Welfare policy may promote social integration and reduce social conflicts in communities. However, this study finds that the Indonesian unconditional cash transfer program stimulated multifaceted conflicts, which were accompanied by harmful social unrest. The government failed to lessen such conflicts, but community leaders successfully minimized the conflicts through informal redistribution. This redistribution reflects problematic informal-formal layering and nesting, which lead to a complicated policy failure. Employing social conflict and institutional change theoretical frameworks, this article aims at using the Indonesian cash transfer as a lens to understand how and why welfare policy causes social conflicts in communities and how the conflicts stimulate policy distortion and modification, resulting in policy failure. This policy failure reveals important theoretical implications on the nexus of conflict and institutional change.

The largest prime factor of $X^{3}+2$ was investigated in 1978 by Hooley, who gave a conditional proof that it is infinitely often at least as large as $X^{1+\delta}$, with a certain positive constant $\delta$.It is trivial to obtain such a result with $\delta=0$.One may think of Hooley's result as an approximation to the conjecture that $X^{3}+2$ is infinitely often prime.The condition required by Hooley, his R$^{*}$ conjecture, gives a non-trivial bound for short Ramanujan--Kloosterman sums.The present paper gives an unconditional proof that the largest prime factor of $X^{3}+2$ is infinitely often at least as large as $X^{1+\delta}$, though with a much smaller constant than that obtained by Hooley.In order to do this we prove a non-trivial bound for short Ramanujan--Kloosterman sums with smooth modulus.It is also necessary to modify the Chebychev method, as used by Hooley, so as to ensure that the sums that occur do indeed have a sufficiently smooth modulus. 2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 11N32.