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This chapter introduces the major themes of the book. Insurance practices and related metaphors began expanding rapidly from a European base some 500 years ago. The simultaneous emergence of the modern state was hardly coincidental. Increasingly complex societies energized by market economies required protection from risks of various kinds. This required mobilizing and organizing private capital to achieve common goals. The deepening of markets and development of financial technologies now increases demands for protection beyond conventional borders. But where the fiscal power of the modern state underpinned national insurance and reinsurance systems, the absence of a global fiscal authority is exposed by rising cross-border, systemic, and global risks. That the background condition for necessary innovation in governance is uncertainty has also become undeniable.
Of the sectors comprising international capital markets, insurance and reinsurance have attracted relatively little attention from students of politics. New social conventions and financial instruments arising from the invention of probabilistic calculation and the discovery of risk began to spread around the world five centuries ago. Today, states and firms are harnessing the logic of insurance to address an expansive array of risks confronting their societies. In Insuring States in an Uncertain World, Louis Pauly examines the history and politics of pragmatic experiments aimed at governing complex global risks. His fascinating and accessible narrative explores the promise and the challenges of multi-faceted insurance arrangements in arenas ranging from nuclear energy production and international financial intermediation to those focused on environmental change, infectious diseases, and disruptive new technologies. At a time when the foundations of global order are under mounting stress, Pauly makes the case for limited and effective political innovation.
Data Rights in Transition maps the development of data rights that formed and reformed in response to the socio-technical transformations of the postwar twentieth century. The authors situate these rights, with their early pragmatic emphasis on fair information processing, as different from and less symbolically powerful than utopian human rights of older centuries. They argue that, if an essential role of human rights is 'to capture the world's imagination', the next generation of data rights needs to come closer to realising that vision – even while maintaining their pragmatic focus on effectiveness. After a brief introduction, the sections that follow focus on socio-technical transformations, emergence of the right to data protection, and new and emerging rights such as the right to be forgotten and the right not to be subject to automated decision-making, along with new mechanisms of governance and enforcement.
By revisiting the works of the eclectic and controversial thinker Giovanni Papini, the chapter shows how pragmatism was much more than an original American product. It was a transnational philosophical approach involving many people on both sides of the Atlantic enmeshed in a kaleidoscope of different philosophical traditions, whether voluntarist, immanentist, or historicist. By framing the pragmatist tradition on both sides of the Atlantic, I show that Vico’s intellectual resurrection in the early twentieth century and the parallel success of pragmatism in the same period are somewhat linked. They both resulted from a widely felt obsession with human action and an uncompromising contempt for all kinds of barren intellectualism.
Published in 1710, Giambattista Vico's groundbreaking On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians argued, against Descartes, that knowledge is more about making and producing than speculating and theorising. Historicised activities precede any kind of ethereal abstraction. Maurizio Esposito situates Vico's epistemology of praxis within the longstanding tradition of the maker's knowledge perspective and shows how Vico transformed the ancient idea that knowledge is a form of making into a humanist and existential principle. Humans do not merely fabricate tools and transform nature; they also create symbolic spaces in which different forms of thinking and understanding evolve. Esposito explores the possibility that Vico envisioned a non-Cartesian version of modernity, where praxis, rather than reason, drives human history. This alternative modernity has directly or indirectly influenced some of the most significant philosophical traditions of the past two centuries and is more relevant today than ever.
Part of the fascination of Being and Time is that it seeks to weave together so many different strands of thought. But unsurprisingly, its readers also worry that such a work must subject itself to such strain that ultimately it itself must unravel. Key tensions are between the outlooks of three figures: Heidegger the pragmatist, Heidegger the existentialist, and Heidegger the philosopher of being. Seeing how openness to our concerns as a whole is both necessary for authenticity and reveals a unified horizon against which entities with different ways of being show themselves, dissipates these apparent tensions. Recognition of the mediating role played by a conception of the good – that Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle and Augustine inspired – helps make clear that authenticity is both compatible with the practical embeddedness of our concerns and reveals a form of understanding necessary for ontology to be possible.
This chapter begins by acknowledging the value of the classical model of scientific discovery with its commitment to isolating variables and cancelling out noise to give us a sense of significance in the numerical results produced. But the 20 chapters in this book amply demonstrate that in the real world of discovery things are messy, unpredictable, and highly differentiated within and across disciplines. Such enduring principles of discovery, emerging from the work of scientists and scholars, are identified not only for their intellectual value but also for their practical guidance for those engaged in advanced research.
