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This chapter concentrates on the conditions of access to and the nature of membership in the international system as established by international law—specifically, three issues. The first issue is the type of society that is presented as a legitimate collective member of the international order. One of the first steps that international law takes to determine legitimacy at the international level is to identify the criteria necessary for a collective actor to be viewed as a full-fledged legitimate member of the international community. The second issue is that after World War II and the creation of the United Nations (UN), access to international membership in the international order moved toward a form of universality that has been relatively pluralistic. The third issue is that despite this movement toward a pluralistic universality, there are limits to the universality and pluralism of international membership in the international system as defined by international law.
In this article, I argue for a “multifunctional account” of political feasibility and against recent attempts by several theorists to defend accounts of political feasibility that reduce feasibility judgments to a single function. According to the view I defend, political feasibility can (and should) serve multiple useful functions in our political deliberative practices. This pluralist and context-dependent approach allows us to retain the insights provided by various monofunctional accounts, while avoiding the limitations of each.
Considers legal restrictions on clothing, particularly in light of pluralism and multiculturalism. Examines several approaches to such restrictions. Analyzes and examines the notion of cultural appropriation when it comes to clothing, and discusses where the wrongs of appropriation lie.
In a commercial society we see gains from trade. Entrepreneurship involves alertness to opportunities for gains from trade along with a willingness to bear risks that go with being on a frontier of innovation. Social entrepreneurship, whatever else it may be, is first of all a form of entrepreneurship.
In his widely anthologized article on the therapy-enhancement distinction, Resnik argues that, from a moral point of view, the claim that something is not health related cannot be a dispositive argument against the permissibility of enhancements. He further states how the permissibility of an intervention will depend on considerations like the intention for its use and the likely consequences that will ensue, and whether these violate any moral standards. Within this framework, in this paper I first argue that enhancements may be morally permissible on autonomy grounds (its political conception); and secondly, that this permissibility does not dissolve a moral distinction between therapies and enhancements, with the reason being that there is still a difference between something being generally permissible (i.e., therapies) and something being conditionally permissible (i.e., enhancements). But that is not all that is important for a moral therapy-enhancement distinction. I also argue that the distinction — apart from being about “permissibility” (at the level of regulation of individual use) — is also about regarding justice more broadly (at the level of what is owed to individuals). What captures the moral distinction more fully is that therapies are, generally speaking, not only morally permissible but also owed to persons (due to being enablers of social cooperation and competition), whereas, at this stage, enhancements can only be morally permissible. I demonstrate the appeal of this view by considering its stability and usefulness across specialized bioethical contexts and across various kinds of enhancements and show that its practical value for policy lies in its legitimizing / anticipatory and prioritizing functions.
In this contribution we ask how Přibáň’s theoretical choices shape the capacity of ‘European constitutional imaginaries’ to account for the ever more necessary work of recognition and redistribution within European society. While ‘European constitutional imaginaries’ reveal the intricate ideologies at play within European law and politics, as well as their power in motivating dominant currents of European political life, the project remains limited in that it accepts essential tenets of functional differentiation in society, obscuring the conditions of possibility for the formation of differentiated systems. Put differently, ‘European constitutional imaginaries’, both as forms of life and analytic concepts, have difficulty in conceiving the frontiers of imaginaries, their beginning and end, their formation and transformation—and in so doing, risk naturalizing their initial differentiation as a priori excluded from political contestation.
This article examines the democratic potential of global network governance. It critiques conventional legitimacy frameworks that focus on the institutional qualities of governance networks for evading deeper ethical questions about how to deal with diversity as a fundamental condition of global life. Drawing on contestation theory, English School pluralism, and radical democratic theory, I argue that democratic network governance thrives by embracing diverse norm interpretations and fostering agonistic engagement among its members. I illustrate how this idea can guide a critical analysis of global governance networks through a case study of humanitarian governance in Southeast Asia. I assess to what extent diverse humanitarian actors have been able to assert and practise their own interpretations of humanitarian norms, how they relate to the fact that others advance competing understandings, and whether the boundaries for legitimate norm enactments are drawn on legitimate grounds. By highlighting the ethical significance of these dynamics from a pluralist standpoint, the study offers a novel way of thinking about democracy in a world that is characterised by complex policy problems, diffuse authority, and vocal demands for recognition by an increasingly diverse array of actors.
