This chapter explores the function of ethics in the International Tennis Federation (ITF). It starts off by setting out the difference between ethics and law and then introduces the ITF’s substantive ethical rules. It explores covered persons under these rules, as well as the incumbent basic and other rules. It then examines the role and functions of the ITF’s Ethics Commission and analyses the few cases that it has entertained over the years. The chapter examines how ethics investigations are conducted, as well as the nature of relevant decisions by the Commission, which classifies breaches as either aggravated or non-aggravated. It futher examines the suspensive effect of the notice of charge and recourse to the ITF’s Independent Tribunal and the CAS, as well as the range of sanctions that may be employed. Finally, the chapter explores the elections and Eligibility Panel of the ITF in respect of those seeking elections to the higher executive echelons of the ITF.

This chapter brings together the book’s analysis and argues that crucial yet feasible reforms can be made to the operation of the global anti-financial crime regime. They include distinguishing between various categories of regulated services, such that certain essential services – for example, basic bank accounts – must be provided to everyone but attract reporting obligations, whereas highly specialised services with a significant potential to facilitate money laundering – for example, high-end investment banking activities – must be refused if a suspicion arises that proceeds of crime are involved. The chapter also argues that the FATF Recommendations should be revised to explicitly require countries to maximise intelligence-gathering opportunities that serve law enforcement purposes while minimising the risk of complicity in money laundering, terrorist financing or proliferation financing. In particular, this should entail the requirement for countries to ensure that the regulated businesses’ AML/CTF compliance efforts are aligned with the country’s law enforcement priorities, whether through public–private partnerships, ‘keep open’ laws or other appropriate means.

Over the past decades, multiple areas of law – including anti-money laundering (AML), counterterrorist financing (CTF) and sanctions rules – have emerged that regulate the interactions of the legitimate economy with known or suspected criminals. These rules impose significant compliance burdens on regulated sectors and their effectiveness is often contested. Furthermore, they raise profound civil liberties questions, such as whether one can be excluded from banking or other services based on a mere suspicion of crime or what the permissible extent of financial surveillance is. Despite the growing recognition of the extraordinary role that AML/CTF and sanctions laws play in shaping our societies, there have been few attempts to trace in detail the historical evolution of global thinking about the dilemmas that those laws present, with a focus on key policy tensions rather than the mere development of laws and institutions. This chapter offers an introduction to the overall book project and outlines the policy intentions it studies.

This chapter considers examples of State enforcement of international law, including in cases of war crimes and genocide. It then assesses collective enforcement under mechanisms provided for in the UN Charter, giving particular consideration to UN sanctions, including Australian law and policy approaches giving effect to sanctions, and peacekeeping.

This chapter theorizes payment infrastructures as crucial material sites of hegemonic power in three different regards. First, the material form of payment technologies and the uneven routes of circulation produced by them are an integral part of the ways in which modern money and finance exercise power. Payment technology is not a neutral infrastructure, but a carrier of hegemonic power and potential site of hegemonic contestation. Second, payment infrastructure is inextricably connected to state security and sovereignty. State security and sovereignty were enabled and made durable with and through the payment infrastructure. Third, infrastructures are historically durable, though they may be rerouted or reinscribed. This chapter distills three elements that typify the hegemonic power of infrastructure and that can be used when taking “infrastructure” as the starting point for analysis. These elements are (1) sedimentation, (2) reach, and (3) disposition. The arguments are illustrated empirically by reference to the so-called financial war on terror, where financial infrastructures became a major but highly depoliticized site of security power. Empirically, this chapter focuses on the way in which the payment technology SWIFT and financial transactions are being appropriated for security purposes.

Russia’s policies, as responding to the pressure of sanctions on financial infrastructures, provide a prime example of the development of alternatives to Western-dominated financial systems. From a perspective of infrastructural power, this chapter discusses the issue in relation to an expansion of the state’s economic role. Focusing mainly on the payment card system “Mir” and the digital ruble, it traces the development of cashless payment in post-Soviet Russia from an early phase of dominating Western companies to the strongly increased involvement of the Bank of Russia in the payment market. It also shows how payment via state-owned infrastructures serves as a vehicle for further infrastructural projects, entailing an extension of state power. With regard to the controversies between the regulator and the banking industry over state-owned payment infrastructures, it shows how the verticalization of the political system in Russia affects the positioning of the Bank of Russia and also its relationship to the large state-owned enterprises in the financial sector.

This second chapter on transnational approaches to grand corruption looks at other ways to pressure corrupt governments when internal controls like the judiciary or auditors don’t work. It looks at individual or “smart” sanctions for human rights violations or grand corruption in the US, EU, UK, Canada and elsewhere. It then considers cases based on extraterritorial jurisdiction, private standards and certifications, and conditions placed by international development banks and agencies as sources of pressure and redress.

