The nineteenth-century Russian poet Fedor Tiutchev rightly marvelled at his motherland’s remarkable growth: ‘Moscow, and Peter’s town, and Constantine’s city, these are the Russian realm’s cherished capitals … But where is its limit? Where are its borders? The fates will reveal them in times to come …’ Over the past 400 years an obscure principality deep in the forests on Europe’s eastern edge had expanded to become the largest continental empire on Earth – a domain whose immense territory stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean and beyond, covering one-sixth of the planet’s dry surface. Although somewhat diminished in size after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russians today still nickname their country ‘the seventh continent’.

Ottoman wars from the mid-fifteenth century through the end of the eighteenth century fundamentally changed the geopolitics of Southeast Europe, West Asia, and the Middle East. The Ottomans emerged in West Asia Minor toward the end of the thirteenth century. Known as “Turks” in contemporaneous Europe, the Ottoman ruling elite incorporated people of a wide variety of ethnic origins who considered themselves the followers and descendants of Osman (d. 1324?), the dynasty’s founder. Those loyal to the dynasty of Osman used the Turkish designation of “Osmanlı” (Turkish, “of Osman”), which over time came to be rendered in English as “Ottoman.” Within three generations after Osman’s death, the Ottomans had either conquered or subjugated into vassalage most of the preexisting polities and rival dynasties in the Balkans and Asia Minor. Timur Lenk’s victory over the Ottomans near Ankara in 1402 temporarily checked Ottoman expansion. Still, the dynasty recovered, and by 1453 Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1444–46, 1451–81) sealed the Ottomans’ status as a formidable military power by conquering Constantinople, the capital of the thousand-year-old Byzantine or Eastern Roman Empire. Expansion through conquest continued well into the sixteenth century. Ottoman battlefield victories under Sultan Selim I (r. 1512–20) against the Safavids of Persia (Chaldiran in 1514) and the Mamluks of Syria and Egypt (Marj Dabiq in 1516 and Raydaniyya in 1517) and under Sultan Süleyman (r. 1520–66) against the Hungarians (Mohács in 1526) resulted in spectacular Ottoman territorial gains in eastern Anatolia, Azerbaijan, Syria, Egypt, and Hungary.

This chapter examines a series of events that occurred in Chuquisaca in mid-1781 following the spread of rumors of an alleged popular revolt against rising royal taxes. While there was no compelling evidence of such a conspiracy, the focal point of discord became the origin and intent of the false rumors, which the urban resident, both patricians and plebeians, attributed the peninsular audiencia ministers and a newly arrived company of Spanish soldiers dispatched from Buenos Aires to suppress the pan-Andean rebellion led by Tupac Amaru and Tupac Katari. At the root of the public conflict was a dispute over the status of the Chuquisaca people within the monarchy following their victory over the indigenous insurgents. Fears of a popular uprising ended up giving rise to novel forms of group representation, political rituals that underscored the sudden relevance acquired by the opinions of the local population, and public ceremonies that exposed the construction of the city as a subject of history and a political actor. In the customary language of monarchical legitimism, the collective practices both invoked and subverted the axiomatic loyalty to the Crown.

The post-Frederician Prussian army cultivated the glory of the past, but also experienced continuous debates and reforms intending to optimize the army according to the principles of enlightened rationalism. The confrontation with the French revolutionary armies activated intensive discussions, but for the military authorities, the experiences did not call for principal doubts about the suitability of the army. The defeat of 1806, however, did. The following reforms had to handle elementary needs to re-establish the armed forces, but also took the opportunity to create new organisational frameworks and to introduce new principles for recruitment, military justice and officers’ careers. From a quantitative perspective, the important measures converged on the implementation of a general conscription, and from a qualitative perspective, they especially targeted reconciling the educated middle-class with military service. When the break with France in 1813 effaced the previously existing restrictions, the plans resulted not only in an augmentation of the standing army, but in the establishment of complementary military formations of own characters. Their coexistence reflected organisational constraints, as well as different aspects of the previous debates. Although not without improvisations, the authorities were able to increase the armed forces more than sevenfold within about nine months.

The overall approach of the book is thematic, with the Introduction providing important context for what follows, especially for those less familiar with Roman history, first by defining key terms and parameters (especially explaining the chronological range of the volume, from the fourth century BC to the early seventh century AD), and then through an overview of the incidence of warfare, both external and internal, across the course of Roman history. The evolution of Roman military forces from the Republic through to Late Antiquity is outlined, with particular attention to Augustus’ formalisation of a standing army and the reconfiguration of the empire’s forces in the early fourth century. Finally, the most important ancient sources for the subject are introduced, with discussion of key literary sources (Polybius, Caesar, Livy, Josephus, Tacitus, Ammianus Marcellinus and Procopius), the less familiar Syriac chronicle atttributed to Joshua the Stylite, military treatises, documentary evidence (inscriptions, papyri) and relevant archaeological material.