Most philosophers of mathematics try to show either that the sort of knowledge mathematicians have is similar to the sort of knowledge specialists in the empirical sciences have or that the kind of knowledge mathematicians have, although apparently about objects such as numbers, sets, and so on, isn't really about those sorts of things as well. Jody Azzouni argues that mathematical knowledge really is a special kind of knowledge with its own special means of gathering evidence. He analyses the linguistic pitfalls and misperceptions philosophers in this field are often prone to, and explores the misapplications of epistemic principles from the empirical sciences to the exact sciences. What emerges is a picture of mathematics both sensitive to mathematical practice, and to the ontological and epistemological issues that concern philosophers.
"Azzouni's book is a well-conceived and worthwhile contribution. ...it is altogether closely argued, and stimulates serious reflection." Canadian Philosophical Reviews
"Interesting, important and well worth reading." Mark Balaguer, Journal of Symbolic Logic
". . . this is a very interesting and stimulating book. . . I repeatedly return to it to study its ideas and arguments, and to test my own views against them" --Michael D. Resnik, Philosophia Mathematica
"Metaphysical Myths is written in an engaging style and contains a wealth of informative references . . . . the book is rich with arguments that will more than repay careful study." --Philosophical Books
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