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How Valuable Could a Material Object Be?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 July 2016

ANDREW M. BAILEY  and
JOSHUA RASMUSSEN
ANDREW M. BAILEY
Affiliation:
YALE-NUS COLLEGE, SINGAPOREwrathius@gmail.com
JOSHUA RASMUSSEN
Affiliation:
AZUSA PACIFIC UNIVERSITYjrasmussen@apu.edu
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Abstract:

Arguments for substance dualism—the theory that we are at least partly nonmaterial beings—abound. Many such arguments begin with our capacity to engage in conscious thought and end with dualism. Such are familiar. But there is another route to dualism. It begins with our moral value and ends with dualism. In this article, we develop and assess the prospects for this new style of argument. We show that, though one version of the argument does not succeed, there may yet be a deep problem for standard physical accounts of our nature.

Keywords

materialismsubstance dualismmetaphysicspersonal identitypersonal ontologyphilosophy of mind

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Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , Summer 2016 , pp. 332 - 343
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2016 

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