This editorial critically examines the European Union’s rearmament agenda, framed by the Commission’s Readiness 2030 plan and the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation, in response to geopolitical threats and possible US disengagement. While EU leaders present military investment as essential for safeguarding the ‘European way of life’, the measures proposed reveal a deep disjunction between rhetoric and reality. The plan falls short of establishing genuine strategic autonomy, as NATO remains central and procurement from US industries is reinforced, undermining the claim of independence. Moreover, by relying primarily on national spending and only modest EU financial instruments, the initiative risks entrenching asymmetries between Member States, strengthening national military–industrial complexes rather than building a coordinated European defence framework. By the same token, the legal dimension is equally fraught: the selective use of (national) escape clauses in the Stability and Growth Pact and the reliance on Article 122 TFEU for SAFE highlight the EU’s increasing dependence on creative but legally precarious interpretations. Substantively, the rearmament effort may erode the European social model, as higher defence spending is likely to erode welfare and public investment. Ultimately, the project reflects continuity with past crises: lofty integrationist rhetoric coupled with measures that entrench fragmentation and fiscal imbalance.

This article pursues re-constructive and explanatory objectives which are embedded in a theoretical and normative agenda. The introduction specifies its beginnings including biographical notes. The following conceptual history of the law of the integration project distinguishes three stages in which three distinct varieties of economic constitutionalism have been pursued, which all remained defective when measured against the commitments to democracy, social justice, and the rule of law. These defects deepened in the managerial responses to the financial crisis of 2008. Throughout the article, a counter vision of conflicts-law constitutionalism is developed step by step. The final section of the article seeks a theoretical backing for this counter vision in Lisa Herzog’s theory of ‘democratic institutionalism’. The epilogue sketches out how the project will continue.

It is difficult to disentangle, in EU merger control, between issues of law (subject to full review by the EU courts) and complex economic assessments (controlled for manifest errors). This article discusses, and puts in context, the judgement of the Court of Justice in CK Telecoms. It explains why some of the interpretative choices made by the ECJ open the door to the transformation of the nature and intensity of judicial review in EU merger control. Where the meaning of an interpretation of a legal concept can only be figured out ex post (that is, after performing complex assessments), the control of administrative action may become, de facto, deferential and process-oriented (as opposed to substance-oriented). Leaving constitutional considerations aside, this shift would have the advantage of giving the European Commission the necessary policy space to test new doctrines and act nimbly in a changing economic and technological landscape. On the other hand, it may come at the expense of legal certainty and may not necessarily increase the quality of decision-making.

How has the European Union been integrated in the past? Legal academics have traditionally pointed to the Court of Justice and to the broader idea of an ‘integration-through-law’. Through its supranational jurisprudence, the Court – not the EU legislature – was thus placed at the centre of the European integration project. The underlying reasons for this dominance of constitutional ‘law’ over legislative ‘politics’ have thereby been the subject of three famous explanations: the ‘equilibrium theory’ (Weiler), the ‘asymmetry theory’ (Scharpf) and the ‘over-constitutionalisation theory’ (Grimm). What are the merits of these grand theories of European integration when measured against the historical record? This article hopes to explore this question in the context of the internal market. Its historical revision begins with an analysis of the respective spheres of normative and decisional supranationalism during and after a foundational period (Sections 2 and 3). This is followed by an examination of the meaning and significance of the Cassis de Dijon judgment in the late 1970s. Through this revolutionary case, a dialectical relationship between the EU Court (‘law’) and the EU legislator (‘politics’) emerges (Section 4) that ultimately leads to the spectacular rise of EU legislation (Section 5) after the SEA. This transformational relationship will provide the critical lens for a historical revaluation of the three grand theories of legal integration (Section 6).

The Digital Services Act (DSA) is a critical piece of the procedural puzzle of generating a safe social media environment. This article highlights how the DSA’s ambitious provisions regarding content moderation rely on psychological assumptions and inferences about behaviour, yet do so in the absence of extensive empirical behavioural evidence. The difference between how individuals are assumed to behave and evidence on how they actually behave is a crucial element in the complex landscape of effectively moderating content on social media. For this reason, the article sheds light on the value of behavioural research in understanding preferences, incentives and decisions, and the role of such information in interpreting and developing legal provisions. Specifically, through explaining the results of a novel experimental study designed with the DSA in mind, the article offers insights on certain decision-making processes, and how this evidence can steer away from unfounded suppositions to help interpret and apply the DSA against the reality of behaviour.

