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3 results

  • 14 - Suffering and Sympathy

  • from Part II - Aspects of Ethical Agency
  • Edited by James Laidlaw, University of Cambridge
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook for the Anthropology of Ethics
    Published online:
    11 May 2023
    Print publication:
    25 May 2023, pp 359-388

  • Summary

    Engaging two intertwined and yet competing literatures detailing moral aspects of suffering through the lenses of sympathy and empathy, this chapter examines the extent to which suffering (and responses to it) may be viewed as a condition of possibility for ethical/moral experience. While arguably distinctive responses to suffering that have unique ethical entailments, sympathy and empathy still share, however, a more primordial manifestation in pathos. Drawing upon insights from the phenomenological tradition, the chapter argues that pathic attunement is the generative, responsive ground from which sympathy and empathy arise. Moving beyond the either/or framework that often emerges in anthropological discussions of empathy and sympathy, a focus on pathos leads to a different way of envisioning suffering as a condition of possibility for moral experience. Without collapsing the ethical and political, pathos is thus a phenomenon through which recursive relationships between ethical, political, and ontological orientations to others becomes discernible and therefore analysable.

  • Chapter 23 - Anthropology of consciousness

  • from Part I - The cognitive science of consciousness
  • Edited by Philip David Zelazo, University of Toronto, Morris Moscovitch, University of Toronto, Evan Thompson, University of York
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    14 May 2007, pp -

  • Summary

    Empirical evidence shows that much of the functioning of our motor system occurs without awareness. It seems that consciousness can manifest itself at three stages: intention to perform an action, performance of intended action, and perception of the effects of performed action. This chapter reviews the evidence that suggests that many aspects of action, from initiation to appreciation of the percepts that guide them, occur without awareness. It argues that one aspect of an action that is normally available to awareness is the sensory consequence(s) of that action, or, more precisely, the prediction of the sensory consequences of that action. Action execution depends on one of the two visual systems. There is a sensorimotor or "how" system, which controls visually guided behavior without access to consciousness. The other is a cognitive or "what" system, which gives rise to perception and is used consciously in pattern recognition and normal visual experience.