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The second political service provided by firms is to supplement the state’s societal control efforts. When public grievances arise over a project, infrastructure, or plant, the state may politicize the associated firms by demanding their assistance in managing social unrest. Firms play two distinct roles in societal control: serving as allies when the state employs suppression strategies against protesters or acting as scapegoats when the state opts for appeasement strategies.
Private firms are more suited to serve as scapegoats, while SOEs, particularly large and powerful ones, are stronger allies. This distinction arises from differences based on ownership and extent of political capital available to firms. Private firms typically have narrower and more limited sources of political capital than SOEs. In sectors where protests become increasingly frequent and intense, suppression strategies often replace appeasement, leading to a decline in the standing of private firms as large SOEs gain dominance.
Applying a novel theoretical approach, Tamar Groswald Ozery combines law and political economy to deconstruct the role of law in China's market development since 1978. The book examines how economic and administrative powers within China's Party-state system have been legally and politically configured throughout China's growth process. Using a vast range of primary sources, Ozery illuminates how the law acts as a mediating institution that translates and gives shape to the relations between politics and economics. Using the evolution of public firms and corporate governance as a case study, the book illustrates the complex relationships between law, politics, and economic development, and sheds new light on the possible varieties of growth-supporting governance institutions in firms. By studying China's distinct market experience through the lens of law and political economy, the book offers a significant contribution to development studies, comparative corporate governance, and interdisciplinary discussions about China as a growth model.
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