A pragmatic approach to international human rights law involves discussing its premises, principles like human dignity, liberty, equality, and solidarity, and structural principles such as democracy, pluralism, and the rule of law. The chapter also examines the conditions, matters, and actors involved in the discussion. It explores how these principles are applied in practice and the challenges faced in their implementation. The chapter emphasizes the importance of a pragmatic approach that considers the practical realities of applying human rights principles in different contexts. It also discusses the role of various actors, including states, international organizations, and civil society, in promoting and protecting human rights.
The witholding of equal public recognition of national, cultural and language identity often causes severe anguish to sub-state peoples and sometimes leads to war. For this reason, political philosophy has an important responsibility to think through the moral grounds and the appropriate means of recognition. This chapter draws a moral map of the recognitional debate, outlining three normative camps: nonrecognition, monorecognition, and recognitional pluralism. I argue for recognitional pluralism, in two steps. The first step establishes, contra nonrecognition, that nations, cultures and languages are recognition-worthy, and that this is so for two reasons: they give people access to cultural life-worlds, and they are sources of dignity. The second step builds the case for a pluralistic means of according public recognition. To do so, I argue, against monorecognition, that egalitarian recognition of life-world access and dignity is to be the driving principle. Within the pluralist camp, I argue for the principle of equal services, which implies that the state accords comparable cultural services to the cultural groups that share a state or territory. Examples of this can be found in equal language rights regimes, egalitarian public holiday systems, as well as in multinational federalism.
This article explores the causes of nationalist civil war, a subtype of ethnic civil war in which anti-state actors fight for greater communal autonomy. It presents a theoretical framework claiming that grievances over lost communal autonomy commonly motivate nationalist civil war, but that other conditions are needed to put this motive into action: Nationalist frames and expectations must make communities sensitive to lost autonomy, and mobilizational resources must be available so actors can organize nationalist movements. Nation-state building, in turn, commonly promotes reductions in communal autonomy, and British colonial pluralism frequently strengthened nationalist frames, expectations, and mobilizational resources, suggesting that nationalist civil war should be common in former British colonies after transitions from empire to nation-state. To test the framework, this article provides a comparative historical analysis of Zomia, a region that has the highest concentration of nationalist civil wars in the world and in which half of the countries are former British colonies. The analysis provides strong evidence supporting the theoretical framework.
This introduction assesses a range of popular and scholarly attitudes toward the current state of American democracy, identifying in them a dominant theme of modern democratic theory, namely, an aversion to conflict. Just as John Rawls believed democratic societies to be perennially threatened by a “mortal conflict” between comprehensive doctrines and their “transcendent elements not admitting of compromise,” and so proposed a theory of liberal order aimed at preempting, containing, and resolving these conflicts, so contemporary critics perceive the intractable disagreements and polarizations of American political culture to be only corrosive and destabilizing. They propose strategies for achieving social cohesion grounded in a sense of national unity, shared history, or common identity more fundamental to difference. Many religious persons and traditions exhibit a similar aversion to conflict, believing it to indicate some form of sin, injustice, or moral error. I question this presumption that conflict is inherently vicious, ruinous, or violent, and begin to sketch an alternative view of conflict as basic to human creaturehood and potentially generative for social life.
Nicholas Norman-Krause argues, in this authoritative and sophisticated new treatment of conflict, that contestation is a basic - potentially regenerative - aspect of any flourishing democratic politics. In developing a distinctive 'agonistic theology,' and relating the political theory of agonism to social and democratic life, the author demonstrates that the conflicts of democracy may have a beneficial significance and depend at least in part on faith traditions and communities for their successful negotiation. In making his case, he deftly examines a rich range of religious and secular literatures, whether from the thought of Augustine, Aquinas, and Stanley Cavell or from less familiar voices such as early modern jurist and political thinker Johannes Althusius and twentieth-century Catholic social philosopher Yves Simon. Liberationists including Gustavo Gutiérrez and Martin Luther King, Jr. are similarly recruited for a theological account of conflict read not just as concomitant to, but also as constitutive of, democratic living.
Through a historical analysis of Japanese constitutions and key constitutional drafts from the Meiji Era to the present day, this article examines the relationship between the constitution of Japan and the rights of indigenous peoples. In recent decades, the constitutions of a number of countries have introduced clauses recognizing the culture or rights of indigenous people, but this still remains a lacuna in Japanese constitutional debates. After examining the continuing social problems which result from this lack of constitutional recognition, particularly from the perspective of the Ainu and Ryūkyū peoples, the article concludes with a call to oppose current government schemes for constitutional change by putting forward a radical alternative proposal to revise the constitution in a way that would recognize and celebrate Japan's ethnic, historical and cultural pluralism.
