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Impairments in social interaction are common symptoms of dementia and necessitate the use of validated neuropsychological instruments to measure social cognition. We aim to investigate the Hinting Task – Dutch version (HT-NL), which measures the ability to infer intentions behind indirect speech to assess Theory of Mind, in dementia.
Method:
Sixty-six patients with dementia, of whom 22 had behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), 21 had primary progressive aphasia, and 23 had Alzheimer’s disease (AD), and 99 healthy control participants were included. We examined the HT-NL’s psychometric properties, including internal consistency, between-group differences using analyses of covariance with Bonferroni-adjusted post hoc comparisons, discriminative ability and concurrent validity using the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC), and construct validity using Spearman rank correlations with other cognitive tests.
Results:
Internal consistency was acceptable (Cronbach’s α = 0.74). All patient groups scored lower on the HT-NL than the control group. Patients with bvFTD scored lower than patients with AD dementia. The HT-NL showed excellent discriminative ability (AUC = 0.83), comparable to a test of emotion recognition (ΔAUC = 0.03, p = .67). The HT-NL correlated significantly with a test for emotion recognition (r = .45), and with measures of memory and language (r = [.31, .40]), but not with measures of information processing speed, executive functioning, or working memory (r = [.00, .17]). Preliminary normative data are provided.
Conclusions:
The HT-NL is a psychometrically sound and valid instrument and is useful for identifying Theory of Mind impairments in patients with dementia.
Exposure to multiple languages may support the development of Theory of Mind (ToM) in neurotypical (NT) and autistic children. However, previous research mainly applied group comparisons between monolingual and bilingual children, and the underlying mechanism of the observed difference remains unclear. The present study, therefore, sheds light on the effect of bilingualism on ToM in both NT and autistic children by measuring language experiences with a continuous operationalization. We measure ToM with a behavioral, linguistically simple tablet-based task, allowing inclusive assessment in autistic children. Analyses revealed no difference between monolingual and bilingual NT and autistic children. However, more balanced exposure to different languages within contexts positively predicted first-order false belief understanding in NT children but not autistic children. Mediation analysis showed that the impact in NT children was a direct effect and not mediated via other cognitive skills.
Spontaneous mentalizing refers to the capacity to attribute mental states to oneself and others without explicit prompts or conscious deliberation. This process enables individuals to comprehend and anticipate social behaviors in a more intuitive manner. Individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia frequently demonstrate deficits in this domain, which contribute to impaired social functioning. The present meta-analysis aims to assess the extent of spontaneous mentalizing impairments in schizophrenia.
Methods
A comprehensive search was conducted in four prominent databases: MEDLINE, EMBASE, CENTRAL, and Web of Science. Following the review of the retrieved records and subsequent citation searching, a total of 15 studies were selected for inclusion in the quantitative synthesis. The data of 526 patients diagnosed with schizophrenia and 536 controls were subjected to analysis. Effect sizes for intentionality and appropriateness were computed utilizing weighted or standardized mean differences, and heterogeneity was evaluated.
Results
Patients with schizophrenia exhibited substantial impairments in intentionality and appropriateness during mentalizing tasks, with large effect sizes. No significant differences were observed in random movement tasks, although patients also demonstrated deficits in interpreting goal-directed movements. Furthermore, high heterogeneity in some outcomes and variability in study methodologies were also noted.
Conclusions
This analysis corroborates substantial spontaneous mentalizing deficits in schizophrenia, underscoring their potential role in impaired social functioning. In conjunction with previous analyses, the present findings emphasize the pervasive nature of mentalizing deficits in schizophrenia, encompassing explicit, implicit, and spontaneous dimensions. These results hold significant implications for therapeutic strategies designed to augment social cognition in individuals with schizophrenia.
Mentalizing defines the set of social cognitive imaginative activities that enable interpretation of behaviors as arising from intentional mental states. Mentalization impairments have been related to childhood trauma (CT) and are widely present in people suffering from mental disorders. Nevertheless, the link between CT exposure, mentalization abilities, and related psychopathology remains unclear. This study aims to systematically review the evidence in this domain.
Methods
A Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA)-compliant systematic review of literature published until December 2022 was conducted through an Ovid search (Medline, Embase, and PsycINFO). The review was registered in the Prospective Register of Systematic Reviews (PROSPERO) (CRD42023455602).
