catheter removal, 78.6% reporting lack of physician response to these alerts, and 90.5% reporting deficiencies in removing unnecessary catheters in the postanesthesia care unit. For CLABSIs, 79.3% of facilities reported failure to replace central lines within 48 hours after emergent insertion, and 62.1% reported that feedback was not provided to staff on central-line device utilization ratios. Conclusion: For both assessments, absence of CAUTI and CLABSI prevention champions, failure to conduct competency assessments, and inconsistency in performing device insertion practices were commonly reported across facilities. These common gaps have and will continue to inform the development of tools and resources to improve infection prevention practices as well as help to better target the implementation of interventions.

Funding: None

Disclosures: None

N95 respirators are personal protective equipment most often used to control exposures to infections transmitted via the airborne route. Supplies of N95 respirators can become depleted during pandemics or when otherwise in high demand. In this paper, we offer strategies for optimizing supplies of N95 respirators in health care settings while maximizing the level of protection offered to health care personnel when there is limited supply in the United States during the 2019 coronavirus disease pandemic. The strategies are intended for use by professionals who manage respiratory protection programs, occupational health services, and infection prevention programs in health care facilities to protect health care personnel from job-related risks of exposure to infectious respiratory illnesses. Consultation with federal, state, and local public health officials is also important. We use the framework of surge capacity and the occupational health and safety hierarchy of controls approach to discuss specific engineering control, administrative control, and personal protective equipment measures that may help in optimizing N95 respirator supplies.

A nationwide survey indicated that screening for asymptomatic carriers of C. difficile is an uncommon practice in US healthcare settings. Better understanding of the role of asymptomatic carriage in C. difficile transmission, and of the measures available to reduce that risk, are needed to inform best practices regarding the management of carriers.

Healthcare organizations are required to provide workers with respiratory protection (RP) to mitigate hazardous airborne inhalation exposures. This study sought to better identify gaps that exist between RP guidance and clinical practice to understand issues that would benefit from additional research or clarification.

Previously published guidelines are available that provide comprehensive recommendations for detecting and preventing healthcare-associated infections (HAIs). The intent of this document is to highlight practical recommendations in a concise format designed to assist acute care hospitals in implementing and prioritizing their methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) prevention efforts. This document updates “Strategies to Prevent Transmission of Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus in Acute Care Hospitals,” published in 2008. This expert guidance document is sponsored by the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA) and is the product of a collaborative effort led by SHEA, the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA), the American Hospital Association (AHA), the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC), and The Joint Commission, with major contributions from representatives of a number of organizations and societies with content expertise. The list of endorsing and supporting organizations is presented in the introduction to the 2014 updates.

This report updates US Public Health Service recommendations for the management of healthcare personnel (HCP) who experience occupational exposure to blood and/or other body fluids that might contain human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Although the principles of exposure management remain unchanged, recommended HIV postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) regimens and the duration of HIV follow-up testing for exposed personnel have been updated. This report emphasizes the importance of primary prevention strategies, the prompt reporting and management of occupational exposures, adherence to recommended HIV PEP regimens when indicated for an exposure, expert consultation in management of exposures, follow-up of exposed HCP to improve adherence to PEP, and careful monitoring for adverse events related to treatment, as well as for virologie, immunologic, and serologic signs of infection. To ensure timely postexposure management and administration of HIV PEP, clinicians should consider occupational exposures as urgent medical concerns, and institutions should take steps to ensure that staff are aware of both the importance of and the institutional mechanisms available for reporting and seeking care for such exposures. The following is a summary of recommendations: (1) PEP is recommended when occupational exposures to HIV occur; (2) the HIV status of the exposure source patient should be determined, if possible, to guide need for HIV PEP; (3) PEP medication regimens should be started as soon as possible after occupational exposure to HIV, and they should be continued for a 4-week duration; (4) new recommendation—PEP medication regimens should contain 3 (or more) antiretroviral drugs (listed in Appendix A) for all occupational exposures to HIV; (5) expert consultation is recommended for any occupational exposures to HIV and at a minimum for situations described in Box 1; (6) close follow-up for exposed personnel (Box 2) should be provided that includes counseling, baseline and follow-up HIV testing, and monitoring for drug toxicity; follow-up appointments should begin within 72 hours of an HIV exposure; and (7) new recommendation—if a newer fourth-generation combination HIV p24 antigen-HIV antibody test is utilized for follow-up HIV testing of exposed HCP, HIV testing may be concluded 4 months after exposure (Box 2); if a newer testing platform is not available, follow-up HIV testing is typically concluded 6 months after an HIV exposure.