Introduction

The Organizational Roots of New Parties

In recent decades, new political parties from both the left and right have regularly emerged again and again in democracies all over the world. While new parties arise frequently even in well-established democracies with allegedly 'frozen party systems' in Western Europe, they appear even more often in young democracies. At the same time, most of these new parties remain transient and disappear again quickly, and only very few manage to take root in society.

Yet if new parties are unable to take root, this raises serious problems for democratic representation and accountability. Political parties have been long acknowledged as some of "the most significant organizations in society" for democratic politics (Schattschneider 1942, 36). They serve several functions that are central to any democratic system: they aggregate and represent societal interests, mobilize voters, select candidates for political office, and form governments (e.g., see Downs 1957, 97; Katz and Mair 1995, 6; Kirchheimer 1966; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1976, 58). Different parties might emphasize one function over another, such as focusing on winning office rather than representing particular interests. However, for a party to fulfill any of these functions, it needs to establish itself within society and endure electorally and in voters' minds over time. Yet many new parties seem unable to accomplish this goal, particularly in new democracies, which are more likely to have unstable parties and the frequent entry of new parties (Mainwaring 1999, 3; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, 204; Tavits 2008b).

Contemporary new parties emerge in a very different context from earlier episodes of party formation, which might seem to prevent the development of new mass parties. In the past, for example, in the late

nineteenth-century Europe or early twentieth-century Latin America, the most successful mass-based parties routinely relied on major labor unions to mobilize voters (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Collier and Collier 1991; Przeworski and Sprague 1986). The decline in the membership and importance of such unions in most countries in recent decades makes them a less viable basis for the formation of new parties (Collier and Handlin 2009b; Levitsky 2003; Murillo 2001). At the same time, the rise of mass media and modern campaigning allow contemporary parties to eschew such organizations and 'speak directly' to voters. These trends have led many scholars to predict the demise of close voter–party ties and the end of mass parties (Katz and Mair 1995; Kirchheimer 1966; Panebianco 1988).

However, although most contemporary new parties fall into oblivion after one or two elections, some manage to establish stable ties with voters and win substantial electoral support in repeated elections. How do some new parties successfully take root in society, establish stable ties with voters, and successfully compete in elections over time, while others fail to do so? What explains the variation in their ability to create stable mass support? This book seeks to explain mass support for new parties by distinguishing between two closely related but conceptually separate dimensions of this outcome: new parties' ability to (1) secure electoral support and (2) build partisan attachments in the electorate.

While the stability of party identification,[1] the de-alignment away from traditional parties,[2] and, to a lesser extent, the drivers of the emergence of new parties have received considerable attention in the literature,[3] we do not yet have a good understanding of why some new parties are able to secure stable electoral support and build a partisan base while others are not. This study attempts to fill this gap. It explores the different paths that new parties can take to build mass support, which ultimately determines their long-term success or failure. In doing so, I seek to explain both how voters come to support new parties as a result of different mobilization strategies and how new parties choose their mobilization strategies in the first place.

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[1] For example, see Campbell et al. (1960), Cyr (2017), Green and Palmquist (1994), Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002), Miller and Shanks (1996), Pérez Bentancur Rodríguez, and Rosenblatt (2019), Rosenblatt (2018), and Schickler and Green (1997).

[2] For example, see Lupu (2014, 2016b), Mair, Müller, and Plasser (2004), Roberts (2014), and Seawright (2012).

[3] For example, see Arriola (2013), Bruhn (2012), Hale (2006), Hicken (2009), Kalyvas (1996), Kitschelt (1989), LeBas (2011), Levitsky et al. (2016), and Riedl (2014).

I study these issues in the context of the recent wave of party formation in Latin America. Following the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s/1990s, many traditional parties across the region were discredited, quickly lost electoral support and, in many cases, virtually disappeared.[4] In the most extreme cases, this crisis of representation culminated in the complete collapse of the party systems, as occurred in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. Elsewhere, some established parties have survived, but the disruption of the party system led to the collapse of one or more major parties, as happened in Argentina, or caused longstanding dominant parties, such as Mexico's Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), to lose their hold on power.[5] This rupture in party systems across the region, which left many voters without attachments to any political party, coincided with a major wave of party formation.

The new parties that are part of this recent episode of party formation vary greatly in their capacity to secure stable electoral support, their ability to establish stable ties with voters, the strength of their party organizations, and their potential to effectively link society and the state. Some of these new parties, such as Bolivia's Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) or Brazil's Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), resemble traditional "mass integration" parties (Kirchheimer 1966, 184) with enduring ties to voters, as indicated by stable rates of voter identification and lower levels of electoral volatility. Other parties with a similar platform, such as Ecuador's Alianza Patria Altiva i Soberana (Alianza PAIS), failed to establish stable ties with voters.

I investigate the trajectories of major new parties during this episode of party formation by comparing the types of linkages new parties forge with voters using different mobilization strategies. Much of the recent literature has concentrated on parties' *direct appeals*, made through speeches or advertisements spread through mass media, to attract voters through issue- or identity-based platforms or personalistic appeals. In this study, I consider different types of direct appeals and explore *organizationally mediated* strategies, that is, appeals that engage voters through societal organizations. I argue that organizationally mediated strategies can secure electoral support particularly effectively and yield durable voter ties by socializing organization members into identifying with the party.

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[4] For explanations of the demise of traditional parties, see Dietz and Myers (2007), Lupu (2014), Morgan (2011), Roberts (2014), and Seawright (2012).

[5] For explanations of the decline of the PRI as a dominant party, see Greene (2007) and Magaloni (2006).

At first glance, one might expect voter mobilization through societal organizations to be less relevant and effective in the modern age of campaigning because mass media allow parties and candidates to 'speak directly' to voters. However, in a seemingly ever more complex world in which citizens are bombarded with information through numerous mass media, high-entitativity groups, such as societal organizations,[6] become *more* – not less – relevant for their members because they help reduce uncertainty about the social world (Hogg 2000, 2001, 2004).

Even though civil society organizations' mediating role has been largely overlooked with the decline of labor unions and the rise of mass media, I show that more recent types of organizations – such as indigenous organizations, neighborhood associations, and informal sector unions – play immensely important mediating roles in democratic societies today. Such organizations, formed around fundamental political group identities or interests, play crucial roles in the everyday lives of large segments of the population in many young democracies. Members usually have very immediate, regular face-to-face contact with these organizations (usually at the local level). Furthermore, in a seemingly ever more complex world in which citizens are flooded with information through mass media, such organizations represent a crucial source of guidance for their members and others in their wider social networks. While prior research has examined the formation of these organizations and their role in politicizing class and ethnic identities, little attention has been paid to the various ways in which different types of party–organization linkages might influence vote choice and the emergence of partisanship.

My argument proceeds in two steps. I first explore why new parties adopt different mobilization strategies: the primary use of direct appeals to voters versus the additional use of organizationally mediated strategies. All contemporary parties will, at least to some extent, directly communicate substantive/programmatic and/or descriptive appeals to voters through, for example, speeches or advertisements spread through mass media. However, while some parties rely primarily (or exclusively) on such *direct appeals*, other new parties also heavily invest in organizational structures, that is, they develop linkages with societal

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[6] Societal organizations can be characterized as high-entitativity groups, that is, groups that exhibit relatively "clear boundaries, internal homogeneity, clear internal structure, and common fate" (Hogg 2005, 211; see also, Campbell 1958; Hamilton and Sherman 1996; Hogg 2004).

organizations or build proper party branches, and use *organizationally mediated strategies*, that is, appeals that build ties to voters through societal organizations.

In this context, I focus on the period before a new party contests its first major election to show how the intraelite dynamics during these *founding moments* influence which mobilization strategies the party adopts. Two features of this period – one internal to the new party, and the other external to it – are key: (1) the cohesion of the coalition of party leaders and organizational allies and (2) the credibility of other attractive parties in the party system. These factors have long-lasting consequences for party–organization relationships. They shape early on whether a party–organization tie becomes institutionalized by adopting routinized rules and mechanisms that govern how candidates will be selected and factional disagreements will be settled. Whether party–organization ties become institutionalized in turn establishes whether a new party can rely on organizationally mediated strategies or is restricted to employing direct appeals. Furthermore, the institutionalization of a linkage can provide the basis for different types of organizationally mediated strategies and resulting party structures, depending on the structure and resources of the organizational allies.