Results
Twenty-nine studies were included in the qualitative synthesis. Twenty studies (69%) showed a significant negative correlation between CT and mentalization. There was solid evidence for this association in patients with psychotic disorders, as almost half the studies focused on this population. The few studies focusing on unipolar depression, personality disorders, and opioid addiction also reported a negative impact of CT on mentalization. In contrast, evidence for post-traumatic stress disorder was inconsistent, and no evidence was found for bipolar disorder. When stratifying for subtypes of CT, there was solid evidence that neglect (physical and emotional) decreased mentalization capacity, while abuse (physical, emotional, or sexual) was not associated with mentalization impairments.
Conclusions
Although causality cannot be established, there was substantial evidence that CT negatively affects mentalization across various psychiatric disorders, particularly psychotic disorders. These findings highlight the potential of targeting mentalization impairments in prevention and treatment strategies aiming to reduce the incidence and the social functioning burden of mental illness.
This book recovers an important set of American literary texts from the turn of the nineteenth century to the Civil War that focus on bodies that seem to have minds of their own. Artists such as Charles Brockden Brown, Robert Montgomery Bird, Edwin Forrest, Henry Box Brown, Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, and Herman Melville represented the evocative expressiveness of these literary bodies. With twitches and roars, flushes and blushes, these lively literary bodies shaped the development of American Literature even as they challenged the structures of chattel slavery, market capitalism, and the patriarchy. Situated within its historical context, this new story of nineteenth-century American Literature thus reveals how American literary expression-from novels to melodramas, from panoramas to magic tricks-represented less repressive, more capacious possibilities of conscious existence, and new forms of the human for those dehumanized in the nineteenth century.
While a role of language in the development of Theory of Mind (ToM) is well established, the interplay with a child’s ability to understand structured scenarios remains unclear. A new scale (Pictorial Theory of Mind Scale), assessing true and false belief comprehension at different levels of linguistic complexity, was used to explore language effects on ToM while accounting for scenario comprehension. Thirty-nine children (aged 4–6 years; 53.8% female) participated in this study. Results showed that 46.8% of 4- to 6-year-olds can understand false beliefs from picture-based scenarios with limited language output. Both language and scenario comprehension contributed to ToM in first-order false beliefs, whereas only scenario comprehension predicted true beliefs. In contrast, only language predicted second-order false beliefs, highlighting their different roles in ToM development.
Deficits in Executive Function (EF) and Theory of Mind (ToM) are common and significant in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), impacting self-regulation and social interaction. The nature of ToM deficits is believed to be partially associated with preexisting deficits in other core cognitive domains of ADHD, such as EF, which are essential for making mental inferences, especially complex ones. Evaluating these associations at a meta-analytic level is relevant.
Objective:
To conduct a systematic literature review followed by a meta-analysis to identify potential associations between EF and ToM among individuals with ADHD and their healthy counterparts, considering different developmental stages.
Method:
A systematic review was conducted in seven different databases. The methodological quality of the studies was assessed using the Newcastle-Ottawa Scale. The meta-analytic measurement was estimated with the correlation coefficient as the outcome. Due to the presence of heterogeneity, a random-effects model was adopted. Independent meta-analyses were conducted for different EF subdomains and ADHD and healthy control groups. Subgroup analyses were performed to examine the influence of age on the outcome of interest.
Results:
Fifteen studies were analyzed. Moderate associations were found when comparing EF and ToM between individuals with ADHD (0.20–0.38) and healthy subjects (0.02–0.40). No significant differences were found between child and adult samples (p > 0.20).
Conclusion:
The association between EF and ToM was significant, with a moderate effect size, although no significant differences were found according to age, the presence of ADHD, or EF subdomains. Future research is suggested to expand the age groups and overcome the methodological limitations indicated in this review.
The identification of early warning signs is of great importance for identifying individuals at risk for mental disorders. Especially in the case of bipolar disorder, these research endeavours are imperative considering that the frequently delayed diagnoses and longer illness duration are associated with symptom exacerbation and lower recovery rates.
Aims
To multimodally investigate associations between hypomanic personality traits and altered social affect and social cognition to probe their role as early warning signs of bipolar disorder.
