As extreme political views gain popularity and acceptability, the conditions under which media exposure to extreme right views contributes to this process, and strategies to counter media-induced persuasion and normalisation effects remain unclear. Using population-based survey experiments leveraging real-world interviews with extreme right activists on Sky News UK and Australia, we test whether media exposure leads to higher agreement with extreme right statements. We also test whether exposure affects perceptions of how many others agree with these statements. Our findings are consistent across both countries: exposure to uncritical interviews increases agreement with extreme statements and perceptions of broader support in the population. Testing the media strategy in the UK, we find that critical interviewing tarnishes the activist’s image and reduces effects, but still heightens perceived support for extreme statements. This study identifies a mechanism through which extreme political ideas spread and offers insights into media strategies to counteract persuasion and normalisation effects.

Scholars often use survey experiments to evaluate political messages’ persuasive effects, but messages developed in the lab do not always persuade in real-world campaigns. In this research note, we report three experiments on one central obstacle in lab-to-field messaging applications: getting people’s attention. We first analyze a large-scale direct mail campaign run by an established non-profit that promotes conservative solutions to climate change. In this experiment, postcards with messages based on extant survey-experimental research did not cause changes in key climate attitudes. In a follow-up survey experiment, identical postcards induced attitude change— Re but only when participants were required to pay attention to them. A final field experiment highlights the difficulty of inducing attention; in another real-world campaign, postcards with eye-catching scratch-off panels performed no better than standard postcards. These findings illustrate the crucial role of attention and the complexity of translating messages developed in survey experiments into effective real-world campaigns.

In experimental social science, precise treatment effect estimation is of utmost importance, and researchers can make design choices to increase precision. Specifically, block-randomized and pre-post designs are promoted as effective means to increase precision. However, implementing these designs requires pre-treatment covariates, and collecting this information may decrease sample sizes, which in and of itself harms precision. Therefore, despite the literature’s recommendation to use block-randomized and pre-post designs, it remains unclear when to expect these designs to increase precision in applied settings. We use real-world data to demonstrate a counterintuitive result: precision gains from block-randomized or pre-post designs can withstand significant sample loss that may arise during implementation. Our findings underscore the importance of incorporating researchers’ practical concerns into existing experimental design advice.

This paper investigates public attitudes towards education spending based on a survey experiment. It enquires whether a trade-off between education and other welfare domains, namely healthcare, unemployment benefits and pensions, diminishes support for higher public spending on education. Drawing on five Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (Italy, Spain, Greece, Mexico and Turkey), the paper demonstrates that education spending preferences are contingent on the nature of trade-offs and the priorities of the stakeholder groups. Testing the predictive power of age, income, ideology, labour market positioning and gender, our research finds robust support for public spending on education across all countries. Nonetheless, this support diminishes significantly when trade-offs that are linked to cuts in other welfare domains are introduced.

In survey experiments, should all covariates be administered before the experimental treatment? Some scholars argue that post-treatment items should never be used as covariates because the treatment could bias the measurement of those items and disrupt experimental randomization. Other scholars argue certain items—specifically sensitive questions measuring prejudice—should not be administered pre-treatment. They argue if asked pre-treatment, these items may prime respondents in ways that will influence how they engage with the experiment treatment, thereby affecting the overall outcome of the experiment. Using evidence from four studies (two original collections) that vary the placement of sensitive items—pre-treatment, post-treatment, or in a separate wave—we find little evidence that the placement of sensitive items influences the measurement of those items, the experimental outcomes, nor heterogeneously affects the outcome conditional on the treatment. However, we find the placement of sensitive items inconsistently affects the experimental outcome by interacting with both the measurement of the items and the experimental treatment condition. Overall, we find these measures to be robust to where they are administered. It may be best to place items pre-treatment to preserve randomization. If researchers have reason to include sensitive moderators post-treatment, they should transparently discuss this choice and the anticipated trade-offs.

Can states improve their international image by apologizing for past wrongs, or do apologies hurt countries’ reputations? We argue that apologizing can boost a country’s international image by providing reassurance about future behavior and conveying appropriate values. Yet apologies could also signal weakness, and their international effects could depend on reactions in the sending and receiving countries. To test these arguments, we pair large-scale US-based survey experiments involving Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with the historical case of Germany’s 1951 Holocaust apology. In our experiments, respondents learned whether a foreign state apologized for past offenses, how the target of the apology responded, whether key domestic groups in the sender opposed the apology, and whether the sender was democratic or not. We found that apologies boosted foreign favorability and willingness to cooperate, and did not indicate weakness. These effects persisted even if the target rejected the apology or the apology provoked backlash inside the sender, and did not depend on whether the sender was described as democratic. The case of Germany’s 1951 Holocaust apology corroborates these patterns. Together, our findings suggest that apologies may be a powerful tool of public diplomacy.

