The problem of epistemic justice concerns the optimal distribution of knowledge and power in society. The two main strategies for addressing the problem reflect two ways of understanding the slogan “knowledge is power”. One supposes that more knowledge helps concentrate power, the other that it helps distribute power. Analytic social epistemologists (see analytic social epistemology) adopt the former perspective, while Fuller's version adopts the latter. To be sure, knowledge involves both the expansion and contraction of possibilities for action. Knowledge expands the knower's own possibilities for action by contracting the possible actions of others. These “others” may range from fellow knowers to non-knowing natural and artificial entities, in so far as they are capable of impeding the knower's will. Moreover, the “others” may even be one's own future states, in which case “knowledge is power” refers to an agent's sphere of autonomy.

Such a broad understanding of “knowledge is power” encompasses the interests of all who have embraced it, including Plato, Bacon, Comte and Foucault. But differences arise over its normative spin: should the stress be placed on knowledge opening or closing the possibilities for action? If the former, then the range of people recognized as knowers is likely to be restricted; if the latter, then the range is likely to be extended. After all, my knowledge provides an advantage over you only if you do not already possess it. In that respect, knowledge is a positional good (see social capital versus public good).