Acts of God are not acts of God. They are sudden, unexpected, natural occurrences with a significant impact on human affairs. It is, therefore, not incoherent to contend, as I do, that autonomous agents are not individuals whose actions and decisions are self-directed. I hasten to add that this negative conclusion about autonomy is not just fallout from the rejection of the very project of theorizing about the self. It is rather a result which is forced on us by the convergence of a variety of considerations, including powerful intuitions about particular cases.

Taking etymology seriously, we begin, like everyone else, with the assumption that autonomy is self-direction and embark on a search for the difference between self and other. When William Blier, a member of David Koresh's cult, acquiesced in his own suicide, he was acting from motives, values, and beliefs that were inculcated from without in a way which made him a virtual paradigm of heteronomy. Although Blier's action was inspired by motives that were in a sense his, that were among other things accessible to him in the unique way any person knows her own mental states, we rightly hesitate to describe his behavior as self-directed. His submission to another person – Koresh – was as complete as is possible for a human creature.