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Both the theoretical and practical roots of contemporary preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacemaking trace back to the League of Nations. Starting with the Vilna dispute in 1920, the League organised collective action on several occasions, achieving varying degrees of success in different parts of the world. Although the League was ultimately unsuccessful in its overarching objective of preventing another global conflict, its results in preventing local conflicts from erupting or escalating have been unduly neglected. Furthermore, although a theoretical framework for preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacemaking would not be developed until many decades after the League had dissolved, its basic contours may be found already in the work and reflections of the organisation’s bodies and functionaries. This chapter analyses the League’s pioneering work in an attempt to present the organisation’s own contribution and better understand these phenomena in light of their early iterations.
European diplomacy changed significantly during the Ancien Régime. Sovereign powers made increasing use of different categories of ambassadors while grappling with religious division, international conflict, and emerging globalization. Papal diplomacy was itself hardly new, although it too evolved in these challenging circumstances. In various respects, the structures of papal diplomacy mirrored those of Europe’s dynastic states. Popes were nevertheless supposed to abide by certain ideological values as paternal figureheads, maintaining peace amongst warring Catholic powers while extending authority beyond Europe. This was problematic, as the papacy sought to square its own political interests with its moral duties. Given early modern Europe’s changing political landscape it is also unsurprising that the papacy’s supranational power was under increasing pressure. That was evident by the mid-eighteenth century, and the upheavals of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, although today it retains its traditional identity as a neutral diplomatic actor.
In 2022, the world experienced the deadliest year of armed conflict since the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Much of the intensity and frequency of recent conflicts has drawn more attention to failures in forecasting—that is, a failure to anticipate conflicts. Such capabilities have the potential to greatly reduce the time, motivation, and opportunities peacemakers have to intervene through mediation or peacekeeping operations. In recent years, the growth in the volume of open-source data coupled with the wide-scale advancements in machine learning suggests that it may be possible for computational methods to help the international community forecast intrastate conflict more accurately, and in doing so reduce the rise of conflict. In this commentary, we argue for the promise of conflict forecasting under several technical and policy conditions. From a technical perspective, the success of this work depends on improvements in the quality of conflict-related data and an increased focus on model interpretability. In terms of policy implementation, we suggest that this technology should be used primarily to aid policy analysis heuristically and help identify unexpected conflicts.
Why are progressives often critical of US foreign policy and the national security state? What would a statecraft that pulls ideas from the American left look like? Grand Strategies of the Left brings the progressive worldview into conversation with security studies and foreign policy practice. It argues that American progressives think durable security will only come by prioritizing the interconnected conditions of peace, democracy, and equality. By conceiving of grand strategy as worldmaking, progressives see multiple ways of using foreign policy to make a more just and stable world. US statecraft – including defense policy – should be retooled not for primacy, endless power accumulation, or a political status quo that privileges elites, but rather to shape the context that gives rise to perpetual insecurity. Progressive worldmaking has its own risks and dilemmas but expands how we imagine what the world is and could be.
This chapter explores third-party mediation and peacekeeping. Mediation, along with arbitration and adjudication, is a form of peacemaking. Peacekeeping means maintaining durable peace after conflict has ended. The UN is one of several kinds of actors that engage in peacekeeping missions. They leverage the costs belligerents would pay if they return to war, provide information, reduce uncertainty, and provide political cover to facilitate political concessions. Also discussed in the chapter are peacebuilding efforts, including developing the proper political, legal, social and economic infrastructure to stabilize the security environment. Challenges for third parties seeking to engage successfully in peacekeeping and peacemaking include the difficulties they face in providing long-term incentives for peace, the possibility of distorting information flows such that peace is less stable, and being sensitive to local contexts. The chapter applies many of its concepts to a quantitative study of the causes of peacekeeper sexual exploitation and abuse, and a case study of third-party involvement during the conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa in the 1990s and 2000s.
The book concludes by analyzing what it means to say that the First World War ended in less than victory for the Allies. The peace process amounted to little more than reimaging an old imperial system that forged a peace that came at a heavy price.
The sudden end of the war in 1918 gave rise to high expectations of the forthcoming peace congress. Yet neither the gathering at Paris nor the settlement to which it gave its name marked a new beginning in international politics. ‘New Diplomacy’ proved to be a short-lived blossoming. Old diplomacy, with its focus on the management of relations between states, persisted, though bearing outwardly the stamp of Geneva. Openness and democratic ideals did not lend themselves to peacemaking but rather complicated international relations. Not only was the Paris settlement not ‘a building finished and complete in all respects’, it also did not rest on stable foundations. In erecting it, the peacemakers had undermined the primacy of order; and into the cracks in the new building seeped malign ideas and narrowly defined interests which, ultimately, brought it down.
