Why do states exit IOs? How often does IO exit happen? And what are the consequences of IO exit for leaving states? Despite recent attention to individual cases and the importance of membership in IOs, little is known about state exit from IOs across states, organizations, and time. Chapter 1 outlines the common logic of IO exit that links withdrawal and suspension: States often use IO exit as a strategy to negotiate institutional change when mechanisms of voice have failed. We summarize our empirical contributions that rely on a new dataset of IO exit across 198 states and 534 IOs from 1913 to 2022. We show that exit is infrequent, intermittent, and often temporary rather than terminal. Factors related to bargaining help predict IO exit, and exit generates negative reputational and cooperative consequences for leaving states. Nonetheless, IO exit is often an imperfect tool in achieving institutional change. Overall, we correct the view of IO exit as recently increasing. We also show that alternative arguments are not correct: IO exit is not widely occurring because of a backlash against globalization, nationalism/populism, IO authority, or legal rules. Moreover, exit is not inconsequential. We end with a roadmap for each chapter.

Chapter 2 theorizes the causes and consequences of state exit from IOs. We explain that IOs start as being beneficial to member states but may become dissatisfying to some states as preferences diverge, power shifts, or IOs themselves evolve. Leaning on the “exit, voice, and loyalty” framework by Hirschman (1970), we argue that dissatisfied states can voice their discontent but when this does not generate desired results, states sometimes use the process of IO exit to invoke change. Threatening and enacting exit can accelerate a tipping point by presenting states with a potential future without the exiting state, which could reduce institutional benefits. The ability to use exit as a negotiation strategy shifts with a state’s bargaining power as well as institutional constraints. As part of the negotiating process, many exit threats are not implemented and many exiting states return to IOs. But exit is costly: Given that exiting states may be perceived as reneging on an international commitment, they can incur negative reputational and cooperative consequences from other actors in the international community. Exiting states may therefore engage in stigma management. And while institutional change is often the goal, exit is usually an imperfect tool for achieving it.