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141. - Parallelism

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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

The term ‘parallelism’ is used by commentators to describe Spinoza’s conception of relation between ideas and things, or between the modes of different attributes. It refers to E2p7, which establishes that “the order and connection of ideas is the same [idem est] as the order and connection of things.” The doctrine of parallelism, whose explicit paternity lies with Leibniz (Considerations on the Doctrine of a Universal Spirit, 122–23), is often presented as expressing Spinoza’s thinking, although it was imported retrospectively into his system, where, arguably, technically, it does not appear.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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References

Recommended Reading

Deleuze, G. (1990). Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Joughin, M.. Zone.Google Scholar
Della Rocca, M. (1993). Spinoza’s argument for the identity theory. Philosophical Review, 102(2), 183213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Della Rocca, M. (1996). Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gueroult, M. (1974). Spinoza, vol. ii: L’Ame (Éthique, 2). Aubier-Montaigne.Google Scholar
Hübner, K. (2019). Spinoza on intentionality, materialism, and mind-body relations. Philosophers’ Imprint, 19(43), 123.Google Scholar
Jaquet, C. (2018). Affects, Actions and Passions in Spinoza: The Unity of Body and Mind, trans. Reznichenko, T.. Edinburgh University Press.Google Scholar
Melamed, Y. (2013a). Spinoza’s Metaphysics of Thought: Parallelisms and the Multifaceted Structure of Ideas. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86(3), 636–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Melamed, Y. (2013b). Spinoza’s Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rice, L. C. (1999). Paradoxes of parallelism in Spinoza. Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly, 48, 3754.Google Scholar
Winkler, S. (2018). Parallelism and the idea of God in Spinoza’s system. Idealistic Studies, 48(2), 149–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yakira, E. (2014). Spinoza and the Case for Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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