The definitions of the emotions in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations 3 which refer to magnitude are not meant to represent Stoic orthodoxy, and should not be read as direct evidence for the Stoic theory. Cicero’s aims and methods in the Tusculans led him to use non-Stoic accounts of the emotions, in order to offer a kind of consolation that is neutral between Stoic and Peripatetic theories of value. This chapter also discusses the structure of the Tusculans as a unified whole.

The introduction addresses questions about Kant’s access to Stoic philosophy and other matters about Stoicism in his immediate intellectual context. After this biographical and historical contextualisation, the individual chapters are introduced.

This chapter considers the presentation of virtue and happiness in the Meditations and asks how far this matches the distinctive features of Stoic thinking on these topics. The main topics considered are (1) the virtue–indifferents distinction, (2) the presentation of the virtues as forming groups or as unified in some way, (3) the virtue-happiness relationship and the idea of happiness as ‘the life according to nature’, meaning according to human or universal nature (or both). Overall, it is suggested that, although Marcus’s focus in the work is on the contribution of these ideas to his overall project of ethical self-improvement, his presentation largely reflects the ideas and connections between them that we find in the standard ancient accounts of Stoic ethics.

In this chapter, I attempt to trace the influence of the Stoic tradition on Marcus Aurelius by focusing on his approach to impressions, material flux, and fate. The primary suggestion is that the influence of earlier Stoicism is best interpreted within the framework of how Marcus develops a normative response to the external world. It is within this context of getting to grips with fluctuating, alienating, and disturbing appearances that we should seek to locate his reception of the Stoic theories of the cognitive impression, material flux, and the philosophical life, more broadly. Such an emphasis on inculcating a reliable response in the soul to the outside world also helps to explain a much-discussed feature of the Meditations, namely the unusual incorporation of Epicurean atomism within the work. I also push back on recent claims that there is evidence of a flirtation with Platonism evident in this text. Marcus was an innovative interpreter of his tradition with a particular focus on psychological stability, but, for all that, he was also a thoroughgoing Stoic.

This chapter explores Marcus’ concept of the soul and its main cognitive parts (hēgemonikon, nous, dianoia, daimon) and their relevance for the construction of a concept of the self that is closely interwoven with Stoic self-care. It also investigates Platonic influence on Marcus’ concept of the mind and its relation with the body. Selfhood, understood as an entity referring to itself, unfolds around the hēgemonikon and, to a lesser extent, the dianoia. Self-reference by cognitive acts is limited to the logical soul. These three rational elements are subordinated to the ‘I’ (or psychagogic subject) and serve as objects of its psychagogic self-(trans)formation, thereby construing its selfhood. The perfect starting point for mental self-transformation in Marcus is hypolēpsis ‘assumption’, a single mental act, similar to Epictetus’ prohairesis ‘choice’, to which Marcus’ concept of mental selfhood is heavily indebted. Platonising rhetoric supports the delineation and detachment of the soul’s rational part (esp. nous) from external entities and subordinate mental phenomena but offers no evidence for a dualist psychology or metaphysical concept of the mind. Instead, Marcus’ concepts of mind and body abide by Stoic orthodoxy and its materialist monism.

This chapter sets Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations in the wider historical context of the emperor’s life and reign. It considers his family, upbringing, and route to the imperial purple, as well as his principal philosophical and intellectual influences. Marcus’ attitudes to proper imperial conduct are explored through his description of his adoptive father Antoninus Pius. Special attention is paid to comparing and contrasting Marcus’ own views in the Meditations with other ancient sources, particularly his correspondence with his tutor Fronto and later accounts by Cassius Dio and the Historia Augusta.

Marcus’ Meditations have been the object of special attention for their literary form, structure, and style as well as for the function and destination that the author ascribed to them. Since they lack a precise plan and present some formal characteristics, the most important of which are the use of the second person, i.e. self-reference, conciseness, and repetitiveness, most scholars have concluded that the work was intended only for the emperor’s reading and use. This chapter provides, after an overview of the scholarly trends that have promoted such an exegesis of the form and function of the Meditations, a reconstruction of the relationship between formal elements and philosophical content follows and a terminological analysis of a sample of the text, concluding with a proposal to revise the widespread belief that the Meditations were conceived by the author only for his own education and spiritual improvement.

Cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) is the leading evidence-based form of modern psychotherapy. Albert Ellis and Aaron T. Beck, the two main pioneers of CBT, both described Stoicism as the main philosophical inspiration for their respective approaches. The idea of a Stoic psychotherapy isn’t new, and indeed the ancient Stoics referred to their philosophy as a type of therapy (therapeia) for the psyche. This chapter focuses on the ways in which concepts and practices described in the Meditations resemble those of modern psychotherapists, and indeed the direct influence of Marcus and other Stoics upon them. Marcus’ remarks about the Stoic therapy of anger provide an example of a specific application.

The relationship between Marcus’ views of natural philosophy and his ethical commitments has long been a vexed issue. This chapter aims first to clarify what Marcus’ own views on physics were, relying only on the contents of the Meditations, and only then to ask how these views relate to those of earlier Stoics and to consider whether Marcus’ position was a good one for him to hold. It becomes clear that Marcus regards nature, which is for him identical with god, as directly setting some important norms for human beings, most importantly because of the thorough integration of humans into the providential and teleological order of the cosmos. Marcus’ understanding of the natural world includes his conception of human nature as naturally social, which entails other important norms for human behaviour. Humans are, for Marcus, integrated ‘vertically’ with the cosmic order and ‘horizontally’ with other human beings; these integrations structure a great deal of Marcus’ ethical theory. But natural philosophy is far from being the only source of norms for Marcus; reflection on his relationships with other people and on the workings of his own mind also have impact and, as I suggest, may even lead him to views which conflict with the materialist determinism of most earlier Stoics.