In this paper we identify and discuss three different strategies for taking up intersectionality in the space of European private law, ie, liberal ideal theories of social and private law justice, liberal nonideal theories of reparation, and private law abolition. While we caution for how intersectionality is taken up in the European space of private law, these strategies yield insights about how intersectionality may recast (European) private law’s role as a potential site to advance, or thwart, pursuits of justice. The three strategies imply (potentially radical) shifts in how legal scholars may understand private law justice. We suggest that (European) private law abolition might be the most promising starting point to think intersectionality’s significance for recasting dominant understandings of private law’s relation to (in)justice in the EU context.

Christian Joerges is a scholar whose work spills over the conventional boundaries between public and private law, social science and legal theory, law and public policy, empirical inquiry and normative philosophy. This essay brings into focus Joerges’s under-appreciated role as a prescient, critical intellectual biographer of European integration. It argues that Joerges’s work has helped to diagnose, explain, and dismantle three misconceptions or myths with which European integration has been saddled from its formative decades. These misconceptions are (1) that the European integration project is ‘self-legitimating’ and therefore politically neutral; (2) that the delegation of decision-making authority to supranational institutions is constitutionally neutral; and (3) that there can be an epistemologically neutral, authoritative disciplinary perspective from which to comprehend European integration. Breaking the hold of these misconceptions is an essential step towards gaining a critical understanding of the promises and limitations of European integration today.

The core of the contract between economic and monetary union is set in not so much the formally legal, if economically irrational and practically contentious, divide of the Treaties, but rather, the rules for governing the right balance of EMU are found in its economic governance framework, set up to condition national budgetary policies into optimal function in service of Union monetary policy. Within those rules we can differentiate two ‘worldviews’ of constitutionalism. The first we may refer to as ‘optimal function EMU’ where sovereigns are equal, democracies may pick their own socio-economic policy and make equally valid claims to be managed by the conflicts law approach of cooperation within the preventive arm of the European Semester based on Article 121 TFEU, and where we may pretend the economic-monetary divide erected by law is a real, tangible phenomenon. The alternative version of constitutionalism is found beyond ‘optimal function EMU’, in fact, as soon as any risk to the model arises. This worldview institutes a strict legal hierarchy that establishes monetary supremacy over the economic realm. Within this setup, the very existence and proper function of the single currency rationalise the ultimate truth – that all Member States are equal, but some are more equal than others. Can conflicts law constitutionalism offer a way to recalibrate unity and diversity in a format fit for the purposes of the contemporary financial and economic context, while simultaneously re-claiming the space for national collective choice and protecting Union values?

This article proposes a framework to understand questions of fairness in EU law. It builds on the scholarly literature on the meaning and scope of this concept, to then consider its relevance to legal orders and specifically the European Union’s. Having set out an umbrella definition of fairness as a legal principle, the article applies it to a specific example: namely, the system of border procedures introduced by the new asylum and migration pact. The objective of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it aims to provide a blueprint for discussing issues of fairness in the EU beyond a specific area of law and policy. Secondly, in concretely adapting that blueprint to the specificities of the ‘case study’ analysed in the paper, it sheds light on the degree of its (un)fairness.

The EU’s 2022 Digital Services Act (DSA) requires large online platforms to assess and mitigate risks to various vaguely-defined and contestable values, including fundamental rights; public health and security; civic discourse; and people’s mental and physical wellbeing. The scope of these provisions is thus incredibly broad and they have unsurprisingly attracted significant academic interest. So far, most scholarship has taken a broadly functionalist approach: it accepts the basic premise that certain social impacts of platforms constitute risks which must be managed, and evaluates the DSA’s capacity to achieve this ‘effectively’.

In contrast, this article aims to step back and critically reflect on the underlying conceptual and institutional framework of systemic risk management, based on an explicitly social constructionist understanding of risk as a technology of governance shaped by competing political agendas. Drawing on critical literature on risk regulation from various disciplines and regulatory fields, it identifies two key themes. First, discursively framing political problems as risks tends to exclude issues less amenable to the ‘risk’ framing; to privilege technocratic expertise; and to depoliticise distributive and ideological conflicts. Second, the DSA’s institutional approach to risk regulation delegates primary responsibility for identifying and managing risks to regulated companies, creating well-documented risks of capture. Overall, both themes point to similar conclusions: the systemic risk framework will be highly favourable to the interests of the powerful multinational corporations it seeks to regulate.