What are the effects of reason-giving on political attitudes? Both political philosophers and political scientists have speculated that defending proposals with reasons may change voters’ preferences. However, while models of attitude formation predict that the explicit justification of one’s political views may result in attitudes that are more ideologically consistent, less polarized, and more stable, empirical work has not assessed the connection between reason-giving and attitudes. Implementing a survey experiment in which some respondents provide reasons before stating their opinions on six issues in UK politics, I find that reason-giving has very limited effects on the constraint, stability, or polarization of the public’s political attitudes. These findings have important implications for our understanding of deliberative conceptions of democracy – in which reason-giving is a central component – as well as for our understanding of the quality of voters’ political opinions.

Does the public apply a “double standard” for human rights abuses based on the perpetrator’s alliance status? Research shows that individuals are more supportive of military action against states that violate human rights. However, other studies claim that condemnations of violations are often contingent upon the strategic relationship with the perpetrators. In this paper, we bridge these different strands of literature by examining whether the effect of foreign states’ human rights practices on public support for war depends on the alliance status of the violator. To investigate this interaction, we conducted two preregistered experiments that independently randomized the state’s human rights practices and U.S. alliance status. Both experiments reveal that the alliance status of the human rights violator has a negligible effect on support for war. Consequently, our findings challenge the prevailing notion that the public applies a double standard for human rights violations.

A growing number of studies focus on how governments can manage audience costs when they want to back down from international crises. In line with previous studies, especially Kohama et al. (2024), this paper argues that the Japanese government can use a variety of reasons to justify its decisions to de-escalate while minimizing domestic audience costs. I found that governments can reduce audience costs using several rhetorical devices, reinforcing the current understanding of audience costs. However, my design, which presented a fait accompli scenario by China against Japan, yielded significantly different results regarding audience costs compared to previous studies on the subject. Specifically, the results of this study indicate that the public might not value economic development following a fait accompli as highly as in less severe scenarios. The results also suggest that leaders might have a harder time backing down after a loss of territory compared to other forms of provocation.

How do episodes of post-conflict violence affect public support for peace? I argue that political messaging about who or what is to blame can influence how violence affects attitudes towards peace agreements. I test this argument in Colombia, a country which has experienced violence after a 2016 peace agreement, and where rival political camps debate whether government failures or noncompliance by rebels is to blame. In an experiment with 1466 respondents in conflict and non-conflict zones, I paired news about post-conflict violence with information supporting these competing messages. I find that emphasizing rebel culpability reduced support for peace agreements, but emphasizing poor government implementation did not have a strong countervailing effect. A probe of the mechanisms suggests that while emphasizing rebel culpability increased perceptions that rebels alone were to blame, emphasizing government implementation failures led respondents to conclude that both parties were to blame, limiting the effectiveness of this message.

How does the mass public form attitudes on electoral rules and reforms? Existing research on this question reveals a trade-off between principles, such as fairness, and partisan self-interest. I use two survey experiments on state legislative redistricting to explore how voters weigh principles against partisan self-interest when forming opinions on electoral reforms. First, I ask whether the public’s partisan self-interest motivation stems more from individual representation considerations or broader partisan power considerations. I find that both considerations provide a powerful enough incentive to activate partisan self-interest regarding preferences for state legislative district maps. Unexpectedly, the two considerations have quite similar effects on public support for redistricting reforms. Second, I explore the principles versus partisan self-interest trade-off through the lens of loss aversion, a concept developed in behavioral economics. In line with expectations, I find that preventing loss provides a more powerful incentive for Americans to violate democratic principles than achieving partisan gain. In sum, this research sheds light on voters’ decision between principles and partisan self-interest in the formation of opinion on electoral reform.

Students of comparative law have long argued that undermining judicial independence is electorally costly, and that the norms against interference uphold institutional checks and balances essential to constitutionalism. However, evidence from countries with robust judiciaries suggests that exposing voters to deficiencies in the legal process or the courts’ partisan leanings can reduce perceptions of judicial legitimacy, making such interference on part of would-be authoritarians more likely. The rise of populist politicians poses additional risks: by emphasizing judges’ unelected status and counter-majoritarian tendencies, populists may erode legitimacy, framing judges as part of a “corrupt elite” opposing “the people.” This rhetoric challenges liberal-democratic norms that limit state interference with individual rights. To test whether one observes the effects of partisanship and procedural fairness on voters’ perceptions of the courts outside the US context, and whether populist messages produce comparable effects, a pre-registered survey experiment is conducted in the context of Czechia, a country that, until recently, has had both a populist executive and a strong and independent Constitutional Court. The study presented respondents with vignettes describing an important electoral ruling of the Czech Constitutional Court, embedding messages that highlighted judges’ unelected status, the ruling’s procedural irregularities, or its partisan implications. Contrary to expectations, findings show no significant effects of any message type on perceptions of judicial legitimacy. The results of the study suggest that the marginalization of robust judiciaries in backsliding democracies may be a largely elite-driven institutional process, with uncertain electoral payoffs.