This article explores the experience of the Afro-Colombian movement over the course of two peace processes, investigating the relationship between opportunities for participation and effective inclusion. The 1991 Constituent Assembly that emerged from the peace processes of the late 1980s presented a particularly open opportunity for civil society participation, and yet the Afro-Colombian movement was unable to gain representation in negotiations for a new constitution. In the 2016 peace process with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC, despite insistence from the government that its negotiations with FARC were exclusively bilateral, the Afro movement was able to gain a seat at the table along with its Indigenous counterparts and generate a commitment from both parties to protect ethnic rights, known as the Capítulo Étnico (Ethnic Chapter). In contrast to existing literature that focuses on international actors as drivers of inclusion, we argue that effective inclusion reflects in large part the internal capacity, coherence, and unity of the movements themselves.
How can force be used to pursue human security? Treatments of this issue are surprisingly rare. This chapter addresses the potentially positive uses of force to address basic human needs under the new doctrine of human security in international law. International laws, cases, and regimes addressing the constituent elements of human security are addressed in turn: personal and political security, economic, food, health, community and environmental security. The evolving structure and function of UN Peacekeeping Operations is demonstrated through cases of specific missions. Finally, the possibilities of 2001’s "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine are debated.
In the face of the current decline or spectacular collapse of peace processes, this article investigates whether peace has become systematically blocked. It investigates whether the ineffectiveness of an ‘international peace architecture’ (IPA) can be explained by a more potent counterpeace system, which is growing in its shadow. It identifies counterpeace as proto-systemic processes that connect spoilers across all scales (local, regional, national, transnational), while exploiting structural blockages to peace and unintended consequences of peace interventions. It elaborates three distinct patterns of blockages to peace in contemporary conflicts across the globe: the stalemate, limited counterpeace, and unmitigated counterpeace. Drawing on the counterrevolution literature, this research asks: Have peace interventions become the source of their own undoing? Which factors consolidate or aggravate emerging conflict patterns? Are blockages to peace systemic enough to construct a sedimentary and layered counterpeace edifice?
Chapter 14 presents a new interpretation of the peacemaking and reordering process that unfolded at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. It argues that it was not only the most complex process of its kind in history but also, at the core, a process that was dominated by the struggle to negotiate the underpinnings and ground-rules of a new Atlantic order – which in turn had far-reaching global repercussions. Taking into account the unprecedented multiplicity of governmental and non-governmental actors who tried to influence this process in and beyond Paris it sheds new light on how the peace negotiations ultimately came to be shaped by the interests, concepts and strategies of those who led and represented the most powerful states after the war: Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau – and their main advisers. And it opens up new perspectives on why the first truly modern peacemaking process remained in crucial respects incomplete. It shows that while the principal “peacemakers” began to learn how to forge complex compromises under the challenging conditions of 1919 what they ultimately managed to negotiate could not lay firm and legitimate foundations for a sustainable Atlantic, and global, peace order.
Failures to bring internationalised civil wars, such as in Syria, Libya, or Yemen, to a negotiated agreement have led to a questioning of the UN's role in peacemaking. The literature explains such mediation outcomes by examining micro-level aspects pertaining to either the mediation process or the conflict context. While both are important, they are influenced by macro-level dynamics related to world politics that have received less attention. Yet, such an awareness of the structural context in which mediation takes place is particularly relevant in times of tectonic shifts in world politics, such as the current change in world order from unipolarity to multipolarity. This article fills this gap by exploring the mechanisms through which macro- and micro-level factors interact in mediation, illustrated by the case of the UN mediation in Syria. The article thereby makes two contributions. First, it provides an analysis of the link between world politics and UN mediation by complementing micro-level explanations with a macro-level perspective. Second, it allows for a better understanding of UN mediation in internationalised civil wars, and particularly in Syria. Overall, the article contributes to reflections on how the UN can keep its relevance in peacemaking in a shifting world order.
A popular view holds that foreign policy hawks have an advantage at bringing about rapprochement with international adversaries. This idea is rooted in domestic politics: voters respond more favorably to efforts at reconciliation when their own leader has a hawkish rather than a dovish reputation. Yet, domestic reactions are only part of the equation—to succeed, rapprochement must also evoke a favorable response by the adversary. In this research note, we argue that hawks who make conciliatory gestures may face international liabilities that could offset their domestic advantages. Foreign audiences should view doves who make overtures as more sincere and should therefore be more willing to support cooperation with foreign doves than with foreign hawks. We field a pair of survey experiments to examine whether Americans respond differently when foreign hawks versus foreign doves deliver the olive branch. We find that foreign doves fare better at eliciting cooperation because they are deemed more sincere, though the prospect of military vulnerability limits how willing Americans are to respond positively even to a dove who makes a gesture. Thus, while past research has shown that hawks are better positioned domestically to initiate rapprochement, our findings suggest that they have a harder time eliciting a favorable response from the adversary.