This chapter of the handbook compares the major moral sanctioning behaviors of blame and punishment from two perspectives: their cultural history and their underlying psychology. The author draws a dividing line between two phases of human evolution – before and after human settlement – and proposes that, before that watershed, moral sanctions were informal, nonhierarchical, and often mild, akin to today’s acts of moral blame among intimates. Soon after settlement, hierarchies emerged, in which punishment took hold as a new form of sanctioning, typically exacted by those higher up in the hierarchy, and eventually by institutions of punishment. The author reviews the empirical evidence on the cognitive and social processes underlying each of these sanctioning tools and proposes that their distinct cultural histories are reflected in their psychological properties we can observe today. Whereas blame is, on the whole, flexible, effective, and cognitively sophisticated, punishment is often more damaging, less effective, and can easily be abused – as in past and modern forms of institutional punishment.

The opening chapter lays the foundation for a comprehensive exploration of sanctions. It traces their historical evolution, categorizes episodes, and unveils a comprehensive typology. The chapter dissects multilateral and unilateral sanctions, secondary and extraterritorial measures, and various types, revealing strategic diversity and broad consequences. Effectiveness, especially in US sanctions, is assessed, highlighting the US’s significant role in shaping global sanctions and their impact.

Utilizing the theoretical framework of transnational legal orders (TLOs), this chapter treats two master questions in global governance: What are the limits to the power of the UN Security Council? Can rule-of-law (ROL) norms constrain UNSC powers? First, we outline a research design with emphasis on its documentary and unique internal empirical sources. Second, we sketch an interpretive narrative of UNSC engagement from the early 1990s to the present with ROL in three areas of UNSC action: peacekeeping, sanctions, and force. Third, we offer a new conceptual approach by proposing that ROL in the UNSC manifests itself in three dimensions: discourse, procedure (or rules), and structures. These dimensions come into play both internally, within the UNSC itself, and externally, in ROL institution-building in and between states, as well as in post-conflict zones, with a rather gray area between (e.g., when the UN peacekeeping missions are themselves subject to ROL oversight for the behavior of their personnel). Fourth, we examine the emergence of micro-TLOs under construction within the UNSC itself. We conclude with reflections on the potential for empowering elected members of the UNSC and weaker states in the UN to press ROL norms on the UNSC as a springboard for ROL global governance via the UNSC.

This chapter explores how the Indian state asserts its digital sovereignty through digital public goods, including the Unified Payment Interface (UPI), which is overseen by the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), an entity governed by the Reserve Bank of India. This chapter demonstrates how, as part of the “India Stack,” indigenous digital payment design, architecture, and governance mechanisms allow for accessible, secure, and interoperable transactions in a mobile-first, open API-based payment network. This significantly reduces India’s dependence on foreign financial systems and protects it from shocks that could result from foreign sanctions (e.g., US economic sanctions of Russia in 2014 impacting MasterCard and Visa users in Russia). However, such a system is not without potential drawbacks, some of which include the dominance of foreign entities (e.g., Google Pay) on UPI as well as state-sanctioned monopolies that may minimize civil society participation and market competition. Besides interoperability and risk mitigation, the authors also advocate a multi-stakeholder governance model for the national digital payment system to bolster public ownership and institutional checks and balances.

This chapter delves into the question of the impact of extraterritorial and secondary sanctions on private contractual relations. It opens with a discussion of the characterisation of extraterritorial and secondary sanctions as potential legal or factual impediments to the performance of contractual obligations. A detailed analysis of the case law follows, bringing to the fore some degree of reluctance on the part of judicial authorities to allow operators to suspend the performance of their contractual obligations or to terminate contractual relations on account of their exposure to extraterritorial or secondary sanctions, at least in the absence of sanctions or force majeure contractual clauses. The chapter also explores the potential tension between such sanctions, on the one hand, and measures – commonly referred to as blocking statutes – enacted by states or by the EU to thwart their effects, on the other hand. A discussion, in this respect, of the relevant case law reveals a quest for a balance between policy objectives and economic soundness and shows the existence of incongruent views on the compatibility of sanctions clauses with blocking statutes.

Sanctions are intrinsically complex. Implementation of sanctions regulations often entails navigating an extremely dynamic environment consisting of numerous restrictions and prohibitions, difficulties in interpretation, inconsistent measures adopted by imposing jurisdictions and countermeasures. This has been evident following the sanctions against Russia, often described as unprecedented in scale. The more frequent resort to sanctions further means that an increasing number of international contractual relationships are affected. Financial institutions operating globally are particularly impacted. This is exacerbated by the use of secondary sanctions which remain a controversial foreign policy tool and even subject to countermeasures, for example, blocking statutes. Consequently, financial institutions and other economic operators with an international presence, torn between two conflicting regimes, face an unsolvable legal dilemma. This uncertainty extends to the termination of contracts involving persons or activities subject to secondary sanctions. Although in most cases international (financial) contracts contain sanctions clauses (often under force majeure provisions), it remains unclear whether these can be relied on, especially where the institution’s own jurisdiction opposes secondary sanctions. This chapter presents in more detail what are the practical challenges in sanctions implementation. It focuses on financial institutions and provide recommendations on how such challenges could be addressed.