This book introduces a normative theory of property. Property laws and social norms are justified by whether and how well they secure natural rights. The natural rights are justified by run-of-the-mill principles of natural law, which evaluate human action by whether it helps people survive or flourish rationally. The book studies how natural rights legitimate property law in general and in specific doctrines. It also studies the main topics in property law and policy – ownership, public commons, the appropriate design of property rights, rights less sweeping than rights of ownership, property torts, regulatory takings, and eminent domain. The book studies in particular the phenomenon of practical reasoning, the sphere of moral reasoning that converts fundamental moral goals into specific laws and policies to enforce in practice. A theory of natural rights contributes importantly to normative theory beyond the theories most respected today – egalitarian or progressive theories, law and economics, and approaches the book calls pragmatic.
Arndt Emmerich and Alyaa Ebbiary explore the evolution of scholarship on Salafi Islamic movements, highlighting how the field has matured over time. The chapter emphasizes recent research that recognizes the agency exhibited by Salafi women in engaging with their faith. These women adhere to the core rulings while negotiating secondary ones to ensure they can live fulfilling lives while respecting tradition.
Normative conflict is at the centre of many current discussions about order and change in world politics. In this article, we argue that studying normativity in practice is necessary when analysing processes of global ordering, such as negotiating, cooperating, or protesting. Practices are imbued with normativity. This key aspect, however, remains often overlooked in current International Relations (IR) practice research due to a conservative bias that treats practices mainly as patterned. Focusing on normativity reveals the inherent contestation of practices, providing a conceptual avenue for understanding how international practices oscillate between social order and change. Normativity can be defined as evaluating criteria experienced in practice and used for the contextualised moral judgement of public performances. This perspective is relevant for IR scholars interested in how relational, contested, and learning processes relate to order and ordering in world politics. We propose taking a comprehensive approach hereto based on three key dimensions: how normativity is enacted and disputed in practice; how it must be learnt as practical knowledge in communities; and, how ambiguity remains due to the multiplicity of rules applied in everyday situations. We illustrate our approach by examining global protests in different fields (sports, the environment, and peace).
This Introduction distinguishes three approaches to studying politics: political science, political philosophy, and the history of political thought. It identifies the last of these as the focus of the chapters in the collection. It then uses an example from Abraham Lincoln’s 1858 Illinois US Senate debates with Stephen A. Douglas to characterize literature’s relationship to politics. Finally, it distinguishes three approaches to literary history, which it labels poststructuralist discourse analysis, standpoint epistemology, and pragmatism. It treats pragmatism as the most suitable description of the mode of literary history practiced in the chapters in the collection.
The alignment of artificial intelligence (AI) systems with societal values and the public interest is a critical challenge in the field of AI ethics and governance. Traditional approaches, such as Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) and Constitutional AI, often rely on pre-defined high-level ethical principles. This article critiques these conventional alignment frameworks through the philosophical perspectives of pragmatism and public interest theory, arguing against their rigidity and disconnect with practical impacts. It proposes an alternative alignment strategy that reverses the traditional logic, focusing on empirical evidence and the real-world effects of AI systems. By emphasizing practical outcomes and continuous adaptation, this pragmatic approach aims to ensure that AI technologies are developed according to the principles that are derived from the observable impacts produced by technology applications.
In their recent article ‘Europe’s political constitution’, Alexander Somek and Elisabeth Paar conclude: ‘scholactivism is the form of constitutional law of Europe. There is nothing below or above it. It is all there is’. In this reply I want to take issue with such (rather bleak) view of what European constitutional scholarship is about. Firstly, I argue that scholactivism undermines the very conditions of scholarship as a pursuit of knowledge autonomous from both public and private power. The current attacks on academic institutions by authoritarian governments, and also the increasing dependence of research on private funders result, at least in part, from the politicization of scholarship. Secondly, I argue that we should be more critical towards the infrastructure of the digital public sphere, which Somek and Paar see to be emerging through blogs and other platforms, and be more protective of the existing practices that we inherited from our predecessors.