In conclusion, however, the article notes that platform regulation may pose distinctive challenges that are not well illuminated by scholarship on risk regulation in other fields – notably because of the widely-recognised possibilities for political abuse of more prescriptive regulation of online media. It suggests some avenues for further research into risk politics in the specific context of online media platforms, in particular drawing on scholarship on risk management in critical security studies.

Many legal scholars and practitioners consider the German judiciary to be a reliable and cooperative interlocutor of the Court of Justice. German judges refer more and more constructive references than their peers in other Member States – or so the prevailing narrative runs. The present study seeks to dispel and correct this image as reference champion. It identifies three challenges to the preliminary reference procedure in German courtrooms: a complex procedural framework restricting the discretion and obfuscating the duty to refer (1), a reluctant judiciary (2), and instrumental uses as a tool of judicial contestation (3). The study proceeds in four steps. Starting from a doctrinal perspective, it sketches the intricacies of the German procedural framework and analyses how it may obstruct preliminary references. Taking a quantitative perspective, it places German references in relation to other indicators, such as population size, incoming cases, or the number of judges. Under such a lens, Germany finds itself at the lower end of the spectrum. This reluctance can be traced back to a bundle of factors, such as judicial hierarchies, workload, or lack of knowledge and trust. Shifting to a qualitative perspective, the study then explores the instrumental uses of references as a tool of judicial contestation, both externally regarding the EU and internally regarding the German judicial architecture. The study concludes by focusing on a new actor in the reference game – the federal constitutional court. Its two senates have approached the preliminary reference procedure with diametrically opposed logics: the second senate underlines the power of the last, the first senate the potential of the first word. It remains to be seen whether the first senate will carry the day and herald – as a model for the entire German judiciary – a more cooperative future for the preliminary reference procedure.

This review essay forms a contribution to the Dialogue & Debate symposium on Christian Joerges’s volume Conflict and Transformation (Hart 2022). The specific angle of this article is an interdisciplinary one that conceives of Joerges’s work as a boundary-crossing exercise between law and the social sciences. Aspects highlighted are the inspiration that his work finds in responding to Europe’s vocation, or realising the latter’s normative potential; the law-in-context quality of the approach, which combines inside and outside perspectives on what the law is and does, how it motivates and what it means; and the two-pronged ambition to take the law seriously as a legitimating force and to question, at the same time, the power of economic ‘facts’ and arguments, which sometimes overrule what seems legitimate. Moreover, this article considers the relevance and implications of two intellectual influences on Joerges’s work, one a more formative one (Habermas) and one resonating with recent experiences of crisis (Polanyi), and it follows the journey of Joerges’s reconstructive approach within European studies: between integration theory, governance approaches, and rethinking democracy in postnational constellations. As Joerges himself concedes, the normative vision that this yielded for European law and politics was overtaken by actual developments in the context of the monetary union, and conflicts-law constitutionalism became more of a counterfactual appeal. This article outlines how the critical edge of this approach could be enhanced by taking perspectives from critical political economy on board, which would also facilitate countering economic arguments.

The article promotes a new methodological approach to examining the development of European law that significantly advances our understanding of European legal integration. Building on interdisciplinary debates on European law between historians, lawyers, and political and social scientists, the article argues for analysing European law by approaching a legal text from a bottom-up perspective. Our understanding of legal text includes all texts that jurists consider as legal and use in judicialised conflicts.

Examining how a range of actors have used legal text to shape conflicts instead of taking ‘integration’ (or lack thereof) as the ontological lens yields important new insights into the functioning of European law over time. The case studies in this special issue trialling our methodological approach show that, first, certain areas of European law come into view including non-discrimination, the environment, and human rights. Second, social actors in the Member States and beyond were from the beginning involved in co-creating these areas of law, which indicates that European legal integration has always been more than an elite-driven project. Third, actors have mobilised European law for various reasons, often not tied to ‘Europe’. They have used European law to translate a range of political issues into legal questions. Finally, legal knowledge and expertise – and lawyers – have been central to European integration even if this is not reduced to an understanding of the binary relationship between European institutions and the Member States.

