In exploring deliberative dynamics within mini-publics, it has been observed that initial group-building activities play a crucial role in enhancing deliberative reasoning. However, the influence of liberal democratic practices such as voting mechanisms and the inclusion of strategic or representative stakeholders, on deliberative processes is not well understood. This study undertakes a comparative configurational meta-analysis (CCMA) of 22 minipublics to investigate how these liberal democratic elements influence deliberative reasoning. Results indicate that participants’ deliberative reasoning is significantly enhanced in contexts where initial group activities are coupled with prolonged periods of deliberation and where voting is minimised or absent. In contrast, the presence of voting mechanisms, strategic stakeholder involvement, and a high impact of minipublics on decision-making processes are associated with weaker, negative, or stable participant deliberative reasoning. These findings contribute to the broader discourse on the integration of deliberative and non-deliberative components within minipublics, highlighting the potential negative impact of strategic behaviour on the quality of deliberation.

This paper argues that we are not just social epistemic creatures because we operate in social contexts. We are social epistemic creatures because of the nature of our epistemic cognitive capacities. In The Enigma of Reason, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber develop and defend the view that reasoning is a social competence that yields epistemic benefits for individuals through social interaction with others. I argue an epistemological consequence of their position is that, when beliefs are formed and sustained by dialogical deliberation, the relevant justification-conferring process doesn’t occur solely within the cognition of the subject whose belief is under evaluation. Rather, it extends to include her interactive engagement with other deliberative participants. I argue this demonstrates that not all justification-conferring is evidential. As such, the analysis not only supports reconceiving the process reliabilist’s notion of justification-conferring processes; it also serves as an argument against evidentialism. A goal of this paper is to demonstrate that social epistemology isn’t merely a siloed offshoot of traditional epistemology. Even when approaching social epistemology using a conservative methodology, our investigation has serious implications for fundamental questions concerning epistemic normativity.

It is common for philosophers to suggest that practical deliberation is normative; deliberation about what to do essentially involves employing normative concepts. This thesis—‘the Normativity Thesis’—is significant because, among other things, it supports the conclusion that normative thought is inescapable for us. In this article, I defend the Normativity Thesis against objections.

Design rationale is the justification behind a product component, often captured via written reports and oral presentations. Research shows that the structure and information used to communicate and document rationale significantly influence human behavior. To better understand the influence of design rationale on engineering design, we investigate the information engineers and designers include in design rationales in written reports. Eight hundred and forty-six pages of student engineering design reports from 28 teams representing 116 individuals were analyzed using a mixed-methods approach and compared across project types. The rationales from the reports were coded inductively into concepts and later applied to five industry reports consisting of 218 pages. The findings reveal a spectrum of rationales underpinning design decisions. Grounded in the data, the feature, specification and evidence (FSE) framework emerged as a feature-based and low-effort capture approach. We discuss the need to improve design communication in engineering design, through structuring rationales (i.e., using the proposed FSE framework or other representations) and improving technical writing skills. Lastly, by enhancing design rationale communication and documentation practices, significant benefits can be realized for computational support tools such as automatic rationale extraction or generative approaches.

When we're inquiring to find out whether p is true, knowing that we'll get better evidence in the future seems like a good reason to suspend judgment about p now. But, as Matt McGrath has recently argued, this natural thought is in deep tension with traditional accounts of justification. On traditional views of justification, which doxastic attitude you are justified in having now depends on your current evidence, not on what you might learn later. McGrath proposes to resolve this tension by distinguishing between different ways of having a neutral attitude. I argue that McGrath's account is unable to account for the full range of cases in which an agnostic attitude is warranted. We can remedy this by pairing his account with my theory of transitional and terminal attitudes, which claims that attitudes are justified in different ways depending on whether they are formed in intermediate stages of deliberation or as conclusions of deliberation. I compare my view with an alternative, more parsimonious one, according to which deliberation itself is a source of new evidence. I argue that this alternative proposal is faced with a dilemma: it either generates a vicious regress, or it fails to capture the relevant cases.

Our experience of reasoning is replete with conflict. People phenomenologically vacillate between options when confronted with challenging decisions. Existing experimental designs typically measure a summary of the experience of the conflict experienced throughout the choice process for any individual choice or even between multiple observers for a choice. We propose a new method for measuring vacillations in reasoning during the time-course of individual choices, utilizing them as a fine-grained indicator of cognitive conflict. Our experimental paradigm allows participants to report the alternative they were considering while deliberating. Through 3 experiments, we demonstrate that our measure correlates with existing summary judgments of conflict and confidence in moral and logical reasoning problems. The pattern of deliberation revealed by these vacillations produces new constraints for theoretical models of moral and syllogistic reasoning.

According to Action-First theorists, like Jonathan Dancy, reasons for action explain reasons for intentions. According to Intention-First theorists, like Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way, reasons for intentions explain reasons for action. In this paper, I introduce and defend a version of the Action-First theory called “Instrumentalism.” According to Instrumentalism, just as we can derive, using principles of instrumental transmission, reasons to ψ from reasons to ϕ (provided there’s some relevant instrumental relation between ψ-ing and ϕ-ing), we can derive reasons to intend to ϕ from reasons to ϕ (provided there’s some relevant instrumental relation between intending to ϕ and ϕ-ing). After providing some defense of Instrumentalism, I turn to two recent, important arguments for the Intention-First theory advanced by McHugh and Way, and I argue that neither of them succeed. I conclude that we should reject the Intention-First theory and that we have grounds for optimism about the Action-First theory.

A peculiar feature of our species is that we settle what to believe, value, and do by reasoning through narratives. A narrative is adiachronic, information-rich story that contains persons, objects, and at least one event. When we reason through narrative, we usenarrative to settle what to do, to make predictions, to guide normative expectations, and to ground which reactive attitudes we think areappropriate in a situation. Narratives explain, justify, and provide understanding. Narratives play a ubiquitous role in human reasoning. Andyet, narratives do not seem up to the task. Narratives are often unmoored representations (either because they are do not purport to referto the actual world, or because they are grossly oversimplified, or because are known to be literally false). Against this, I argue thatnarratives guide our reasoning by shaping our grasp of modal structure: what is possible, probable, plausible, permissible, required,relevant, desirable and good. Narratives are good guides to reasoning when they guide us to accurate judgments about modal space. Icall this the modal model of narrative. In this paper, I develop an account of how narratives function in reasoning, as well as an account ofwhen reasoning through narrative counts as good reasoning.

Influential ‘fast-and-slow’ dual process models suggest that sound reasoning requires the correction of fast, intuitive thought processes by slower, controlled deliberation. Recent findings with high-level reasoning tasks started to question this characterization. Here we tested the generalizability of these findings to low-level cognitive control tasks. More specifically, we examined whether people who responded accurately to the classic Stroop and Flanker tasks could also do so when their deliberate control was minimized. A two-response paradigm, in which people were required to give an initial ‘fast’ response under time–pressure and cognitive load, allowed us to identify the presumed intuitive answer that preceded the final ‘slow’ response given after deliberation. Across our studies, we consistently find that correct final Stroop and Flanker responses are often non-corrective in nature. Good performance in cognitive control tasks seems to be driven by accurate ‘fast’ intuitive processing, rather than by ‘slow’ controlled correction of these intuitions. We also explore the association between Stroop and reasoning performance and discuss implications for the dual process view of human cognition.