Shortly after a deadly aerial attack on Great Britain in 1917, Ethel Bilbrough, a forty-seven-year-old woman living in Kent, recorded her reactions in her diary: ‘the cowardly wickedness of such raids is almost incredible; to think of defenceless innocent women and children, and old men and boys being ruthlessly murdered and mutilated by these devils in the air is unspeakably horrible. But as someone said the other day, “There are no civilians now, we are all soldiers.”’1 This somewhat startling assertion – that civilians had somehow ceased to exist and that instead all inhabitants had acquired the status of military participants – would have been unimaginable without the transformative qualities of the First World War. The extent to which air power, in particular, as well as a range of other innovations, could shape Britain’s so-called home front into a war zone remains a crucial and often underestimated aspect of this war.

Known as enemies of all nations, pirates emerged out of a contest for New World resources and land amidst an increasingly lawless early modern Atlantic World. While Spanish treasure fleets faced attacks from brazen British privateers, such as Henry Morgan, piracy became commonplace by the start of the eighteenth century. Although some engaged in slaving and certainly embraced violence, many pirates established outlaw communities based on democratic ideals that would come to characterize the Enlightenment. By the Age of Revolution, instability and intermittent warfare allowed sea bandits such as the Laffite brothers to flourish once again during the War of American Independence and the Napoleonic Wars, especially in coastal enclaves like Louisiana and Texas and on smaller Caribbean islands such as Guadeloupe. The wars of independence in Spanish America likewise saw an upsurge in smuggling and privateering. As new nations began to curtail the licensing of these privateers, their numbers and significance waned by the 1830s.

This chapter investigates the weaponry available to both armies and navies of the Napoleonic wars and their improvement during the period. This was very much a period of improvement rather than an era seeing the introduction of radical new technologies in the fields of weaponry and tactics. However, by the greater use of industrial processes, it became possible to greatly increase the number of arms available and thus the size of the combatting forces it was possible to put into the field. The greatest improvements however were undoubtedly in the field of artillery, which were made more powerful with the improved quality of gunpowder, while the weight of artillery pieces was reduced significantly, allowing them to be far more manoeuvrable on the battlefield. This allowed them to begin the process of achieving the domination of the battlefield that was so obvious in the First World War.

Between 1914 and 1918 the United Kingdom equated to a ‘nation in arms’ for the first time in a century. Yet there were wide variations between nations, regions and localities. The national war effort concealed myriad national and local loyalties. National and local political, social, economic and cultural factors all impacted upon military participation both under voluntary enlistment prior to 1916 and conscription thereafter.

The concluding chapter examines the impact of the Napoleonic Wars on Europe. Between 1803 and 1815, Europe plunged into an abyss of destruction as thousands died in the blood-soaked fields of Germany and Russia and savage street fighting in ruined Spanish cities. While many in the ruling classes would continue to consider war as a glorious undertaking – even as one that could rejuvenate tired and corrupt societies – no longer did they see it as a normal, ordinary part of human existence that could be engaged in on a regular basis without enormous cost. The Congress of Vienna signaled this change by establishing mechanisms of cooperation (the ‘Concert of Europe’) to maintain the peace among the major powers, rather than assuming that the powers would themselves instinctively act to limit the extent and destructiveness of military conflict.

During the early stages of the Sino-Japanese war, which had erupted in July 1937, it quickly became apparent that the Chinese air force urgently required modern fighter aircraft which combined a high rate of climb with superior manoeuvrability.

The Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company (CAMCO), founded by American William Douglas Pawley, had assembled a series of Curtiss Hawk II and III fighter planes for the Chinese Nationalist government. Pawley was also president of Intercontinental Corporation, this company was sales representative for Curtiss-Wright in China during the second half of the 1930s. The strong ties between Pawley and Curtiss-Wright were the stepping stone for development of a new light weight fighter which would meet the demands of modern air war.

