The book examines Nationalist China’s military provisioning strategies during its war against Japan, from procurement and storage to transportation and seizure from the enemy, to make two broader points. Firstly, the conflict shows that the historical concept of total war should not be confined to modern technology as a means or to rapid victory as an end. Chinese thinkers christened their struggle against Japan a “total war,” but held a different vision of totality to accommodate China’s premodern resource base and commitment to protracted warfare. Secondly, logistics deserves more attention not just among military historians, but among all scholars of war. Its technicalities are a crucial window into the everyday experiences of ordinary actors who have been marginalized in historical scholarship.

dedicate sufficient forces and use them decisively. In the Korean War, the US failed to grasp opportunities to decisively defeat the enemy and failed to commit forces sufficient to bring about a quick conclusion to the struggle. The result was an attritional stalemate. In both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the US overestimated and misunderstood the effectiveness of airpower. Moreover, the US has also too often failed to understand that winning in a counterinsurgency struggle hinges upon three key factors: gaining the support of the people, eliminating insurgent sanctuaries, and isolating the insurgents from outside support.