In a second step, I explore how voters come to support new parties. I compare the electoral support and partisanship that develop in response to the various party mobilization strategies. I show that organizationally mediated appeals can help parties obtain electoral support more effectively than most types of direct appeals. Furthermore, I present evidence that mediated appeals also yield durable voter–party ties by socializing organization members and people in their social networks to identify with the party. Drawing on social identity and self-categorization theory, I contend that societal organizations – which serve as highly salient, immediate reference groups to their members – provide social spaces in which socialization into new parties can occur, if the organization repeatedly expresses its support for a party.

The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. The first section defines and conceptualizes new political parties and mass support. The second section discusses key prior research on mass support for new parties. The third section explores the mediating role played by societal organizations, and the fourth section presents the study's main argument and theoretical contributions. The last section reviews the new parties selected for study and outlines the evidence presented in the subsequent chapters.

This study investigates why some new parties are able to take root in society, establish stable ties with voters, and successfully compete in elections over time, while others fail to do so. In doing so, it explores various paths that new parties can take to build mass support, which ultimately determines their long-term success or failure. Therefore, it seeks to explain mass support for new parties. I distinguish between two closely related but conceptually separate dimensions of this outcome: new parties' ability to (1) secure electoral support and (2) build partisan attachments in the electorate.

Definitions

NEW POLITICAL PARTIES It is important to clearly define what constitutes a new party. Building on Sartori's canonical definition (Sartori 1976, 63), I define a party as a political group identified by an official label that presents candidates for election to public office.[7]

Parties often also serve many other functions that are crucial to democratic representation (Downs 1957, 97; Katz and Mair 1995, 6; Kirchheimer 1966; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1976, 58), but this minimal definition seems most appropriate because it does not include normative notions about what parties *ought* to do; it only assumes they have electoral ambitions. This criterion is necessary because parties in democratic regimes must attempt to place candidates in public office before they can pursue any other goal.[8] Furthermore, this definition is helpful because it looks past the (usually self-chosen) label 'party' to consider the functional role of such groups within the political system. For example, most parties that were founded in Latin America in recent years have eschewed the label 'party' and instead called themselves 'movements' to distinguish themselves from traditional parties. While some of these grew out of social movements, many of them resemble elite or cadre parties and have no ties to any mass movements. While the relationship between a new party and social movements is very important, it should be empirically investigated rather than determined based on a group's self-chosen label.

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[7] Satori defines parties as "any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), candidates for public office" (1976, 63).

[8] Even a niche party that might only aim to raise awareness of an issue (rather than attain elected office) would still need to put forward candidates and campaign in elections in order to do this.

Based on this definition of parties, determining what constitutes a new party at first appears to be straightforward; yet given the various forms in which parties can come to be, it is not immediately obvious what should be considered 'new.' I propose a definition of new parties that combines characteristics of a party-in-the-electorate with those of a party-in-government (Key 1942). It is based on two criteria.

First, building on Barnea and Rahat's threshold-based definition, I consider a new label or name to be a necessary criterion. As they point out, "(i)f the main activity of the party is to seek office by competing in elections, then its identity in the competition, the banner that makes the office-seekers a 'team', that is, the party label, must be 'new'" (2010, 311). While they "consider a party label to be new if it was not used in the election preceding the one in question" (311), I propose a slightly more restrictive definition that accounts for the fact that parties might occasionally 'boycott' an election, especially in new democracies. Therefore, I understand a party label to be new if it was not used in either of the last two previous national elections.

Second, I consider "the newness of the candidates competing under the label" to exclude merely relabeled parties (311). However, I relax Barnea and Rahat's threshold for this criterion. They require that "at least a majority" of "the candidates and representatives of the office-seeking/office-holding team ... must be new ..., i.e. must not originate from one party" (2010, 311). While this threshold might be adequate in many party systems, I believe it is too high in posttransition contexts, where many (if not most) members of the political elite might have been previously associated with a dominant party. Therefore, I deem a party to satisfy the 'newness of candidates' criterion if at least a quarter of its national-level candidates and representatives are new, that is, originated from different parties or from no party at all. Therefore, 'pure' splinter parties, that is, those consisting only of candidates and representatives who split off from an established party and simply renamed themselves, do not meet this criterion. However, parties that include both a splinter group from an established party and other outside candidates and representatives who were not previously part of the same party would satisfy this criterion.

Building on these two criteria, I consider a party to be new if (1) it employs a party label that was not used in either of the last two previous national elections and (2) some of its national-level candidates and representatives originated from different parties or from no party at all.

MASS SUPPORT As stated above, we can distinguish between two closely related but conceptually separate dimensions of mass support: a party's ability to (1) secure electoral support and (2) build partisan attachments in the electorate. The first dimension is fairly straightforward: electoral support refers to which party (or parties) voters vote for in a given election. Within this dimension, I consider both voters' *past vote choice*, whether they voted for the party and its candidates, and *vote intention*, whether they intend to vote for them in a future election.[9]

The second dimension, partisan attachments, might require a little more explanation.[10] Drawing on the canonical definition presented by Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, I use the term party identification to "characterize the individual's affective orientation to … [a party] in his environment" (1960, 121). As they point out, "[o]nly in the exceptional case does the sense of individual attachment to party reflect a formal membership or an active connection with a party apparatus. Nor does it simply denote a voting record … Generally this tie is *a psychological identification*" (Campbell et al. 1960, 121; emphasis added). Building on this understanding of party identification, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler maintain that "party identification is a genuine form of social identification … [and that] [c]itizens have an enduring sense of what sorts of people belong to various parties and whether they identify with these social groups" (2002, ix). Party identification can thus be viewed as a genuine social identity that can become independent and disconnected from other social identities. For example, whereas a voter's class or ethnic identity might have shaped which party she identifies with years ago, this party identification can persist even if the other identities change over time. For decades, scholars have pointed out that party identification "raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation" (Campbell et al. 1960, 133).

1.2 EXPLAINING MASS SUPPORT

1.2.1 Explanations of Electoral Support

Most recent studies have explained success in securing electoral support in terms of different types of direct appeals, although a rich,

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[9] I primarily consider elections at the national and regional/state levels. I exclude local elections since, in many systems, independent candidates are more common at the local level and local issues and idiosyncrasies often determine vote choice.

[10] I use the terms 'partisan attachment,' 'partisan identity,' 'party identification,' and 'partisanship' interchangeably.

older literature explores the role of organizational mediation in creating electoral support. In this context, parties and candidates are understood to appeal directly to voters (e.g., through speeches or advertisements spread through mass media) and attract them through issue- or identity-based platforms or by making selective material promises. According to this understanding, success in securing electoral support primarily hinges on the types of direct appeals made – and how credible they are.

First, a significant strand of the literature emphasizes the importance of direct programmatic or issue-based appeals in explaining vote choice. These studies assume that parties appeal directly to the electorate through programmatic or issue-based platforms, and citizens choose who to vote for by determining which issue proposals most closely match their policy preferences. Spatial voting models in the tradition of Anthony Downs assume that voters make these decisions by choosing the party or candidate with a platform closest to their ideological ideal point (Downs 1957). As Achen and Bartels point out, "(s)ubsequent work has elaborated the canonical spatial model in a variety of important ways – for example, by allowing for probabilistic voting behavior, nonspatial 'valence' factors such as charisma and incumbency, parties motivated ... [not only by] office seeking, constraints on parties' platforms (for example, due to historical legacies), and uncertainty in voters' perceptions of parties' platforms" (2016, 25).

While spatial voting models remain prominent in political science, a mounting body of evidence from both developed and developing countries raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of issue-based appeals and the adequacy of such accounts of vote choice. As Achen and Bartels succinctly summarize, "voters, even the most informed voters, typically make choices not on the basis of policy preferences or ideology" (2016, 4).

A second strand of the literature emphasizes the importance of personalistic or charismatic appeals. Going back at least to Max Weber's ideal type of charismatic authority (Weber 1922, 124ff.), the discipline has recognized the importance of strong leadership and the influence that personalistic appeals might have over voters. More recently, the vast literature on neopopulism has emphasized the importance of charismatic appeals (e.g., see Barr 2003; Ellner 2003; Roberts 2016; Torre 1999; Weyland 1996).

