Three decades ago, in Cole v Whitfield, the High Court of Australia opted for a discrimination-based standard with the argument that s 92 of the Australian Constitution targets solely protectionist measures. This article demonstrates, with the use of comparative law analysis, that, in contrast with this teleology, the High Court has built a lacunose definition of discrimination that is incapable of covering the whole spectrum of protectionist measures. It argues that measures having an asymmetric impact should be considered discriminatory and countenanced only if they are justified by a local legitimate end and are proportionate, even if they rely on distinctions that are not based on out-of-state origin.

The application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to the Member States has given rise both to a controversial phraseology and a controversial case-law. This paper offers a reconstruction of the constitutional intent and proposes a conceptualization in conformity with the structural function and the constitutional contemplation of the pouvoir constituent. As to the phraseological debate, it demonstrates that the Charter’s application to the Member States may occur by reason of either “implementation” or “interpretation” of EU law and the two strands are embraced but not synthetized by “scope” as a collective term. As to the substantive debate, it demonstrates that the CJEU’s case-law on “implementation” is not only amorphous but also inconsistent with the Charter’s constitutional mandate. The paper proposes a novel approach based on the notion that the application to the Member States is accessory to the supremacy of EU law. The paper’s argument is presented in the following steps. First, the paper presents the pristine rationale and constitutional function of the application to the Member State through its emergence and historical context. Second, it provides a taxonomy and critical overview of the CJEU’s amorphous case-law and presents the Court’s futile attempt to create a coherent doctrine that faithfully reproduces the constitutional contemplation behind the diagonal application and that reflects the division of competences between the EU and its Member States. Third, it sets out the proposed doctrine of “displacement.”

This article offers a reconstruction and assessment of the emerging rebellion of European constitutional courts against the exceptionless supremacy of European Union (EU) law. It presents the ontological theories of supremacy and how the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) overcame the first two major challenges of its history: the existential challenge of canonizing the general doctrine of supremacy and the Solange challenge of national fundamental rights. It provides an account of the emerging ultra vires challenge, including its root cause and evolvement, and provides an assessment and sets out proposals. The article demonstrates that the crux of the matter is not the primacy of EU law but the interpretive primacy of the CJEU. It argues that the rebellion was triggered by the perception that the CJEU case law features a declining normative and an increasing policy character. The debate about the CJEU's evolutionary interpretation, in a certain sense, parallels US constitutional law's debate between originalism and the living constitution, with the difference that the EU is a pluralist legal order.

In the last decade, EU competition law reached a major turning point in its history. Anti-competitive object became an elusive and unpredictable rule, which boosts the risk of false positives and has a significant chilling effect. This article analyses this metamorphosis and the social damages it is causing, and proposes an alternative conception. The article demonstrates that the emerging new concept of anti-competitive object erroneously conflates ‘contextual analysis’, which has been part of the object-inquiry from the outset, and ‘effects-analysis’, which has no role to play here. It submits that both doctrinal and policy reasons confirm that anti-competitive object should be a category-building principle of ‘judicial rule-making’ (‘definition of the definition’) and not applicable to individual arrangements directly.

On October 6, 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) handed down its judgment in Commission v. Hungary. It found that Hungary had violated the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), as well as internal European Union law—specifically the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter). The case arose out of Hungary's 2017 amendment to its higher education law. The amendment imposed two novel requirements on foreign universities operating in Hungary. It barred any non-EU university from operating unless its country of origin concluded a specific enabling treaty with Hungary. Moreover, it required that the foreign university actually provide educational services in its country of origin. While framed in general terms, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the 2017 amendment was aimed at ending the operations of the Central European University (CEU) in Hungary.

The EU’s limited powers do not enable its institutions to effectively intervene in cases where Member State actions threaten fundamental values. The recent controversies emerging from some Member States’ human rights and rule of law backsliding turned this question to one of the core issues of the European project, calling for effective fundamental rights protection in the EU without suppressing national constitutional identities. Though EU law’s approach, at least at first glance, might appear to be idiosyncratic, it is far from unprecedented and, as far as multilevel constitutionalism is concerned, EU law may draw on the experiences of various regimes where centralized human rights protection and national or state constitutional identities coexist. This Article analyzes the current European approach as to the application of the federal bill of rights to states from a comparative perspective and explores the constitutional and jurisprudential patterns addressing the question of inquiry in a multilevel constitutional architecture. The Article analyzes the subject from a doctrinal, ontological, textual-conceptual, and institutional perspective with the aim of contributing to the current European debate with a new comparative perspective and fostering EU constitutional development with structural patterns. It submits that the currently prevailing paradigm of “scope” should be replaced or complemented with the paradigm of “core standards” and proposes a doctrine of European incorporation, arguing that the diagonally applicable rule of law and human rights requirements should be incorporated via Article 2 TEU to make them judicially applicable.

This paper analyzes the compatibility of intra-EU bilateral investment treaties—intra-EU BITs—with EU law. The status and validity of intra-EU BITs gave rise to a heated debate in Europe, which culminated in the CJEU's recent controversial judgment in Achmea. This Article demonstrates that although the CJEU approached intra-EU BITs from the angle of federalism—where they are both redundant and illegitimate—the reality is that EU law does not provide for the kind of protection afforded by BITs. The paper gives both a positivist and a critical assessment of the Achmea ruling. It argues that the judgment should be construed in the context of the underlying facts and, hence, notwithstanding the CJEU's apparently anti-arbitration attitude, its holding is rather narrow. It gives an alternative theory on intra-EU BITs' fit in the EU internal market—based on European reality—showing that the complete invalidation of intra-EU BITs is flawed because the overlap between BITs and EU law is merely partial: BITs address a subject EU law does not. This Article's central argument is that intra-EU BITs accelerate the internal market and, hence, their suppression does not lead the European integration further, but holds it back. Finally, this Article argues that the prevailing pattern of investment protection is a global scheme that cannot be arrested through regional unilateralism as essayed by the CJEU.

Universal service has a pivotal role in market liberalization and competition on both sides of the Atlantic. It is central to the European thinking on markets and public service and is an inevitable element of market liberalization and sectoral competition rules. The universal service aims at preserving the public service in a competitive environment. The paper analyzes this cornerstone of the European thinking from a comparative and trans-sectoral perspective, demonstrating that the concept of universal services should be fundamentally re-conceptualized in EU electronic communications and energy regulation.

On 5 July 2012, the CJEU rendered a ruling in Erste/BCL on the temporal application of the Insolvency Regulation in Member States that joined the EU after the Regulation's initial entry into force on 31 May 2002 (new Member States).1 The uncertainties of interpretation concerned ‘cross-date’ proceedings; that is, when the insolvency proceeding was launched before the accession of the (new) Member State but after the Regulation's original entry into force (in the old Member States) and remained pending also after the accession. Taking into account that 44.4 per cent of the Member States joined the EU after the Insolvency Regulation's entry into force (12 out of 27 Member States),2 the ruling has an enormous practical and economic relevance, which will be refreshed following the accession of Croatia.3