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Part I - Contests and Contracts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2025

Edited by
Victor Chernozhukov ,
Johannes Hörner ,
Eliana La Ferrara  and
Iván Werning
Victor Chernozhukov
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Johannes Hörner
Affiliation:
Yale University, Connecticut
Eliana La Ferrara
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Massachusetts
Iván Werning
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Advances in Economics and Econometrics
Twelfth World Congress
 , pp. 1 - 2
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

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Save book to Dropbox

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Save book to Google Drive

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