Method
In a community sample (n = 140; 50.71% female), we investigated associations between hypomanic personality traits and both behavioural and neural activity measures of empathy and theory of mind (ToM) based on data from a functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm.
Results
Although analyses revealed no significant associations between behavioural or neural correlates of empathy and hypomanic personality traits, these traits were significantly associated with elevated ToM-related neural activity in the anterior rostral medial prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex. These neural activation differences were not accompanied by differences in behavioural ToM performance, suggesting more intense recruitment of task-relevant brain regions but unaffected behavioural outcomes.
Conclusions
Our findings indicate hypomanic personality traits to be positively associated with ToM-related neural activity but not with behavioural ToM performance. Prospectively, our study contributes to driving towards a more comprehensive and potentially neurobiologically grounded phenotype of bipolar disorder risk that contributes to a more differential understanding of risk and resilience mechanisms.
We design a novel experiment to study how subjects update their beliefs about the beliefs of others. Three players receive sequential signals about an unknown state of the world. Player 1 reports her beliefs about the state; Player 2 simultaneously reports her beliefs about the beliefs of Player 1; Player 3 simultaneously reports her beliefs about the beliefs of Player 2. We say that beliefs exhibit higher-order learning if the beliefs of Player k about the beliefs of Player become more accurate as more signals are observed. We find that some of the predicted dynamics of higher-order beliefs are reflected in the data; in particular, higher-order beliefs are updated more slowly with private than public information. However, higher-order learning fails even after a large number of signals is observed. We argue that this result is driven by base-rate neglect, heterogeneity in updating processes, and subjects’ failure to correctly take learning rules of others into account.
The social environment and our social experiences provide a rich source for social theories about the behavior of others. Important prerequisites are social knowledge about who people are on an individual and group level and the ability to attribute the behavior of others to their mental states, often called mind reading, mentalizing, or theory of mind.
This chapter of the handbook discusses the complex, multifaceted connection between morality and religion from an evolutionary perspective. After providing some much-needed conceptual ground clearing, the authors focus on accounts of the linkage between morality and religion in terms of evolved psychological mechanisms that promote cooperation and inhibit competition. One of the better known of these accounts is the supernatural punishment hypothesis. On this view, the morality–religion link is sustained by the fact that belief in an all-knowing, all-powerful god who monitors people’s behavior and punishes their moral transgressions motivates people to behave less selfishly and more cooperatively. Another account emphasizes religious behavior and posits that participation in religious ritual is a form of costly signaling, indicating to others that the participant can be trusted to observe the moral norms of the community. While there is considerable support for the idea that aspects of religion function to curb selfishness, however, the authors caution that the psychological and sociological mechanisms underlying this function are not yet well understood.
My understanding of children’s cognitive development involved a series of progressive shifts in my understanding of what is involved in learning a language. Rather than language serving as a means of expressing and sharing existing thoughts, I came to see language as the exclusive means of creating thought itself. To my surprise I have become a sort of “Nominalist”; the view that language is the vehicle of thought itself.
I focus on how, for me, big questions such as, “How can we tell whether something is true?” were funneled by haphazard influences into specific interests. Classes on logic got me interested in the origins of concepts. Contact with Piaget’s theory of concept acquisition added a developmental dimension. Wondering about the meaning of words led to the problems of opaque contexts like belief reports. A brush with artificial intelligence made me focus on the distinction between implicit and explicit mental representations and consciousness. My thesis supervisor’s expertise in game theory led me to explore children’s perspective-taking. Work with Heinz Wimmer on the false belief task got me firmly entrenched in theory of mind research, focusing on simulation theory as its main opponent. And to get beyond documenting children’s flourishing achievements I turned to mental files theory to understand how perspectival thinking grows from our basic ability to think about objects.
Some developmental researchers plough a long, straight furrow. I can claim nothing so unwavering. I trace instead a career that has meandered, both geographically and intellectually, with successive forays into topics that have at best a subterranean connection to each other. In the Netherlands, I studied children’s developing understanding of different aspects of emotion, and more broadly their theory of mind. In England, I studied children’s imagination, including their pretending, role-play, reasoning, counterfactual thinking and emotional reactions to works of fiction. In the United States, I conducted studies on children’s willingness to trust testimony from informants who vary in their history of accuracy, their membership of particular groups and their levels of relevant expertise as well as studies of cross-cultural variation in the pattern of testimony that children receive – especially with respect to invisible or hard-to-observe phenomena in the domains of religion and science.
