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Philosophy of the Precautionary Principle, Daniel Steel. Cambridge University Press, 2015, xv + 256 pages.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2016

Charlotte Werndl
Charlotte Werndl*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy (KGW), University of Salzburg, Franziskanergasse 1, 5020 Salzburg, Austria and Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. Email: charlotte.werndl@sbg.ac.at. URL: http://charlottewerndl.net.
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Economics & Philosophy , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 162 - 169
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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References

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