Chapter 6 details and tests our theory of IO exit by applying it to the predictors of IO suspensions. IO member states use suspension to punish states that have violated IO commitments and to incentivize domestic institutional change. We argue that suspension is not an automatic punishment for violations but instead is influenced by factors related to bargaining and institutional constraints: Violator states that are more powerful, have material resources, and have alliance relationships with regional powers are less likely to be suspended while IOs. Empirically, we analyze 101 IO suspensions from 1939 to 2022 across all IOs and states, and then focus our multivariate analyses on suspensions for political backsliding. This is because we show that most suspensions occur for human rights violations and incursions on democracy commitments (like coups d’état); and narrowing the scope allows us to control for the kinds of violations that prompt suspension. Our quantitative analysis shows that IO membership suspension is imposed against some but not all violators – and that this is partly because powerful states are able to insulate themselves from IO pressures, avoiding punishment for violations that less powerful states get suspended for. IO institutional constraints including their democratic density also affect the likelihood of suspension for political backsliding. Suspension can act as a multilateral diplomatic sanction but power and politics matter.

Chapter 7 details and tests our argument about the consequences of IO suspension. We argue that suspension can lead to negative reputational and cooperative consequences because suspension acts as a heuristic for international actors that the state has violated an international commitment. Suspension sends a signal that the state has been ostracized from a peer club, which removes the seal of approval that comes from membership. Suspension can also make it easier for other international actors to implement sanctions that might otherwise be hampered by collective action or legitimacy challenges. We test our expectations about the consequences of suspension by analyzing 71 IO suspensions for political backsliding from democratically committed IOs but also show some effects for the full set of 101 suspensions from all IOs. We show that ousted states incur reputational harm: This worsened perceptions of political stability and investor confidence scores. We also show that suspended states incur negative cooperative consequences: They have a lower chance of being elected as a non-permanent member in the UNSCand suspension facilitates subsequent sanctions by other international actors. Some suspended states use rhetoric to reject and counter stigmatization, and preemptively withdraw to frame the narrative in their favor. The analyses also show that domestic institutional change following suspension is usually shallow.

Chapter 8 traces the dynamics of our argument about the causes and consequences of IO suspensions with three qualitative case studies: Honduras’ suspension from and return to the OAS (2009–2011), Syria’s suspension from and return to the Arab League (2011–2023), and Guinea’s suspension from ECOWAS (2021). Honduras’ and Guinea’s suspensions both occurred after coups d’état violated IO commitments. Syria’s suspension was in response to gross human rights violations that stemmed from government-sponsored violence. Each case shows how IO members used suspension as a multilateral diplomatic sanction, signaling peer disapproval, to push states to halt/change behavior. The suspensions catalyzed other international actors to also punish the countries’ political backsliding as seen through follow-on economic sanctions and the withholding of ambassadors. Each of the suspended countries engaged in stigma management after their forced exits. But the cases also show a range of different outcomes: Honduras returned to the OAS after meeting all of the IO’s stipulations for reinstatement; Syria was readmitted to the Arab League even without behavior changes (largely because of shifts in other members’ domestic politics and an intractable stalemate); and Guinea remains suspended from ECOWAS at the time of writing.