Most electorally successful new parties – in Latin America as well as in historic Western European democracies – have charismatic figures looming large at the head of the party (e.g., as the party's president or candidate for president or prime minister). While it is tempting

to attribute much of the parties' appeal to such figures, many new parties that fail to gather substantial electoral support (or lose it after a short period of time) also have strong charismatic leaders. It is not that charismatic appeals do not influence voters, but rather that such explanations are severely underspecified. While we might have come to think of longstanding parties such as Argentina's Peronists or the German Social Democrats as quintessential mass parties, it is important to remember that many of their founders, such as Perón, Lassalle, and Bebel, displayed strong personalist and charismatic leadership styles at the time (Collier and Collier 1991; Guttsman 1981). Yet most of them also invested in building the party by mobilizing societal organizations. Therefore, it is necessary to look beyond the role of personalist and charismatic leadership to systematically compare various cases of new parties with strong charismatic leaders.

Third, identity-based, descriptive appeals constitute another important way in which parties can try to mobilize voters. Voters might favor candidates who "embody" a shared, often ascriptive, social identity (descriptive representation). For example, they might prefer candidates who share their ethnic or class background. This would allow parties to directly appeal to voters by choosing certain types of candidates (e.g., of a certain ethnic background) and/or selectively signaling candidates' background characteristics (e.g., see Chandra 2004).

In this context, prior research has paid particular attention to ethnic appeals. Across new democracies – and even in Latin America, where ethnic voting was not viewed as an important factor during earlier democratic episodes – appeals based on ethnic identities and interests are viewed as highly salient and have been linked to the stability of electoral support (Chandra 2004; Ferree 2006, 3; Horowitz 1985; Madrid 2005, 1, 2012; Van Cott 2000, 156). According to these accounts, direct ethnic appeals can generate electoral stability in new democracies because ethnicity can serve as a salient cue for voters (Birnir 2001, 219). These approaches share the assumption that voter preferences are primarily determined by an individual's ethnic identity. If this is the case, parties that consistently appeal to voters based on individuals' ethnic identities should enjoy more stable support over time.

Yet there are numerous open questions about this seemingly plausible argument that call into question whether prior studies have been too quick to assume that indigenous voters make their vote choice primarily based on their ethnic identity. Beyond the severe measurement issues that many of these studies suffer from, the debate on how social identities

influence party system stability in Latin America features four significant flaws. First, many studies simply assume or assert that indigenous voters make their vote choice based on their ethnic identity without convincingly testing this claim. On the one hand, the Bolivian case might seem to provide some support for this claim, given that the MAS has made extensive indigenous appeals and has received very stable support over the last two decades. On the other hand, this assumption becomes problematic considering that census and survey data indicate a steep decline in voter self-identification as indigenous during the same time period.

Second, there is a large overlap between ethnic and class cleavages in many parts of Latin America, and many parties such as the MAS that make ethnic appeals also routinely employ class appeals. Therefore, a convincing analysis of ethnic voting must take voters' class backgrounds and the role of class appeals into account. Ideally, research should aim to isolate the individual effects of ethnic and class appeals on vote preferences. Third, prior studies do not fully appreciate the varied roles of interest organizations representing these social identities. Fourth, while many parties in Latin America have tried to appeal based on ethnic and class-based identities, the tremendous variation in the success of such strategies has been understudied.

Class-based appeals constitute another type of direct appeal that has received particular attention in the literature (Evans 2000, 401; Korpi 1983; Lipset 1960, 220–224). Whereas in many Latin American countries, a class cleavage is thought to be reproduced in elite opinions and attitudes (Rosas 2010, 70), many scholars maintain that most "Latin American party systems have not been frozen by the political organization of class cleavages as in post-1920s Europe" (Roberts and Wibbels 1999, 576; see also Rosas 2010, 70). However, several recent studies have suggested an advent of class voting in multiple Latin American countries (Handlin 2012, 142, 2013; Hellinger 2005). Furthermore, as discussed in the previous paragraph, there is tremendous overlap between ethnic and class cleavages in many parts of Latin America, and several parties employ appeals based on both ethnicity and class. Therefore, it is analytically crucial to try to isolate the individual effects of ethnic and class appeals on vote preferences.

Beyond these different types of direct appeals, clientelist linkages are another means of securing electoral support that has received considerable scholarly attention (e.g., see Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013). Clientelist appeals rely on the promise of "direct, personal, and typically material side payments" in exchange for

voters' support of a specific party or candidate (Kitschelt 2000, 849). While clientelist mobilization, especially in the form of vote and turnout buying, certainly plays an important role in securing turnout and swaying voters in elections in many developing countries (Nichter 2008), this strategy is much less important for new parties, unless they are founded from within the state. In fact, unlike in the past, the most recent episode of party formation in Latin America has been much less state driven, as the creation of new parties predates their leaders' election to major political office (Venezuela's Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela is a major exception to this trend). Most of these parties could be characterized as externally mobilized, that is, "parties founded by outsiders" (Shefter 1977, 411). Such parties do not "enjoy access to a pool of resources out of which patronage can be generated if it is to distribute patronage to its supporters" (411) and are thus "compelled to rely upon other means to acquire a following" (415). This is not to say that new parties never employ clientelist mobilization, but that such a strategy is less viable for them than for incumbent parties and that it would complement other strategies. To the extent that new parties nevertheless rely on clientelism, such mobilization could occur directly or be mediated through organizations (Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015).

1.2.2 Explanations of Partisan Attachments

Despite longstanding research on partisan attachments, the theoretical micro-foundations of establishing attachments to new parties are not well understood. Though scholars have long studied the "origins and the 'freezing' of different types of party systems" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 3; see also, Bartolini and Mair 1990; Collier and Collier 1991), we still know surprisingly little about how voters come to identify with new parties – or even how they emerge. This issue is especially relevant for younger or less institutionalized democracies, where the appearance of new parties is particularly common. At the same time, the formation of partisan attachments is often viewed as a sign of democratic consolidation (Achen and Bartels 2016, 233; see also Barnes, McDonough, and López Pina 1985; Brader and Tucker 2001; Lupu and Stokes 2010; Rosenblatt 2018). Therefore, new party systems in new democracies or after dramatic party system changes present a unique opportunity to study "the Big Bang of party birth ... when it happens, not decades afterward" (Holmberg 2007, 565).

The traditional view expressed in *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960) is that "party identification in essence is a non-political attitude formed mainly by socialization during childhood and adolescence (and that) … (t)hereafter party identification is supposed to be immune to politics and economic change, except under really rare circumstances when a realignment can occur" (Holmberg 2007, 562–563). While socialization during childhood and adolescence might explain the stability of party identification once established due to inter-generational transmission, it cannot explain the creation of new attachments for the "first generation" of voters to new parties. And while the literature on voter realignment in the US has convincingly established the long-term effects of generational replacements (Miller and Shanks 1996, 161–163), the debate on short-term realignments appears to be undertheorized, pointing to vague "conditions of pervasive change in the social or political context" and focusing on the role of individual leaders (184). While changes in the broader political environment and party leaders are certainly important for explaining voter realignment, these factors are theoretically underspecified.

Recent innovative studies have begun investigating these issues. The recent volume edited by Levitsky et al. (2016), for example, presents an important contribution to our understanding of the emergence of new parties, or rather the scarcity of successful new parties. Levitsky et al. emphasize that new parties must "cultivate strong partisan identities" (2016, 10) and demonstrate how intense conflict, such as civil war or authoritarian repression, can facilitate party-building. Related, Rosenblatt emphasizes the role of collective trauma in prompting loyalty among activists in voluntary organizations (2018).

Further elaborating on the development of strong partisan identities (Lupu 2014, 2016b), Lupu highlights the importance of parties' "ability to develop a strong and broad-based party brand" (2016a, 77). He goes on to explain that "(w)hen parties offer a demonstrably consistent brand that appeals to a substantial swath of the electorate, voters attracted to that brand are more likely to form lasting attachments" (2016a, 78). While a stable, consistent programmatic party brand might be a necessary condition for the development of partisan attachments, it is likely to be insufficient. Furthermore, given the mounting evidence that voters rarely pay close attention to programmatic appeals, other potential avenues through which voters can develop partisan attachments need to be further explored.

Analyzing the emergence of mass partisanship in Russia, Brader and Tucker emphasize the importance of political experience and characterize partisanship as "something that forms and strengthens over a period of years, rather than as something that springs fully formed from nothing" (Brader and Tucker 2001, 70). While it makes sense that partisanship, like any other deep-seated social identity, takes time to develop, it is unclear why some parties are better and quicker than others at creating partisan attachments.

Further exploring this issue, Samuels analyzes differences in partisanship across Brazilian parties and attributes those differences to "the connections between party recruitment activity, individual motivation to acquire political knowledge, and individual engagement in highly politicized social networks" (Samuels 2006, 2). In a similar vein, Samuels and Zucco explore the 'crafting' of partisan attachments to the PT in Brazil and show that local party presence and civil society density are associated with vote support and partisan attachments (Samuels and Zucco 2015).

