This Chapter first explains what the ECtHR regards as the object of review in cases where an alleged violation of the Convention is caused by legislation: is this the legislation as such (which would invite general and more abstract review), or is it the individual decision applying this legislation (which would invite individualised and more concrete review), or perhaps both? The chapter then turns to discussing how the Court has tried to reconcile its task of offering individual justice and general constitutional interpretations. Specific attention is paid in this regard to the role of precedent-based reasoning in the Court’s case law and to case-based review, incrementalism and the development of general principles. Finally, the legal effect of these general principles is discussed (so-called ’res interpretata’ or force of interpretation), in contrast to the application thereof to the facts of the individual case.

Although any act of (international) judicial interpretation can be conceived of as lawmaking, judicial lawmaking under the Convention system is particularly extensive both in quality and quantity. Today, the text of the ECHR and its Protocols is merely the basis of a much larger notion of Convention law. This chapter discusses lawmaking understood as the general effect of Strasbourg case-law beyond the individual case. It analyzes the Court’s extensive lawmaking function from a Convention perspective and argues that ECHR lawmaking is uniquely supranational and integrative. The ECtHR resorts to a majoritarian approach to set a human rights standard, which may be (re-)imposed on states by virtue of the Court’s interpretative authority and states’ primary duty to secure Convention rights. The possibility of third-party interventions can be viewed as both an expression and justification of the Court’s lawmaking power and interpretative authority.