This chapter reviews research on social cognition and age. This covers self-focused processes, including self-referencing and memory as well as own-age bias and stereotype threat and stigma. Processes focused on other people are also reviewed, including moral judgment, empathy, theory of mind, social interactions and impression formation, memory for impressions, and trust.
Early learning of a second language at home has been found to be beneficial for children’s cognitive development, including their ability to ascribe mental states to others. We investigated whether second language learning in an educational setting can accelerate children’s sensitivity to a communication partner’s perspective and whether the amount of exposure to second language education makes a difference. We tested three groups of English monolingual four-five year old children with varying language exposure at the beginning of their first year at primary school and 24 weeks later. Children attending bilingual schools and children with weekly second language lessons exhibited similar accelerated development of communicative perspective-taking skills compared to children without second language provision. Such advances were not related to other cognitive advances. Thus, limited foreign language teaching might boost young children’s development in communicative perspective-taking skills, providing an enhanced basis for their social competence development.
The previous chapter considered the active role that readers play in the construction of meaning. It focused on the prior knowledge that readers bring to texts and which they use in the process of interpretation, and from this it becomes clear that the process of meaning creation is a result of the interconnection between textual triggers and reader’s world knowledge. Or, to restate this in Semino’s (1997) terms, texts project meaning while readers construct it. The means by which readers go about constructing meaning is, as explained in Chapter 5, the central concern of cognitive stylistics. This chapter continues the book’s consideration of this branch of stylistics by focusing on how readers navigate their way through texts. While Chapter 5 considered the stylistic effects that can arise as a result of textual features, for example deviant schemas or novel conceptual metaphors, this chapter’s focus is primarily on descriptive accounts of how readers process textual meaning. In so doing it outlines some of the most influential theories of text processing to have been adopted by stylistics.
In this paper, we propose a joint modeling approach to analyze dependency in parallel response data. We define two types of dependency: higher-level dependency and within-item conditional dependency. While higher-level dependency can be estimated with common latent variable modeling approaches, within-item conditional dependency is a unique kind of information that is often not captured with extant methods, despite its potential to shed new insights into the relationship between the two types of response data. We differentiate three ways of modeling within-item conditional dependency by conditioning on raw values, expected values, or residual values of the response data, which have different implications in terms of response processes. The proposed approach is illustrated with the example of analyzing parallel data on response accuracy and brain activations from a Theory of Mind assessment. The consequence of ignoring within-item conditional dependency is investigated with empirical and simulation studies in comparison to conventional dependency analysis that focuses exclusively on relationships between latent variables.
Theory of mind (ToM) is an essential social-cognitive ability to understand one’s own and other people’s mental states. Neural data as well as behavior data have been utilized in ToM research, but the two types of data have rarely been analyzed together, creating a large gap in the literature. In this paper, we propose and apply a novel joint modeling approach to analyze brain activations with two types of behavioral data, response times and response accuracy, obtained from a multi-item ToM assessment, with the intention to shed new light on the nature of the underlying process of ToM reasoning. Our trivariate data analysis suggested that different levels or kinds of processes might be involved during the ToM assessment, which seem to differ in terms of cognitive efficiency and sensitivity to ToM items and the correctness of item responses. Additional details on the trivariate data analysis results are provided with discussions on their implications for ToM research.
People often predict that they, and others, will be biased by sunk costs—they think that investing in an object or goal increases how much one values or wants it. In this article, we use sunk cost predictions to look at people’s theory of mind and their conceptions of mental life. More specifically, we ask which mental states and motivations are seen as underlying the bias. To investigate this, participants in two preregistered experiments predicted whether different kinds of agents would be biased by sunk costs, and also assessed the agents’ mental abilities. Participants predicted that some kinds of agents (e.g., human adults and children, robots) would show the sunk cost bias and that others would not (e.g., raccoons and human babies). These predictions were strongly related to the participants’ assessments of whether the different kinds of agents are capable of seeing actions as wasteful, but also related to their assessments of the agents’ capacities to feel regret and frustration.