No prominent pragmatist philosopher to date has offered us a fully developed theory of history or historical interpretation. Nevertheless, a number of pivotal arguments and suggestions made by the pragmatists appeared to many both insightful and pertinent enough to offer a distinctive promise of a cohesive and distinctive general pragmatist perspective in historical theory. The present contribution is intended to secure some advances in this direction, focusing on the relationships between objectivity and perspective; between representation as an accurate correspondence to reality and the social, cultural sense of representation as being represented and being representative; as well as the relationship between individualizing comprehension and generalizing abstraction in historical contexts.
When considering the implications of the shareholder-stakeholder debate in defining the purpose of a company, epistemological clarity is vital in this emerging theory of the firm. Such clarity can prevent recurrence based solely on rephrasing key terms. To understand how various stakeholders develop and interpret a shared purpose, I argue for the necessity of a pragmatist approach that is normative and process-oriented. Mental models play a crucial role in interpretive processes that define decision-making, where individual perspectives converge. The figures of Milton Friedman and Ed Freeman serve as “beacons,” as artefacts, in the transmission of knowledge through which we, as individuals, shape a shared understanding. In current societies, profound polarization obstructs solutions to grand challenges. Pragmatism starts by questioning the underlying values of everyone involved. It assumes that sound deliberative processes are the only way to reach real solutions—not only for the mind but, above all, for the heart.
While there are affinities between Collingwood’s views and pragmatism, their shared considerations of the socio-historical dimensions of scientific knowledge have not been explored thus far. This chapter aims to fill this gap by comparing Collingwood’s views from An Essay on Metaphysics with pragmatist stances in contemporary philosophy of science by Philip Kitcher and Hasok Chang. In addition to similarities regarding the importance of the purposes of inquiry and framing knowledge in relation to a system of practice, there are disagreements between Collingwood and this strand of pragmatism regarding truth, propositional knowledge, and drawing out political implications. I argue that Collingwood’s approach can supply tools that can assist the pragmatist goals of improving scientific practice, mainly through analyzing cases from the history of science. This warrants mapping Collingwood’s place in twentieth-century philosophy as a precursor to recent attempts to overcome the clash between logical and historical approaches to scientific knowledge.
This article brings a pragmatic perspective to the analysis of threat perception in two important ways. First, as does the philosophical tradition of pragmatism, the article joins perception (or knowledge) together with response (action). Perception and response, knowledge and action, are inextricably linked as people learn through the creation of knowledge what is useful in the world. It is in this sense that pragmatists understand the perception and response to threats as evolved practices that are conjoined. Second, the paper explores threat perception and response under the condition of radical uncertainty. I explore the kinds of strategies leaders can use to respond to perceived threat in a context of radical uncertainty, the defining characteristic of contemporary world politics, and explore the advantages of pragmatic strategies that proceed to look for ‘what works in the world’ as provisional responses to perceived threats through iterative, ongoing experimental processes.
The British tended to deny that Darwinism had anything to say to philosophy, epistemology, or ethics. The Americans were far more appreciative of Darwinism, which supported strongly their approach to epistemology – Pragmatism. Today, on both sides of the Atlantic, there are enthusiasts for a Darwin-influenced philosophy, for instance one promoting a naturalistic Kantianism in epistemology and ethical nonrealism in moral discourse.
My aim in this chapter is to contribute to what the volume calls the ‘third move’ in International Relations norm studies, which explicitly addresses the legitimacy of the norm being studied as well as its influence on practice. I build on the work of those who point to the relevance of classical American Pragmatism, which considers how we know that what we are doing is appropriate once we realise that norms are the product of social and historical practices rather than abstract moral foundations. I trace the Pragmatist’s commitment to deliberative inquiry through the ideas of Charles Peirce and John Dewey and relate it to Antje Wiener’s arguments that normativity is sustained through proactive contestation. While there are overlaps between the two approaches, I argue that Deweyan Pragmatism can help us understand when it is appropriate to defend a norm against contestation. It does this by drawing on what Dewey called a ‘stock of learning’, understood as the background knowledge that has epistemic authority because it is the product of a deliberative and inclusive process of inquiry. I develop this with reference to debates within Pragmatist philosophy before applying it to offer a preliminary assessment of global health norms.
This chapter explores how biblical law is treated in the gospels, in Paul, and in other New Testament texts. It shows how recent scholarship has demonstrated that Jesus and Paul treat the law in more positive fashion than they are usually given credit for.