Recent moves by the Abe administration to change the Japanese constitution may result in the most fundamental change to Japanese political life since the 1940s. Although there has been widespread debate on the possible revision of Article 9 – the constitution's Peace Clause – other profound implications of the push for constitutional change have received scant attention. This special issue edited by Tessa Morris-Suzuki and Shinnosuke Takahashi aims to take a broad view of constitutional debates in Japan today by posing two key questions: “What is the purpose of the constitution?” and “What does the constitution mean for a culturally plural and diverse society?”
No prominent pragmatist philosopher to date has offered us a fully developed theory of history or historical interpretation. Nevertheless, a number of pivotal arguments and suggestions made by the pragmatists appeared to many both insightful and pertinent enough to offer a distinctive promise of a cohesive and distinctive general pragmatist perspective in historical theory. The present contribution is intended to secure some advances in this direction, focusing on the relationships between objectivity and perspective; between representation as an accurate correspondence to reality and the social, cultural sense of representation as being represented and being representative; as well as the relationship between individualizing comprehension and generalizing abstraction in historical contexts.
To most contributors in this volume, international organizations (IOs) act both as agents of, and inhibitors of peaceful change. This leaves the task of identifying exactly how and why they foster or inhibit peaceful change to empirical analysis and mid-level theorizing. Yet, as Ian Hurd points out in his chapter, understanding the deep power politics at play in institutionalized peaceful change requires a higher level of theorizing. This concluding chapter takes stock of the collective findings in light of Hurd’s cautionary tale and suggests future avenues of research engaging with postpositivist, relational, and critical theories. It identifies three main areas in need of further theorizing: the agents, the stakes, and the processes of peaceful change. It argues that such further theorizing would not only shed light on transformative processes of maximalist peaceful change which are yet to be fully explored in this volume, but it would also help develop a more pluralistic research agenda.
Electoral competition is typically organized around an evolving set of policy issues. Recent Italian politics suggests a revival of two classic dimensions concerning the mode of interaction that defines the very goals of a polity: elitism (whether goals should be defined from the top down or from the bottom up) and pluralism (whether a polity should only accept widely shared common goals or whether multiple, alternative goals may legitimately compete). While these concerns possibly became less relevant in the heydays of the party government model, recent literatures on populism, technocracy, and process preferences reflect renewed interest. We introduce a two-dimensional elitism–pluralism scheme that explicates the spatial arrangement of top-down and bottom-up visions of party government vis-à-vis models of populism and technocracy. To demonstrate the relevance of the two dimensions for party preference, we turn to the case of the 2022 Italian election, which followed a sequence of a populist, a mixed populist-mainstream and a technocratic government. Voter positions from specialized batteries of the Italian National Election Study are contrasted with party positions from an original expert survey. Findings indicate that preferences on elitism and pluralism complement standard dimensions of issue voting. An explorative analysis of comparative data suggests that many countries across Europe have the potential for similar developments. Electoral competition increasingly reflects concerns about its own principles.
Objects of knowledge exist within material, immaterial, and conceptual worlds. Once the world is conceived from the perspective of others, the physical ontology of modern science no longer functions as a standard by which to understand other orderings of reality, whether from ethnographical or historical sources. Because premodern and non-western sources attest to a plurality of sciences practiced in accordance with different ways of worldmaking from that of the modern West, their study belongs to the history of science, the philosophy of science, and the sociology of science, as well as the anthropology of science. In Worldmaking and Cuneiform Antiquity, Francesca Rochberg extends an anthropology of science to the historical world of cuneiform texts of ancient Babylonia. Exploring how Babylonian science has been understood, she proposes a new direction for scholarship by recognizing the world of ancient science, not as a less developed form of modern science, but as legitimate and real in its own right.
Here I move from historical analysis to philosophical explication of the concept of liberty, and I introduce the main conceptual components of the idea of freedom I defend.
Here I examine the relation between freedom and value, both in the sense of a person’s own values and the inherent value of liberty itself. I then show the relation between liberty, so conceived, and democratic institutions and practices.