My study builds on past work that examines the link between civil society mobilization and partisanship. I focus more directly on *organizational structure* – the structure of social organizations and how they relate to parties. In doing so, I investigate how civil society support translates into partisan attachments, and explain why we observe considerable variation across countries with similar levels of civil society density. Furthermore, this analysis considers other types of strategies often used by new parties, assesses other important cases beyond the PT, and explores the micro-foundations of a theory of mass support.

In doing so, this book also directly builds other recent research on the organizational structure of parties, particularly in Latin America. For example, this study expands on the typology of parties put forward by Luna, Piñeiro Rodríguez, Rosenblatt, and Vommaro that emphasizes "horizontal coordination of ambitious politicians, and vertical aggregation to electorally mobilize collective interests and to intermediate and channel collective demands" (2022, 3). My study expands on their work by elucidating different ways in which vertical aggregation can occur – through direct and organizationally mediated strategies – and how these two types of mobilization strategies result in different levels of mass support. Furthermore, the argument developed in this book explores how institutions for horizontal coordination are shaped by critical experiences during parties' founding moments. Moreover, it connects to research by Anria on the key role that societal organizations can play in counteracting trends toward top-down control and oligarchic tendencies within

parties (2019) and its expands on it at least two ways. First, it examines why party–organization linkages become institutionalized for some organizations (and for some parties) but remain instrumental in other cases.[11] Second, it investigates the how parties' mobilization strategies – and their ability to secure electoral support and create mass partisanship – are shaped by their linkages with societal organizations.

1.3 THE MEDIATING ROLE OF SOCIETAL ORGANIZATIONS

As discussed earlier, many recent studies have explained parties' success in securing electoral support in terms of different types of direct appeals. Many of these accounts treat voters as atomized citizens and consider social identities and groups to be relevant only to the extent that they shape voters' individual preferences over policies or types of candidates. As Achen and Bartels lamented, "[g]roups were implicitly moved offstage; the structure of civil society disappeared from view" in the political science literature (2016, 225).

I propose a theoretical framework that goes beyond direct appeals and reexamines the mediating role that *societal organizations* can play in securing electoral support and creating partisan attachments. Locally organized, participant-based civic associations organized around a broad range of political identities and interests can play a crucial role in mediating parties' appeals to voters. Unlike professionalized (primarily nationally focused) interest groups or international nongovernmental organizations, societal organizations feature regular personal interactions between local leaders and their members. Through this local embeddedness, societal organizations such as indigenous movements, neighborhood associations, and informal sector unions can play a crucial role in connecting new parties to voters within the organizations' distinct social milieus.

While societal organizations – specifically labor unions – are usually thought to have played a crucial role in mobilizing votes and creating lasting identities among voters in earlier episodes of party formation (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Collier and Collier 1991; Przeworski and Sprague 1986), it is unclear what role such organizations now play in the founding

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[11] Even in the case of movement-based parties that are "founded *directly* by movements" (Anria 2019, 9), such as the MAS, the group of organizational allies often include numerous organizations that were *not* part of initial efforts to found the party, raising the question why the linkages to some of those organizations still become institutionalized, while they remain instrumental in other instances.

of new parties. Given the decline in labor unions' ability to represent and mobilize large parts of the electorate in many countries and the rise of new types of societal organizations, the mediating role that civil society organizations can play appears to have been largely forgotten. Purported organizational and structural differences between traditional and contemporary societal organizations have made many scholars rather pessimistic about their mobilizational and representational capacity.[12]

By revisiting the longstanding puzzle of how organized, politicized interests and identities are translated into mass support for political parties, this project builds on social cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). However, while much of this earlier work portrays the translation of politicized interests and identities into partisan support as an almost automatic response, I explicitly focus on the various ways in which organized interests can be linked to parties – and how these linkages shape support for those parties and foster the development of partisan identities. I use this approach to specify and test the micro-foundations through which interests and identities are translated into partisan support.

In the next section I develop the idea that new types of organizations that were largely excluded from corporatist ties with traditional parties in the past now play crucial roles in democratic societies by influencing vote choice and the emergence of partisanship.

1.3.1 Societal Organizations

Societal organizations formed around fundamental political group identities and interests are ubiquitous in democratic societies (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Whether they are understood as interest groups or social movements, organizations rooted in, for example, ethnic, class, or religious identities are immediately relevant to their members and often define where "one's fate and fortune lies" (Berger 1981, 12). I consider *societal organizations* to include all participant-based civic associations, interest groups, and social movement organizations based on fundamental political group identities or interests that are organized at least locally (and potentially regionally or nationally as well) and hold regular "in-person" meetings.

Depending on the salient cleavages and other political identities in a given society, these societal organizations can take various forms: some might be characterized as primarily classist (such as labor unions,

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[12] See Collier and Handlin (2009b) for a comprehensive overview of this literature.

employer associations, and informal sector unions), and others as primarily ethnic (such as some indigenous organizations). Yet others span these divides (such as the *cocaleros* in Bolivia) or take the form of "local programmatic associations" (such as neighborhood associations) (Davies and Falleti 2017, 1707). Regardless of the identities and/or interests at their core, such organizations can "provide a mechanism through which citizens who have a *shared attitude* or a *shared interest* can come together and channel their collective resources into political action" (Thomas 2001, 7).

While broader social groups that are not organized as local, participant-based civic associations might also offer relevant social categorizations to their members, such groups usually exhibit a lower entitativity – or feeling of "group-ness" – due to a lack of clear internal structure, more diffuse boundaries, less internal homogeneity, and lower levels of common fate (Hogg 2000, 2001, 2004). Thus, membership in societal organizations should confer particularly psychologically salient social categorizations on their members.

While comparable cross-national data on membership in societal organizations is limited, such affiliations appear to be extremely widespread in democracies (and semi-democracies) around the world.[13] According to data from the World Values Survey (Haerpfer et al. 2020), on average, about one-third of citizens in democratic and anocratic regimes belong to at least one association that could be classified as a societal organization (see Table 1.1). If we also include religious organizations, which in some contexts play a similar, highly political role, 54 percent of citizens indicate that they belong to at least one organization.

Through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, labor unions were arguably the most widespread and politically relevant type of societal organizations. As Collier and Handlin point out, "(t)hey were not the only popular-sector organizations, but they were politically privileged both by their own resources and capacity to undertake collective

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[13] Most regional and cross-regional surveys ask very few (if any) questions about citizens' involvement in social organizations. In fact, many surveys have stopped asking about fundamental types of organizations, such as labor unions, altogether (Poertner, Garay, and Palmer-Rubin 2022). The World Values Survey still asks about membership in a series of organizations, such as labor unions, environmental organizations, professional associations, and mutual aid groups. While additional information on the frequency of participation in local meetings is not available, many of these organizations could probably be classified as societal organizations, especially in the developing country context.

TABLE 1.1 *Membership in societal organizations across the globe*

Country	Member in at least one organization (%)
Argentina	12
Australia	46
Bolivia	47
Brazil	24
Chile	25
Colombia	45
Cyprus	31
Ecuador	34
Ethiopia	41
Germany	31
Greece	12
Guatemala	39
Indonesia	50
Iraq	28
Japan	19
Kyrgyzstan	16
Lebanon	10
Malaysia	49
Mexico	28
New Zealand	50
Nicaragua	37
Nigeria	51
Pakistan	41
Peru	18
Romania	16
Russia	13
Serbia	19
South Korea	26
Taiwan	44
The Philippines	34
The United States	49
Tunisia	12
Zimbabwe	45

Note: Data from World Values Survey Wave 7 (2017–2021) (Haerpfer et al. 2020). Includes membership in labor unions, environmental organizations, professional associations, and mutual aid groups. Includes all countries in this survey round that are democracies or open anocracies (Polity score > 0 in 2018) (Marshall and Gurr 2020).

action and typically by their affiliation to political parties" (Collier and Handlin 2009b, 4).

Labor unions not only politicized class identities and organized workers as a central part of the electorate; they also played a decisive role in mobilizing votes and creating partisan identities that lasted for generations (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Collier and Collier 1991; Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Labor unions and related ancillary organizations played a crucial role in creating and mediating the social identity at the heart of early socialist mass parties (Guttsman 1981; Lidtke 1985; Mann 1973; Ritter 1963; Wehler 1986). For these parties, strong, shared group identities – often referred to as class consciousness but in fact strongly associated with specific parties[14] – were "formed … in a number of independent and often competitive organizations, most frequently as trade-unions . . . , but also as cooperatives, neighborhood associations, clubs, etc." (Przeworski 1985, 13).

