A traditional view holds that ignorance is simply the absence of knowledge. This view has recently been challenged by the Normative Account, which sees ignorance as involving a normative failure. In this paper, we argue that both perspectives capture important insights. Drawing on three empirical studies, we propose a two-senses account of ignorance, according to which there exist two notions of ignorance: one normative, the other non-normative. We also offer a new explanation of the normative aspect. Our findings suggest that what is negative in being ignorant lies in the expectation that one ought to know the relevant fact.

Value transparency is thought to promote trust in scientific expertise. Yet, transparency is a complex concept. I will argue that transparency requirements come with a varying extent of engagement: merely disclosing information, providing information that is publicly accessible, or having additional mechanisms for criticism in place. It is often not clear in which sense transparency requirements are to be understood in the context of trust in expertise. However, each sense can backfire in different ways. Merely talking about transparency in a general sense hides these possible trade-offs. This furthermore shows that requiring transparency may come with a greater regulatory force.

I offer a critique of the method of analysis employed in Carl-Johan Palmqvist’s article The Mirror Account of Hope and Fear when arguing against the co-variation thesis (CVT). I show that the analysis of CVT—which uses the notational convention of representing a hope as “p’ and its supposed corresponding fear as “¬p’—is problematic in that it potentially obscures the divergent propositional content of hopes and fears. As an antidote, I suggest representing the propositional content of hopes and fears with distinct placeholders p, q, and etc. and I show how this refinement in method allows us to make progress on the issue of co-variation.

Everyday understanding takes empathy to be not just emotional mirroring with a specific etiology, but also a form of feeling for, or on behalf of, another. This article proposes an analysis of that for-relation. The analysis begins with the phenomenon of acting on behalf, which is then used as a template for an analysis of generic on behalfness, applicable to both action and emotion. The key to the relation turns out to be an agent’s espousal of a target’s goal, in light of which the agent acquires reasons for acting or feeling.

Many views of moral agency include, implicitly or explicitly, a consciousness requirement—namely, the claim that phenomenal consciousness is a necessary condition of moral agency. This paper casts doubt on the consciousness requirement. I argue that consciousness is not necessary for instantiating four key capacities necessary for moral agency: action, moral concept possession, responsiveness to moral reasons, and moral understanding. I defend my picture of nonconscious moral agency as a plausible account of an entity that can act for moral reasons and can be morally responsible. Lastly, I discuss broader implications of my argument, especially on the possibility of artificial moral agency.