DEVELOPMENT

Work on this new fighter type started in the St. Louis branch of the Curtiss-Wright Company. The most important design philosophy was to employ a high power engine combined with an airframe as light and compact as possible. The design team, led by Willis Wells (project engineer) and George A. Page jr. (chief engineer), drafted a design which would evolve into the CW-21 fighter.

THE CURTISS-WRIGHT COMPANY

The Curtiss-Wright company was formed on 26 June 1929 when the Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Company merged with the Wright Aeronautical Corporation. The company was organised in an aircraft division (Curtiss) and a division constructing engines and propellers (Wright). The headquarters was located in New York City. During the years before the merger Curtiss had purchased the Keystone, Loening, Robertson, Travel Air and Moth companies, but these were all dissolved during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Production of some types were continued under the Curtiss-Wright company name at the St. Louis facilities – the former Robertson plant. Other businesses such as the Curtiss-Wright Flying service had to discontinue activities.

The completely redesigned CW-19R-12 advanced trainer, armed with two forward firing light machineguns. (Missouri historical society collection)

The new fighter shared some design elements first used in the CW-19L, which was originally designed by the Curtiss- Robertson company as CR-2 Coupe, before this company was absorbed in the Curtiss- Wright company. The CW-19L was introduced in 1935 and was intended as private aircraft featuring side by side seats and streamlined fixed landing gear, covered with trouser type fairings.

The period 1919–1935 was a difficult one for Armstrongs and Vickers. With the end of the war domestic and international demand collapsed, and the firms were left with significant excess armament capacity and mounting financial problems. Armstrongs and Vickers responded by diversifying into other businesses, but with limited success. The contraction of the market led the two armaments firms to merge. The Great Depression further eroded military spending and dashed hopes of expanding exports. In the early to mid-1930s three things happened simultaneously: the international situation deteriorated, arms control proceeded but did not solve international insecurity, and there was growing public ire about the past behavior of armament firms. The subsequent Royal Commission into the armament firms cast Vickers in a very negative light and the firms were threatened with nationalization, something neither the firms nor the government wanted. The intervention of Sir Maurice Hankey in defense of the firms proved vital in heading off nationalization. The interwar period was therefore an extended existential crisis for Armstrongs and Vickers.

Discusses the origins of the Armstrongs and Vickers firms and their shifts into armament production. In trying to make domestic sales Armstrongs and Vickers encountered three main challenges in dealing with the British Government. First, the primacy of laissez-faire ideology within the Government, especially in the Treasury and the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service. Second, the class prejudices of the southern elite dominating the British Government. The governing elite’s distain for trade made it difficult for armament firms to get any help, though the Admiralty and sometimes the War Office needed their products and so dealt with them. Third, departments such as the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service were disinclined to deal with trade, preferring to focus on high politics. In response, Armstrongs and Vickers developed strategies for the domestic and international markets: building and maintaining relationships with British elites, including through exchanging personnel with the government and supplying intelligence; building and maintaining relationships with foreign elites, including using agents for diplomacy, and bribes to facilitate sales; excluding competitors from the domestic market; if exclusion failed, then cooperating and colluding with other armament firms; diversifying when sales were scarce; providing finance to secure international sales; and innovating to generate sales.

This chapter examines the records of Armstrongs and Vickers in selling armaments in Asia over a century. As part of their foreign policy strategies, the firms built diplomatic relationships with states in the region– independent of the British Government– using their own agent-diplomats and reaped impressive rewards for their labors. At the start of the Armstrongs pioneered many gun and warship deals with China (aided by Sir Robert Hart) and Japan. Armstrongs created lasting relationships with key Chinese and Japanese government officials, hosting numerous delegations, and many of the firms’ management received state decorations for their services. The relationship between Armstrongs and China spanned more than six decades and survived several changes of regime. After Vickers moved into warship production just before the turn of the century, they also began to secure lucrative contracts in the region, sometimes competing with Armstrongs and sometimes allying with her. Business was interrupted by the Great War. Weapons ordered by Siam before the war were delivered afterwards. In the interwar period armament sales did not match their previous levels, though Vickers-Armstrongs vigorously pursued Chinese sales.