This type of organizationally mediated identity formation was not limited to labor-based parties. For example, Catholic mass organizations in nineteenth-century Europe and environmental organizations in the 1980s offered a similar social space for party identity formation and mobilizing electoral support (Kalyvas 1996; Kitschelt 1989).

Since these earlier episodes of mass party formation, labor unions' importance as societal organizations that represent and mobilize large parts of the electorate has declined in most parts of the world. The shift away from state-centric, Keynesian or import-substituting, economic models to market-oriented approaches weakened unions and made them less viable as a source of labor-based parties' strength (Collier and Handlin 2009b; Levitsky 2003; Murillo 2001). While labor-based parties pursued different strategies in response to this crisis (Kitschelt 1994; Levitsky 2003; Murillo 2001; Roberts 2014), ties to labor unions became less important in most cases. Nevertheless, despite their decline in power, these weakened unions continue to play a role as societal organizations representing workers in many countries.

1.3.2 Contemporary Societal Organizations

Given the decline in labor unions' ability to represent and mobilize large parts of the electorate in many countries, the rise in the importance

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[14] For further discussion of the social construction of these identities, see Thompson (1966) and Katznelson (1986).

of other kinds of societal organizations, and the changed media context, it is not obvious what role societal organizations can play in the founding of new parties now. The new generation of societal organizations appears to be quite different from the traditional labor union model at first glance. Most of these 'new' organizations either did not exist during earlier episodes of party formation (such as informal sector unions, neighborhood associations, environmental organizations, and the landless movement) or were only partially incorporated into the political arena, such as indigenous or peasant organizations. What is more, contemporary organizations exhibit a broader range of organizational forms and represent a wider array of issues and identities; some focus on classic materialist, class-based issues, while others are shaped by newer political identities.

These purported organizational and structural differences between traditional and contemporary societal organizations have led many scholars to be rather pessimistic about their mobilizational and representational capacity. Collier and Handlin, for example, emphasize that "(p)arties play a much less central role [today] . . . , as associations typically have more distant, intermittent, instrumental relations to parties, if they have any at all" (Collier and Handlin 2009b, 5). Other scholars have argued that, to the extent that contemporary social organizations even have a large enough membership to influence politics, voters become encapsulated by them and are thus *less* likely to become partisans (Chhibber 1999).

However, the recent episode of party-building in Latin America raises doubts about whether this conception of exclusively distant, ad hoc, and instrumental relations between contemporary societal organizations and parties is justified. While for decades scholars have pointed to the demise of close voter–party ties and the waning of mass parties (such as labor-based parties) (Katz and Mair 1995; Kirchheimer 1966; Panebianco 1988), cases such as the MAS in Bolivia and the PT in Brazil suggest these ties may not be passé. These new parties exhibit close, organic ties to a variety of new (and to some extent old) societal organizations and resemble traditional "mass integration" parties (Kirchheimer 1966, 184) that have enduring ties to voters. Beyond cases in which the party and societal organizations have retained close ties over time, there are also examples of extensive, early coordination between new parties and societal organizations failing to generate lasting, organic linkages (e.g., Ecuador's *Alianza PAIS*). Furthermore, while some organizations have developed close, organic linkages with new parties, others have relied

primarily on instrumental, short-term agreements with different parties. Still others provided extensive initial logistical and electoral support to new parties but did not institutionalize those ties and, in some cases, later opposed those parties. Given these divergent trends, what are the conditions under which we might expect party–organization ties to become organic or institutionalized, and under what circumstances might these ties remain instrumental and based on 'short-term agreements' between the two actors? I revisit this question and the implications of different types of party–organization linkages in the theory section later and explore it more fully in Chapter 2.

1.3.3 Societal Organizations in Latin America

Across Latin America, the new generation of societal organizations proliferated at an extraordinary rate and gained increased prominence as a result of their organizing efforts against the neoliberal reforms during the 1980/1990s (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998; Collier and Handlin 2009c, 53; Dietz 1998; Garay 2007; Silva and Rossi 2018; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005, 2006). These organizations play crucial roles in the everyday lives of large segments of the population. Unlike primarily nationally focused interest groups in the US, members of these organizations in Latin America usually have very immediate, regular face-to-face contact with these organizations (usually through local branches) and strongly identify with the group. Furthermore, unlike in some older democracies such as the United States,[15] in most Latin American countries, about one-third to one-half of citizens at least occasionally attend meetings of such organizations (LAPOP 2016). During the period of party system turmoil in the early 2000s, 20–40 percent of the population in most Latin American countries reported attending such meetings at least "once or twice a month" (LAPOP 2016).

These societal organizations can be organized around different underlying interests or identities. Whereas some are primarily classist (such as labor unions, employer associations, and informal sector unions), others are primarily ethnic (such as some indigenous organizations). Yet others span these divides (such as the *cocaleros* in Bolivia) or take the form of "local programmatic associations" (such as neighborhood associations) (Davies and Falleti 2017, 1707).

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[15] For a discussion of why such organizations no longer play a similar role in the United States, see Skocpol (2003).

In terms of their internal structure and organizational traits, these organizations are quite heterogeneous.[16] While some exist and operate at *only* at the local levels, others form major national or regional peak associations. As discussed below, this degree of organization – national/regional, aggregated or local only – has important implications for how such organizations can interact with parties and become linked to them.

However, despite these differences, such societal organizations are "(1) defined by a certain type of *territorial anchor* (characterized by where their activists live, participate, or work), . . . and (2) their demand-making generally involves the allocation of state economic resources, and thus it can be argued that they operate in the domain of 'interest politics'" (Etchemendy 2021, 294).

Furthermore, societal organizations maintain large, stable bases of support and membership even when the party system is disrupted. They facilitate close ties between local leaders and their base, and are often relatively long-lived. Parties, by contrast, are often organized primarily at the national level; they lack the same degree of regular, personal interactions and have less cohesive identities by virtue of having to build a broader coalition of groups in order to be electorally viable.

1.3.4 The Role of Organizations for Participation

Whereas prior research often focuses on direct appeals in explaining mass support and is rather skeptical regarding the representational relevance of societal organizations today, my argument – at its most abstract level – claims that these new types of societal organizations play pivotal roles in democratic representation today and are comparable to labor unions in earlier episodes of party formation. Understanding recent party-building efforts (Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Levitsky et al. 2016; Roberts 2014; Silva and Rossi 2018; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010),[17] requires closely examining the role of these new types of organizations (Anria 2019; Collier and Handlin 2009c; Han 2016; Thachil 2014a, 2014b). Many previous studies have concentrated on the formation of these organizations and their role in politicizing ethnic or

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[16] For an extended discussion of the different traits of these organizations, see also (Collier and Handlin 2009a; Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar 2021).

[17] For a discussion of new party-building episodes in other regions, for example, see Hino (2012), Sikk (2005), and Tavits (2008a).

class cleavages (e.g., Garay 2007; Hummel 2021; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005, 2006), but have largely overlooked the direct ways in which different forms of party–organization linkages might influence vote choice and the emergence of partisanship.

In the existing literature, the role of societal organizations is often directly or indirectly limited to mobilizing and politicizing identities or interests, to which parties can then appeal (Madrid 2008, 2012; Van Cott 2005). This focus overlooks important variation in party–organization linkages and assumes that voters decide who to vote for primarily in response to such direct appeals. Madrid, for example, argues that ethnic parties in Latin America have successfully mobilized voters when they "have eschewed exclusionary *rhetoric*, developed broad-based *platforms*, and *recruited leaders and candidates* from a range of different ethnic groups" (Madrid 2008, 481; emphasis added). In his analysis of the electoral success of the MAS, Madrid maintains that "the MAS's ethnopopulist rhetoric and platform" has been key because it allows the party to mobilize the "large proportion of the Bolivian population [that] is of indigenous ancestry" and appeal to nonindigenous voters through programmatic and personalistic populist appeals (484). Such direct appeals to voters – based on party issue platforms, descriptive appeals through the nomination of co-ethnic candidates, and personalism – might be an effective way to mobilize voters. However, an analysis that focuses only on such direct appeals overlooks the ways in which organizations (based on similar underlying identities and interests) might influence their members' vote choice and identities.

