Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Part I Contests and Contracts
- Part II Topics in Industrial Organization
- Part III Health as Human Capital
- Part IV Social Interactions and Development
- Part V Policy Session: What can Economics do for Racial Justice?
- Part VI Topics in Microeconomic Theory
- Index
- Econometric Society Monographs Series
- References
Part VI - Topics in Microeconomic Theory
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 November 2025
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Part I Contests and Contracts
- Part II Topics in Industrial Organization
- Part III Health as Human Capital
- Part IV Social Interactions and Development
- Part V Policy Session: What can Economics do for Racial Justice?
- Part VI Topics in Microeconomic Theory
- Index
- Econometric Society Monographs Series
- References
Summary
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- Chapter
- Information
- Advances in Economics and EconometricsTwelfth World Congress, pp. 303 - 304Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025
References
References
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