Explores the emerging subdiscipline of Peace Communication (PeaceComm), beginning with a discussion about the history of the practice, and the author’s ongoing quest to introduce a subdiscipline, dedicated to assessing and evaluating the critical efficacy of the practice. A methodological template for comparative global assessment and evaluation is offered, stressing the need to prioritize political conflict data and conflict zones-based context analyses, given that political conflict is caused by collective grievances related to “group”-level disadvantages and perceived disadvantages, not individual prejudice. The template is operationalized through the assessment of Sesame Street interventions into the Israeli Palestinian ethnopolitical nationalist conflict, drawn from field work in 2001, 2004-2006, and 2011. Best practices and other interdisciplinary contributions for practitioners are recommended, to understand conflict intractability where socialization, culture, and inter-“group” (mediated and interpersonal) communication intersect in glocalized conflict zone contexts, and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, specifically. The interventions targeted children, who comprise the majority within conflict zones. The model used, mediated contact effects, is one of seven models and six subtypes of PeaceComm practiced historically worldwide the author has previously categorized, and is one of those most in need of PeaceComm scholarship, with potential to succeed but scarce evidence collected about its efficacy.
This chapter goes back in history to explore the roots of Norway and Sweden’s postulated peace traditions and some key features of the two states’ mediation efforts during and after the Cold War. With particular attention paid to Norway’s attempt to take national ownership of the peace nation narrative in the 1990s and the 2000s, the chapter discusses why Sweden and Norway both found peacemaking an attractive tool for national image building, and demonstrates how the quest for a peace nation identity sparked competition and friction between the two states. The chapter uses examples from Guatemala, the Middle East and Sri Lanka to illustrate the possibilities and limitations of Nordic mediation, and argues that although the mediation successes have been relatively few, the peace nation narrative is hard to challenge since its overarching telos is to be the good, spread the good, and fulfill the good.
Over the last eighty years there has been a global rise in 'peace communication' practice, the use of interpersonal and mass communication interventions to mediate between peoples engaged in political conflict. In this study, Yael Warshel assesses Israeli and Palestinian versions of Sesame Street, which targeted negative inter-group attitudes and stereotypes. Merging communication, peace and conflict studies, social psychology, anthropology, political science, education, Middle Eastern and childhood studies, this book provides a template to think about how audiences receive, interpret, use and are influenced by peace communication. By picking apart the text and subtext of the kind of media these specific audiences of children consume, Warshel examines how they interpret peace communication interventions, are socialized into Palestinians, Jewish Israelis and Arab/Palestinian Israelis, the political opinions they express and the violence they reproduce. She questions whether peace communication practices have any relevant structural impact on their audiences, critiques such interventions and offers recommendations for improving future communication interventions into political conflict worldwide.
This chapter focuses on the psychological analysis of peace in the outer world and examines how peace is psychologically viewed in terms of its components in interpersonal and international relationships.
This chapter focuses on the psychological analysis of peace in the outer world and examines how peace is psychologically viewed in terms of its components in interpersonal and international relationships.
The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is one of Africa's most notorious armed rebel groups, having operated across Uganda, South Sudan, Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. When they entered the Juba Peace Talks with the Ugandan Government in 2006, the peace deal seemed like a gift to fighters who had for years barely been surviving in Central Africa's jungles. Yet the talks failed. Why? Based on exclusive interviews with LRA fighters and their notorious leader Joseph Kony, Mareike Schomerus provides insights into how the LRA experienced the Juba Talks, revealing developing dynamics and deep distrust within a conflict system and how these became entrenched through the peace negotiations. In so doing, Schomerus offers an explanation as to why current approaches to ending armed violence not only fail but how they actively contribute to their own failure, and calls for a new approach to contemporary peacemaking.
This chapter about the failed peace negotiations between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda, the Juba Peace Talks, highlights the main gaps in scholarship on peacemaking, introduces the main arguments of the book, sets the scene on access to the LRA and reflects on methodological challenges. The book argues that contemporary peacemaking suffers from a theory/practice gap, with the way conflicts are supposed to be resolved not mirroring the complexity of the conflict. Current scholarship on peace negotiations emphasises game theory, failing to take context and developing dynamics into account. Yet how actors experience peace talks and their dynamics determines negotiation conduct and the extent to which they can change their own behaviour. For the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M), the process was a contradictory experience with shifting loyalties and interests. Internal dynamics within the LRA/M were profoundly influenced by their perception that they were trapped in an established hostile system with an uneven playing field. Yet the LRA/M also struggled to transform their internal dynamics of distrust. The chapter further outlines the methodological challenges of access to armed groups and using likely manipulated information for research.