Understanding the variation in organizational structures and party–organization linkages as well as the specific ways in which organizations influence the vote choice and identities of their members is relevant not only for the new generation of societal organizations but also for older organizations in the context of the early labor movement. The importance of organizations and associations has been emphasized repeatedly in this earlier context (Guttsman 1981; Lidtke 1985; Mann 1973; Ritter 1963; Wehler 1986), but the specific mechanism through which they advanced the success of early labor-based parties remains unclear. It is not obvious whether these early parties succeeded because these organizations politicized their members and created a diffuse sense of class consciousness to which (multiple) parties could appeal through their policy proposals (e.g., socialist, social democratic, or communist parties), or because these unions mobilized their members for a particular party and got them to vote for (and identify with) that party.

Since we lack public opinion data from that time, we might never be able to establish conclusively whether the majority of these voters would have thought of themselves first and foremost as proletarians or, for example, as social democrats or communists. Therefore, it is unclear to what extent the mass support of early labor-based parties was due to parties' successful mobilization of class identities and interests versus the creation of attachments to specific parties through labor unions and other related associations.

This puzzle arises again in relation to this more recent episode of party formation. To what extent – and how – do societal organizations influence mass support for new parties? Can they shape their members' vote preferences? What about those of their members' families, neighbors, or close friends? Can these new types of societal organizations, which are more organizationally diverse than 'first-generation' organizations, attach voters to new parties and create partisan identities in a similar fashion as we hypothesized labor unions and Catholic mass organizations did in nineteenth-century Europe?

1.4 THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I examine why parties adopt different mobilization strategies. Focusing on the intra-elite dynamics during parties' founding moments, I show how the adoption of different mobilization strategies is shaped by early interactions between societal organizations and the party. Second, I analyze how voters come to support new parties in response to these strategies. I illustrate how different mobilization strategies available to new parties influence vote preferences and partisan identities, and therefore account for the creation of mass support. The focus of this study – that is, the different ways in which organized interests can be linked to parties, and how these linkages shape support for those parties – allows us to specify and test the mechanism through which these interests and identities can be translated into partisan support.

PART I Chapters 3–5 evaluate why parties adopt different strategies to mobilize voters, focusing on parties' *founding moments*, the period before they contest their first major election.[18] The key question is

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[18] To account for the fact that many new parties will run a small number of candidates in a 'test' election before contesting a full election I focus on the first *major* election. I only consider the party's very first national election to be major if it wins a major

whether a party only relies on *direct appeals* to voters (e.g., direct class and ethnic policy appeals) or whether it also uses *organizationally mediated strategies*, that is, appeals that build ties to voters through societal organizations. As discussed earlier, any contemporary party will, at least to some extent, try to appeal directly to voters by communicating substantive/programmatic and/or descriptive appeals (often based on class or ethnic identities and interests, and/or clientelistic promises), often through the mass media. However, while some parties rely primarily or exclusively on such direct appeals, other new parties also invest heavily in organizational structures, that is, develop organic linkages with societal organizations, and use organizationally mediated strategies.

Drawing on a historical institutionalist framework, I argue that these founding moments constitute *critical junctures* during which largely contingent decisions by a small group of actors – proto-leaders of new parties and potential organizational allies (the party's *founding coalition*) – produce distinct legacies for party–organization ties and set the emerging parties on different trajectories. Two features of the founding moments – one internal to the new party, and the other external to it – are key: (1) the cohesion of the coalition of party leaders and organizational allies and (2) the credibility of other attractive parties in the party system. Early on, these factors shape whether a party–organization tie becomes organic, that is, whether an initially instrumental organization–party tie becomes institutionalized. First, a more cohesive coalition – attained through *moments of solidarity*, that is, costly acts of public support for each other and the joint goals, for example, through joint participation in high-stakes protests – can lower the expected costs of institutionalizing such ties by increasing mutual trust and instilling a shared sense of identity between proto-leaders and organizational allies. Second, if there are other credible, attractive parties in the party system, this shifts the distribution of power between party leaders and organizational allies and makes instrumental, short-term linkages more likely than institutionalized ties.

The decision to institutionalize ties has lasting consequences for new parties and affects their ability to rely on organizational allies for voter mobilization down the road. I argue that the dynamics of how party leaders' and organizational allies' incentive structures change over time, from a party's founding moments to after having contested multiple elections,

national office (such as the presidency or more than 25 percent of the vote for legislative elections). Otherwise, the very first electoral contest will be considered a test election and the subsequent national election will be considered the first major election.

makes parties more likely to institutionalize ties with organizations early on. Later, parties are more likely to pursue instrumental linkages when establishing ties with other organizations. Whether party–organization ties become institutionalized through the adoption of routinized rules and mechanisms that govern how candidates will be selected and factional disagreements will be settled in turn determines whether a new party can employ organizationally mediated strategies or is restricted to relying only on direct appeals.

In this context, I distinguish between two types of organizational allies based on their structure and the organizational resources they can offer to a party: (1) major societal organizations, that is, peak associations of membership-based interest groups or social movements organized at the national or regional level, such as a labor union confederation and (2) primarily locally based organizations or groups, such as local social or political movements.

The degree of organization – national/regional, aggregated or local only – has important implications for the resulting party structures and the types of organizationally mediated strategies available to the new party. On the one hand, if a major societal organization already has an organizational structure in place, the new party can 'borrow' this infrastructure to connect to (and mobilize) a large number of local members. Therefore, if a linkage with a major societal organization is institutionalized, the organization (along with its internal hierarchy and structure) will be incorporated into the new party. The resulting party takes the form of what Duverger might have described as an "indirect party" (Duverger 1954, 6), that is, one that "is made up of the union of the component social groups" (6). On the other hand, locally based organizations or groups by definition lack an organizational structure that connects them to the national level. Therefore, if linkages with them are institutionalized, they can only be incorporated into the party at the local level. Furthermore, we might also expect such a local organization to have less organizational autonomy vis-à-vis the party due to the organization's smaller membership and coverage (compared to major societal organizations that have national or at least regional coverage). Given these groups' localized nature and relatively low degree of organizational autonomy, they might effectively serve as local branches for the party once they are incorporated into it. The result is a "direct party" (5): the local organizational structures are eventually subsumed and "the members themselves form the party community without the help of other social groupings" (5).

PART II Chapters 6–8 explore how voters come to support new parties by focusing on the behavioral dynamics behind voters' responses to the different party strategies. I compare the effectiveness of linkages that new parties forge through *direct* appeals to voters versus through *organizationally mediated* strategies to explain their ability to create mass support. While some of these organizations are also organized around class or ethnic identities, the main distinction between direct appeals and organizationally mediated strategies is based on how a party activates those identities. Put differently, the distinction between direct appeals and organizationally mediated strategies is not about the *content* of the message, but *how it is communicated* to voters.

Building on this conceptual distinction between mobilization strategies, I argue that organizationally mediated appeals constitute a highly effective way to garner electoral support – especially for new parties. If repeated consistently, such appeals also generate durable voter–party ties by socializing organization members into identifying with the party. In Part II of the book, I develop this argument in three steps.

First, I contend that appeals mediated through (either instrumentally or organically linked) organizations, in the form of organizational endorsements of a party (e.g., during electoral campaigns), are very effective in swaying organization members' vote preferences. While organizational endorsements should be able to sway their members to support any given party, I show that they are particularly effective for mobilizing support for new parties – especially after dramatic party system changes.

Second, drawing on social identity and self-categorization theory, I contend that societal organizations provide social spaces in which socialization into new parties can occur rather quickly – especially in times of political uncertainty – if the organization repeatedly and consistently endorses the party (*organizational cultivation*). These organizations serve as highly relevant and immediate reference groups for their members, and can lead members to redefine themselves in terms of partisan identities favored by organizational leaders through a psychological process of *depersonalization*, which Hogg and Tindale describe as "a contextual redefinition of self in group terms . . . (through which we) view ourselves as and feel like group members, and we experience ourselves and perceive, think, feel, and behave in terms of the attributes that define the group" (2005, 208).

Through this process of organizational cultivation, organizationally mediated appeals represent a 'shortcut' to robust, deep-seated partisan attachments. Without consistent, repeated, organizationally mediated

appeals, voters might still develop some partisan loyalties *over time* through habitual voting, evaluating parties' promises and performance. However, I contend that partisan attachments that develop without organizationally mediated appeals are an expression of a less crystallized (and potentially temporary) affinity for a party that could be abandoned quickly in response to negative information about the party's performance.