Marcus Aurelius addresses himself as sociable by nature, as someone made to belong to a political community, and as a citizen of the cosmos. The good life for him consists in obeying the gods and cooperating with his fellow citizens in service of the common interest. His fellow citizens are all beings endowed with reason, and as a human he cares for all other people, whoever they may be. The Meditations demonstrate detailed knowledge and agreement with the conceptual foundations of Stoic cosmopolitanism, but specific approaches can be identified. Marcus underscores the organismic and egalitarian nature of the cosmic community and often gives a functional account of his status as a part of the cosmos, while at the same time also suggesting a hierarchical account of degrees of sociability. His rule as emperor he conceives as a personal challenge to live up to the model of his predecessor, Antoninus Pius, also sharing the latter’s conservativism and traditionalism. Marcus’ Stoicism is more apparent in his quest for sincere and truly loving sociability, a striving that finds its limits in the aversion and disappointment Marcus often seems to experience with regard to those around him.

Marcus Aurelius acknowledges his debt to the Stoic tradition of emotions and endorses both the analysis of emotions as value judgements, the ideal of apatheia, i.e. the eradication of ‘passions’, and the promotion of ‘good feelings’. By emotions, he means all kinds of emotional reactions to everything that reaches us from the outside, i.e. pleasure and pain as well as anger, love, fear, etc. Every impression being twofold (what the object is and of what value it is to us), Marcus develops a strategy to eradicate the second judgement. But there is a positive side to the reshaping of desire and aversion, a joy resulting from the gifts of nature and the fulfilment of our human relations. Such emotions are reserved for the Sage in ancient Stoicism, but they become more accessible to Marcus, who does not reject any emotion from human life but values the appropriate ones.

This chapter examines the reception of the Meditations in early modern Europe, focusing primary on the period from the first publication of the Meditations in 1559 to the end of the eighteenth century. In particular it discusses the way in which the text was read as either a generic source of ancient moral maxims or a serious work of Stoic philosophy. Key figures in the early modern debate include Isaac Casaubon, his son Meric, Thomas Gataker, the Cambridge Platonists Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, and on the Continent Joannes Franciscus Buddeus and Johann Jakob Brucker.

This chapter uses Diogenes Laertius’ doxographical overview of Stoic natural philosophy as a starting point to examine the role of physics in Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations. Contrary to a common misconception, all the central aspects of Stoic physics, except for some more technical issues, are well represented. The chapter discusses Marcus Aurelius’ treatment of the telos-formula of ‘living according to nature’; the two fundamental Stoic principles of reality, god and matter; the scale of nature; and the relation between Providence, fate, necessity, change, human action, and freedom. Marcus Aurelius’ distinctive touch comes through in certain areas of emphasis, such as the centrality of sociability, human and divine, or the many implications of the view that the processes of change that also entail human mortality actually constitute the order of the universe.

Explores two instances early in the Metamorphoses where chaos exerts itself on the formed world, namely the climate crises triggered by the flood and Phaethon narratives. These narratives frequently occur as a pair in philosophical discourses, where conflagrations and floods are seen as part of a regular cosmic cycle, whereby the world moves between phases of increasing and decreasing entropy, such as in the Stoic theory of the Great Year or in Empedocles’ cosmogony. In such cases, the Phaethon and flood narratives are seen as myths that can be mined for evidence of a ‘true’ scientific doctrine. In the Metamorphoses, however, the narratives of Phaethon and the flood do not indicate a stable cycle but rather are expressions of a world continually veering towards a chaotic collapse. This becomes evident when reading these narratives through the cosmic theories of Empedocles, Plato, and Lucretius.

This chapter recovers Schopenhauer’s previously neglected account of prudent political action. It points out the connections between the skilled governance of society and the savvy self-control of the individual in Schopenhauer’s works and argues that a full analysis of his conception of politics must include a treatment of prudence in world affairs as well as in interpersonal encounters. In fact, Schopenhauer supplemented his account of the modern state as an instrument of society-wide pacification with an account of prudent self-governance as an obligation for the modern subject. He believed that the state must impose constraints on disruptive egoism from the top, but that individuals should also prudently mask their egoism and in this way soften antagonisms. In Schopenhauer’s view, Hobbes’ theory of statehood could be constructively linked to Baltasar Gracián’s account of prudence; implemented together, they could strengthen the prospects of peace.

Hume’s ‘four essays on happiness’ are distinctive in Hume’s oeuvre, and not merely in the 1741 volume of Essays, Moral and Political in which they appeared. They are written in the style of philosophical monologues, with Hume ‘personating’ a representative of each of the main, late Hellenistic philosophical sects in turn. Each such representative, however, engages critically with the philosophical positions staked out by his rivals and antagonists. The ultimate question each of the philosophical sects seeks to answer is: what is the true end (summum bonum) of human life, and where is true contentment to be found? Scholars have tended to be preoccupied with the question of which sect best articulates Hume’s own underlying philosophical commitments. This chapter argues that such an approach is mistaken, because Hume dismissed the quest for the summum bonum altogether. Hume presented all the late Hellenistic philosophical sects as capturing something important about human life, and about the purpose of philosophical activity. Yet ancient moral philosophers had ultimately failed to develop the ‘science of man’ that Hume took to be the greatest achievement of modern philosophy. The four essays, then, reveal Hume’s keen – and lifelong – interest in the history of moral philosophy, and his attentiveness to the distinctive (and superior) character of modern approaches to the discipline.