How does power affect threat perception? Drawing on advances in psychological research on power, I find that the sense of state power inflates the perception of threats. The sense of power activates intuitive thinking in the decision-making process, including a reliance on gut feelings and cognitive shortcuts like heuristics and prior beliefs. In turn, as psychological IR research shows, these mechanisms tend to inflate threat perception. The powerful assess threats from the gut rather than the head. Experimental evidence from the US and China, a reanalysis of a survey of Russian elites, and a large-scale text analysis of Cold War US foreign policy elites lend support to this expectation. The findings help to psychologically reconcile enduring theoretical puzzles—from “underbalancing” to “overextension”—and generate entirely new ones, like the possibility that decision makers of rising, not declining, states feel more fear. Together, the paper offers a “first image reversed” challenge to bottom-up accounts of psychological IR. Decision-maker psychology is also a dependent variable shaped by the balance of power, with important implications for a world returning to great power competition.

Are centralized leaders of religious organizations responsive to their followers' political preferences over time even when formal accountability mechanisms, such as elections, are weak or absent? I argue that such leaders have incentives to be responsive because they rely on dedicated members for legitimacy and support. I test this theory by examining the Catholic Church and its centralized leader, the Pope. First, I analyze over 10,000 papal statements to confirm that the papacy is responsive to Catholics' overall political concerns. Second, I conduct survey experiments in Brazil and Mexico to investigate how Catholics react to responsiveness. Catholics increase their organizational trust and participation when they receive papal messages that reflect their concerns, conditional on their existing commitment to the Church and their agreement with the Church on political issues. The evidence suggests that in centralized religious organizations, the leader reaffirms members' political interests because followers support religious organizations that are politically responsive.

Survey experiments on probability samples are a popular method for investigating population-level causal questions due to their strong internal validity. However, lower survey response rates and an increased reliance on online convenience samples raise questions about the generalizability of survey experiments. We examine this concern using data from a collection of 50 survey experiments which represent a wide range of social science studies. Recruitment for these studies employed a unique double sampling strategy that first obtains a sample of “eager” respondents and then employs much more aggressive recruitment methods with the goal of adding “reluctant” respondents to the sample in a second sampling wave. This approach substantially increases the number of reluctant respondents who participate and also allows for straightforward categorization of eager and reluctant survey respondents within each sample. We find no evidence that treatment effects for eager and reluctant respondents differ substantially. Within demographic categories often used for weighting surveys, there is also little evidence of response heterogeneity between eager and reluctant respondents. Our results suggest that social science findings based on survey experiments, even in the modern era of very low response rates, provide reasonable estimates of population average treatment effects among a deeper pool of survey respondents in a wide range of settings.

In 2014, Russia denied that its military was assisting separatists in eastern Ukraine, despite overwhelming evidence. Why do countries bother to deny hostile actions like this even when they are obvious? Scholars have argued that making hostile actions covert can reduce pressure on the target state to escalate. Yet it is not clear whether this claim applies when evidence of responsibility for the action is publicly available. We use three survey experiments to test whether denying responsibility for an action in the presence of contradictory evidence truly dampens demand for escalation among the public in the target state. We also test three causal mechanisms that might explain this: a rationalist reputation mechanism, a psychological mechanism, and an uncertainty mechanism. We do find a de-escalatory effect of noncredible denials. The effect is mediated through all three proposed causal mechanisms, but uncertainty and reputational concern have the most consistent effect.

This is a study on the inclusion of Muslims in liberal democracies in the presence of value conflict. We focus on handshaking controversies that appear to pit gender equality against religious freedom. The possible outcomes seem mutually exclusive: either conservative Muslim minorities must conform to the norms of the majority culture, or non-Muslim majorities must acquiesce to the legitimacy of conservative Muslim ideas. Using a trio of experiments to replicate our results, we demonstrate the efficacy of introducing alternative gestures of respect. Presented with a substitute gesture of respect – placing the ‘hand on heart’ – non-Muslim demands for Muslim conformity drop dramatically. The results of the handshaking experiments call out a general lesson. Thanks to the ingenuity and versatility of cultural customs to signal respect, value conflicts can be open to resolution in everyday encounters without minorities or majorities having to forsake their convictions.