Third, organizational endorsements can influence nonmembers within members' immediate social networks (e.g., family members, neighbors, and close friends). Through this 'spillover mechanism,' a broader group of people beyond direct members can be mobilized for new parties.

1.5 WHY STUDY NEW PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA?

While most democracies have experienced the frequent emergence of new (and often unstable) parties in recent decades, this phenomenon is particularly prevalent in nascent democracies (Mainwaring 1999, 3; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, 204; Tavits 2008b). Yet, research on parties often concentrates on the relatively stable party systems in historic democracies (Lupu 2016b). For instance, research on party identification and the development of new parties mostly focuses on well-established democracies and has only recently begun to explore these issues systematically in the Global South.

Latin America is a particularly interesting region in the Global South in which to study the rise and success of new parties. After a long period of relative stability throughout much of the twentieth century, traditional parties in many Latin American countries were discredited beginning in the early 1990s; they quickly lost electoral support and virtually disappeared from the electoral landscape (Dietz and Myers 2007; Lupu 2014; Mustillo 2018; Roberts 2014; Seawright 2012). In the most extreme cases, this crisis of representation culminated in the complete collapse of party systems, as happened in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. In other cases, some established parties survived, but the disruption in the party system led to the collapse of one or more major parties, as in Argentina, or caused longstanding dominant parties, such as the PRI in Mexico, to lose their hold on power. Along with this rupture in party systems across the region, which left many voters without attachments to any political party, we have witnessed a major wave of party formation.

The recently formed parties vary greatly in terms of both their electoral support and the stability of their ties with voters. While the vast majority of these new parties failed to establish stable ties with voters and quickly disappeared (Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck 2016), some new parties, such as Bolivia's MAS or Brazil's PT, resemble traditional "mass integration" parties (Kirchheimer 1966, 184) with enduring ties to voters, as indicated by stable rates of voter identification and decreased electoral volatility. The region thus offers a large number of new parties to study as well as clear variation on the outcome of interest.

Furthermore, Latin America offers a particularly interesting context in which to study new parties' linkages with societal organizations, given its wide range of new societal organizations. While overall levels of membership in such organizations in Latin America are comparable to other parts of the Global South (see Table 1.1), there is a particularly wide range of interests and identities at the heart of these organizations and diverse organizational forms. This variation allows us to explore the mediating role of societal organizations across different underlying interests and organizational structures.

1.6 EVIDENCE

This study compares major new parties that emerged during the recent episode of party-building in Latin America (Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Levitsky et al. 2016; Roberts 2014; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010) – Bolivia's MAS, Ecuador's Alianza PAIS, and Mexico's Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (MORENA) – with each other and with other new parties that were founded during the same time period. In addition to the cross-national comparison between the three parties, I also leverage within-case analysis of the parties' relationships with different societal organizations.

The three contemporary parties, which were formed during a crisis of representation and gained prominence in recent years, exhibit at least five similarities. First, they were founded during a moment of popular mass mobilization. Second, they developed in response to a previous experience of widespread corruption among established parties' elites. Third, they were built on a broad coalition of societal organizations, which had been strengthened by previous mass protests, and, at least initially, purported to represent them politically. The initial coalitions for the MAS and Alianza PAIS represented very similar sectors. Fourth, these parties initially exhibited very similar political platforms and agendas. Fifth,

all three parties, perhaps akin to new parties more generally, featured similarly strong elements of charismatic leadership.

Despite these outward similarities, the new parties pursued remarkably different strategies to mobilize voters and attracted very different levels of mass support. For instance, while the MAS enjoys stable, organic linkages with various major societal organizations and stable rates of voter support and voter identification, Alianza PAIS initially pursued extensive linkages with major societal organizations but failed to institutionalize them; it later relied almost exclusively on direct appeals to voters. The more recently founded MORENA also displays organic organizational linkages, but primarily with local organizations.

Bolivia offers a fascinating context in which to study the rise and success of new political parties. Parties in Bolivia, like those in many young democracies, have traditionally been characterized as weakly institutionalized and not well rooted in society (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 20). As in many other countries in Latin America and beyond (Dietz and Myers 2007; Lupu 2014; Roberts 2014; Seawright 2012), beginning in the early 1990s, traditional parties in Bolivia were discredited, quickly lost electoral support, and virtually disappeared from the electoral landscape. The new parties that have emerged since this party system collapse vary greatly in terms of the stability of their ties to voters and their electoral support. While most of the new parties exhibit a high degree of electoral volatility and are unable to create stable attachments to voters, the MAS can be characterized as a new "mass" party (Duverger 1954, 63) with enduring ties to voters, as indicated by stable rates of voter identification and lower electoral volatility.

First organized in 1995 and registered as a party in 2000,[19] the MAS contested its first national election in 2002, where it came a close second in the presidential and legislative elections (with 20.9 percent of the votes, after the electoral alliance of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) and the leftist Movimiento Bolivia Libre, which obtained 22.5 percent). In the general election 3 years later, the party

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[19] The party was first instituted as Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (ASP) in March 1995. It elected Alejandro Veliz as its president and then split into the ASP and the Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (IPSP) in 1999. After a series of failed attempts to register the party, it was first officially registered in 2000 as an alliance between the IPSP and a defunct (but still registered) party by the name of Movimiento al Socialismo-Unzaguista (MAS-U). It was registered under its final name, Movimiento al Socialismo-Instrumento Político pr la Soberanía de los Pueblos (MAS-IPSP), in 2002. For a detailed account of this process, see García Yapur, García Orellana, and Soliz Romero (2014, 86–113).

received the strongest electoral support enjoyed by any party since the country's return to democracy in 1982: it won the majority of votes for the legislature and president, and has received similar, stable electoral support in the following elections and other popular votes. While also apparent in legislative election results, this stabilization of electoral support is particularly evident for the presidential elections: whereas Bolivia had five different presidents during the tumultuous five years before the 2005 election, the office has been held by two people from the MAS since 2005 (with a 1-year interruption in 2019/2020 due to the constitutional coup of November 2019).

Similar in overall levels of organizational participation and mobilization to Ecuador and Mexico (LAPOP 2016), Bolivia has a multitude of societal organizations that represent a range of fundamental political group identities and interests. While some of these organizations might be characterized as primarily classist (such as labor unions, informal sector unions, and peasant unions), others are mainly ethnic (such as indigenous organizations). Yet others span these divides and are organized around other deep-seated group interests and/or identities (such as neighborhood associations or the *cocaleros* (coca grower unions) in the Chapare region). The vast majority of these organizations were founded before the MAS and have stable bases of support and membership, which appear to have been unaffected by the country's left turn (Davies and Falleti 2017).

Ecuador's Alianza PAIS allows for an interesting paired comparison with the MAS. Alianza PAIS was founded during a period of mass mobilization similar to the one in Bolivia and the major societal organizations in this context in both countries presented similar opportunities to reach large segments of the electorate and had a lot to offer to leaders of new parties, given the electoral contexts in both countries. Therefore, it is not surprising that a broad coalition of powerful societal organizations – representing sectors similar to those in the founding coalition of the MAS in Bolivia – initially supported Alianza PAIS. This support was particularly crucial when the party contested its first elections in 2006, held a national referendum on instituting a Constituent Assembly and elected the Assembly members in 2007, put the new constitution to a popular vote in 2008, and held general elections under this new constitution in 2009. At the same time, Alianza PAIS represents a case of a party that had *not* experienced moments of solidarity between the party's proto-leaders and its organizational allies during the party's founding moments despite their close ideological alignment. Even though extensive popular protests during the 1990s and early 2000s had brought together many

of the organizations that later supported the party, the party's proto-leaders had been largely absent from these events. Thereby, the case allows us to explore the trajectory of close party–organization linkages absent moments of solidarity.

MORENA represents an important case that allows me to examine party-building processes in the context of a party system that dramatically changed during the democratic transition but did not fully collapse. Whereas the party systems in Bolivia and Ecuador had almost completely collapsed by the time these new parties began contesting elections, Mexico's party system never fully collapsed. However, it did experience a serious crisis of representation that caused the longstanding dominant PRI to lose its hold on power (Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006). The traditional parties managed to survive the crisis and persist until today.

