The Human Rights Act incorporates Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights guaranteeing the right to freedom of thought. Yet, in the absence of any guidance from the European Court of Human Rights and in line with the UK’s legal traditions, the right is protected in a piecemeal fashion akin to liberty and non-interference rather than the positive obligatory rights-based approach. As such, this chapter considers whether the right to freedom of thought exists in the common law. Finding that it does exist but that there is no certainty on its content, scope, or application, it is argued that this does not prevent the courts from determining the right under the common law. Attention is given to legal jurists and philosophers, as well as certain historical developments, which have influenced the UK’s development and protection of the right. The right to freedom of thought, like speech, is the liberty to speak truth to power, to dissent, and to organise an alternative form of governance. Contemporary legislation appears to acknowledge the forum internum (the inner realm of the mind) as a subject necessitating protection, albeit, not under the label of human rights.

This chapter introduces the reader to the handbook with a particular focus on the methodology employed by contributors to the book. Drawing on the various contributions, the chapter presents a brief comparative overview of the right to freedom of thought before offering some reflections on the scope of the right.

The right to freedom of thought is guaranteed by Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, yet current jurisprudence interprets the right as a mere dimension of freedom of expression, also protected by Article 13. Contemporary neurotechnology research presents the possibility for human thoughts to be tracked, recorded, analysed and predicted. This applies pressure upon the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ current understanding of the right to freedom of thought. This chapter examines how Article 13 has been interpreted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights at different stages of its jurisprudence. It then argues for an evolution in the interpretation of Article 13 whereby the right to freedom of thought is understood as a distinct right, separate from freedom of expression.