Few issues remain as fraught as the relationship between European integration and national welfare states. For too long, Social Europe was an afterthought, relegated to the soft domain of the open method of coordination, while the formation of the single market proceeded with the full force of European law and institutions. Since the 2008 financial crisis, the social has returned—not just in Europe, but in all regions grappling with what comes after neo-liberalism. In this response, I turn to Christian Joerges’s seminal articulation of the conflict of laws as Europe’s constitutional form as a contribution to this current theoretical task. Central here has been how Joerges has staged a dialogue between theories of European law and the critique of the market order developed by the Hungarian philosopher and social theorist Karl Polanyi. I argue that Joerges picks up on democratic undercurrents in Polanyi’s theory that move beyond the opposition between nationally bounded welfare states and transnational private economic rights. Rather, we can see the social as a domain of multi-level democratic conflict mediation. While Joerges respects the ordoliberal vision of an economic constitution, he draws attention to their democratic deficits. Indeed, both the ordoliberals and Polanyi would reject the EU’s technocratic instrumentalisation of the market as a device for restructuring national social systems in a way that both deformalises European law and undermines its democratic legitimacy. I conclude with some speculative remarks about how the EU could be seen as introducing new dimensions of conflict into an emerging post-neoliberal order.

Over the last two decades, Marxism has experienced a significant revival, including in the discipline of law. The 2003 Iraq War and, perhaps more obviously, the 2008 financial crisis posed questions about the relationship between law, capitalism and imperialism that mainstream legal scholarship had difficulty answering. One marked exception to this revival has been in the field of European Union (EU) law. EU law scholarship, perhaps understandably given that few Member States participated in the invasion, had little to say about the Iraq War. For its part, the 2008 financial crisis and its manifestation in Europe as the ‘Euro-Crisis’ prompted a ‘critical turn’ in EU legal studies.1 However, these two movements – the Marxist tradition and critical EU law scholarship – have largely failed to meet. Marxist analyses of EU law, let alone the development of a full-blown Marxist theory of EU law, remain almost non-existent.

EU legal scholarship’s recent ‘turn towards society’ demands new approaches to studying how EU law has been experienced and shaped both at present and in the past. Yet, there has been relatively little research on the engagement of societal actors with European law beyond a narrow focus on litigation. This article looks at a more indirect engagement with legal norms. Using the contested compliance with the EC’s 1982 Seveso directive on industrial safety as a case study, it uncovers the pivotal role that individuals and societal organisations played in procedures that have thus far been considered highly institutionalised: the infringement proceedings started by the European Commission. By tracing how the problem of preparing for disaster came to be regarded by societal actors in Italy and the Netherlands as both a legal and a European problem, it advances an approach showcasing that societal actors experienced EU law less as a separate category and more as part of a broader continuum of solutions to a societal problem.

When the Treaty of Rome (the Treaty) was signed, the legal profession believed it had no impact on its organisation. Yet, from the very beginning, the Directorate General (DG) Internal Market started to work on a directive that would facilitate the circulation of lawyers within the European market. This article is based on the analysis of the 16-year debates leading up to the adoption of the 1977 Directive, which facilitate the effective exercise by lawyers of freedom to provide services. It adopts a bottom-up, actor-centered approach, to understand the role of lawyers and the importance of legal professions in the construction of the common market. Using archival study, interviews and legal analysis, the article shows that the integration of European legal professions cannot be understood without studying the historical structures of each national profession. Moreover, the rallying of lawyers to the European project can only be attributed to the active interpretative work of multipositioned actors.

Why should one expand Christian Joerges’s pioneering concept of ‘Europe’s conflicts-law constitution’? The European constitution should consistently incorporate the double plurality of Europe because, for centuries, Europe has been governed by two powerful pluralities that are orthogonal to each other, but at the same time closely interpenetrate each other. Europe’s material constitution is characterised not only by the conflicts between nation-state policies, but also by the deeper conflicts between different intrinsic normativities of societal institutions.

The European conflicts-law constitution should therefore not only realise the transnationalisation of the ‘political’ constitutions of the nation states and their underlying conflicts, but also a ‘societal’ constitution that inscribes itself into the conflicts of previously unconstitutional worlds of meaning. On the basis of this extension, Joerges’s ideas can be made fruitful beyond the conflicts-law constitution that he confined to the EU‘s political system. If their extension to sectoral constitutions of Europe is taken seriously, the three strategies, which Joerges developed for conflicts between nation states, are also promising for conflicts triggered by the diversity of functional systems. In three case constellations, the article outlines how Joerges’ methods can be successfully applied in the most recent European sectoral constitution – in ‘Europe’s digital constitution’.