The survival of the PRI in particular and its continued hegemony over most nationally organized societal organizations has imposed critical constraints on the types of potential organizational allies and mobilization strategies available to new parties.[20] Therefore, the case of MORENA allows me to expand on the comparison between the MAS and Alianza PAIS by analyzing the case of new party that emerged in context where the only available organizational allies were not major, peak associations (as in the other two cases) but primarily locally based organizations. Thereby, it allows us to explore how allies' degree of organization – national/regional, aggregated or local only – influences the mechanisms used to institutionalize party–organization ties, the resulting party structures, and the types of organizationally mediated strategies available to the new party. Furthermore, some of the organizations that eventually came to support MORENA were not part of the party's founding moments or at the time still had credible, attractive alternative party options that it could support. Analyzing the trajectory of the party's relationship with these organizations allows me to test additional macro-level implications of my theoretical model.

MORENA might be considered a late developer in the context of this episode of party formation. However, arguably the underlying social dynamics that brought about its formation are similar to the other instances of new party formation at this time. MORENA, which registered as a civic association in late 2011 to prepare Andrés Manuel López

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[20] Many major societal organizations in Mexico were historically affiliated with the PRI through national-level corporatist arrangements. Notable examples are large-scale labor union confederations, such as the *Confederación de Trabajadores de México*, and peasant unions affiliated with the *Confederación Nacional Campesina*.

Obrador's (AMLO) 2012 presidential campaign, was formally registered as a party in 2014 (Bolívar Meza 2014). It successfully contested its first election in 2015 and it has continued to increase its support among voters across the country: it won the country's presidency and both chambers of the Congress of the Union in 2018. What is more, largely unnoticed by most observers, the party has managed to take root across the country quite quickly (Combes 2022, 100). During its first 4 years, the party managed to recruit about 440,000 members (0.49 percent of the adult population – a membership rate comparable to canonical mass parties in established democracies, such as the Social Democratic Parties of Germany (0.50 percent) and Sweden (0.86 percent) and almost twice as high as that of more longstanding parties in Mexico, such as the PAN (Partido Acción Nacional; National Action Party) (0.24 percent)). Unlike other contemporary Mexican parties, such as the PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática; Party of the Democratic Revolution) or PAN, MORENA has been able to build a nationwide presence.

Last, all three principal parties studied here can be characterized as leftist. This ideological similarity allows for a certain level of comparability in terms of programmatic appeals. However, there is good reason to believe that my argument is not limited to leftist parties. Indeed, there are numerous examples in Latin America and beyond of new societal organizations that have become linked to centrist or conservative parties.

The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I first develop a theoretical framework about the behavioral dynamics behind voters' responses to different mobilization strategies and their different effects on voter preferences and party identification. I then explore why these different strategies are available to new parties in the first place. In this context, I develop a theoretical model that focuses on the intra-elite dynamics of parties' founding moments to explain the adoption of different party mobilization strategies.

In the following three empirical chapters, I test the macro-level implications of my theoretical model for why parties adopt different mobilization strategies using my three cases: the MAS in Bolivia (Chapter 3), Alianza PAIS in Ecuador (Chapter 4), and MORENA in Mexico (Chapter 5). These comparative case studies are based on information collected through over 150 original extensive, semi-structured interviews with national, regional, and local leaders of parties and societal organizations as well as political analysts and journalists in different parts of all three countries. These interviews, conducted during 24 months of field research in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico between January 2014 and

August 2017, are further complemented by the analysis of transcripts of interviews conducted with 85 MAS parliamentarians during the early years of the MAS administration in 2007 and 2008 (Zuazo 2009). Furthermore, I analyze relevant newspaper articles from newspaper archives and internal party and organization documents. These sources allow me to assess the extent of endorsements from organization leaders, support from societal organizations' leaders and activists during political rallies, the representation of organizations within the parties (e.g., in party leadership positions or candidates for public office), the historic development of linkages, and parties' campaign strategies (e.g., the extent of direct appeals). These primary sources are further complemented by historians' and anthropologists' accounts of critical moments in party and organization relationships. The newspaper sources and historical accounts in the interviews permit me to engage in process tracing to detect the effects of changes in linkages over time (Brady and Collier 2004). To obtain a more in-depth understanding of the mechanisms at work, I also studied local branches of coca farmer unions (*cocaleros*) in the Chapare (Bolivia) and different labor union locales in different parts of Bolivia and Ecuador by conducting additional interviews with rank-and-file members and through participant observation at meetings of these organizations.

Across the three cases, I demonstrate how the shared experience of moments of solidarity before or during a party's founding moments can bring about a cohesive coalition between the proto-leaders and organizational allies involved. While in all three cases the parties' proto-leaders were closely ideologically aligned with their organizational allies and came to rely extensively on them to secure electoral support, the extent to which different organizational allies and party leaders trusted each other and shared an identity with each other (and with other allies) varied considerably between the three parties – and even across their various organizational allies. For the MAS and MORENA, where leaders of organizations and party proto-leaders were involved in costly acts of public support for each other and their joint goals during these early moments of solidarity, the actors involved came to trust each other and develop a shared sense of cross-organizational identity. While some proto-leaders in the MAS and, to a lesser extent, MORENA, had come from specific member organizations, these moments of solidarity brought together leaders and rank-and-file members from different organizations and helped develop trust and a shared identity – not just between the

proto-leaders and individual organization leaders, but also between different organizations that had little history of working together. As I show across different organizational allies of the three parties, these factors shape early-on whether a party–organization tie becomes institutionalized by adopting routinized rules and mechanisms that govern how candidates will be selected and factional disagreements will be settled. Whether party–organization ties become institutionalized in turn establishes whether a new party can rely on organizationally mediated strategies or is restricted to employing direct appeals. Furthermore, I show that the institutionalization of a linkage provides the basis for different types of mediated strategies and resulting party structures, depending on the structure of the organizational allies.

In Part II of the study, Chapters 6–8, I focus on the micro-level implications of my theory, exploring how voters came to support new parties in response to these mobilization strategies in the three cases. In Chapter 6, I empirically test my theory about the micro-foundations of electoral support for new parties. I analyze how individual voters respond to appeals based on different mobilization strategies in discrete choice experiments conducted in Bolivia and Ecuador. These experiments present voters with campaign posters that closely resemble real-world posters; the results illustrate that organizational endorsements are very effective at mobilizing electoral support, especially for new parties. Such endorsements are also effective across several different types of organizations and can sway members of the organization as well as people in their wider social networks. Furthermore, endorsements can influence voters even when they provide no direct information about policy platforms; unlike organizational members, sympathetic nonmembers do not follow the endorsements. I also find that endorsements can even overcome ethnic cleavages and foster electoral support when candidates' policy positions are at odds with voters' preferences.

In Chapter 7, I expand on the micro-level evidence from Chapter 6 on how effective one-off organizational endorsements are at swaying vote preferences by exploring how repeated organizational expressions of support over multiple years (due to a mechanism that institutionalized a new party's ties with its organizational allies) can help new parties secure support in subsequent elections. Analyzing a natural experiment from Mexico, in which MORENA uses lotteries to select candidates for national public office, I show how the party took root and mobilized voters more successfully in localities where it was able to tap into

organizational networks through candidates who are embedded in local organizations.

In Chapter 8, I explore the resulting party identification in the three cases. Drawing on original and existing survey data from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico, I show that membership in organizations that regularly support a new party is strongly associated with whether a voter develops an attachment to the party. Furthermore, additional analysis of the poster experiments suggests that the frequency of attending organization meetings is associated with the robustness of the attachment. Additional analyses of the natural experiment discussed in Chapter 7 reveal that repeated organizational expressions of support over multiple years help new parties gain new followers. I then compare and contrast this organizationally mediated path to partisanship (*organizational cultivation*), which can account for the development of robust partisan attachments to the MAS and MORENA, with an alternative path to partisanship that can yield party identification even for parties without organically linked organizational allies. I show that in the case of Alianza PAIS, which could not rely on organizational cultivation through organically linked organizations, partisan attachments have developed in direct response to voters' evaluations of the party's performance. These two different paths generate different types of partisan attachments. Whereas organizationally mediated appeals can create partisan attachments that take the form of robust, deep-seated social identities, partisanship that develops in response to voters' evaluations of a party's performance seems to be an expression of a less crystallized (and potentially rather temporary) affinity for a party that could be quickly abandoned in response to negative information about the party's performance.

Finally, in Chapter 9, I discuss the study's main findings and their broader theoretical implications for how we understand the role of parties and partisanship in democratic accountability and representation. It contributes to ongoing debates about the various functions that parties serve, the changing relationship between parties and voters, and the development of partisanship in new democracies. The chapter concludes by illustrating the theory's relevance and plausibility in other new democracies as well as for new parties in more established democracies.