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The chapter discusses regulations and legal reform in medical law, in particular assisted reproductive technology (ART). A combination of Iranian state law, Shiʿi rulings, and national, medical, and clinical guidelines govern access to ART. In 2003, parliament enacted a law allowing the use of embryo donation for treating infertility in married couples. The law also implicitly recognized the permissibility of embryo-carrying and surrogacy arrangements. In comparative terms, this made Iran the most progressive country in the Muslim world regarding ART regulations and has resulted in the phenomenon of medical tourism. The chapter discusses the many ways in which Shiʿi Islamic legal rulings are mobilized to respond to medical and ethical concerns of different constituencies, illustrating the dynamism and adaptability of Shiʿi fiqh. Taking family as a legal concept, the chapter argues that Iranian family beliefs and values play a crucial role in shaping Iran’s permissive reproductive policy. Genealogical continuity and legal parenthood are central to these beliefs and values.
Do we owe anything to our genetic relatives qua genetic relatives? The philosophical literature has primarily addressed this question in the context of procreation. But genetic matching databases raise the question of whether we owe anything to previously unknown genetic relatives. This article argues that influential philosophical arguments regarding moral claims to know one’s genetic origins (sometimes referred to as a ‘right to know’) in the context of gamete donation have implications for a broader set of claims. First, these arguments imply more than a claim to know the identity of a genetic relative; the interests which they invoke can only be satisfied through a relationship. Second, the scope of the claims is broader than tends to be acknowledged: even if procreators have special obligations towards their offspring, these arguments imply that weighty moral claims can be made against other genetic relatives in many different contexts.
Social role theorists argue that the roles that people inhabit and their experiences within can alter their attitudes. We use Swedish panel data to demonstrate how involvement in the parental role changes attitudes toward government policies differently for fathers and mothers. For fathers who take parental leave, the caregiving activities accompanying this leave conflict with stereotypical masculine experiences and such counter-stereotypical engagement should be transformative. We find that fathers who take more parental leave favor care provided by the state. For mothers, we hypothesize and find that the caregiving role during parental leave confirms a female-typical role, resulting in small effects that are not significant. We conclude with a discussion of how state policies can alter the effects of gender by providing specific experiences within a role, such as parental leave, and the significance of finding results in a country with high baseline levels of gender equality.
Parental surrogacy remains a highly controversial issue in contemporary ethics with considerable variation in the legal approaches of different jurisdictions. Finding a societal consensus on the issue remains highly elusive. John Rawls’ theory of public reason, first developed in his A Theory of Justice (1971), offers a unifying model of political discourse and engagement that enables reasonable citizens to accept policies that they do not necessarily support at a personal level. The theory established a promising framework for private citizens with distinct moral positions on the subject to find common ground and, in doing so, to negotiate a consensus regarding the degree and nature of regulation that is palatable to all rational citizens.
Taiwanese masculinity was not defined only by young intellectuals and social elites. Rather, it was constructed, expanded, and complicated by ordinary men as represented by household heads and their family members. This chapter explores their masculinity by revealing the ways in which they continued to negotiate with judges over the treatment of brides and adopted daughters. Household heads had traditionally been free to choose their sons’ brides and preside over any adoptive deals, and thus they established masculinity as tied to household authority. Yet, this unchallenged image of patriarchy began contradicting judicial calls for a more equitable form of the family from the late 1910s. What involved those household heads in judicial reforms was the situation in which two or more household heads competed over the better treatment of brides and adopted daughters, establishing a protective form of masculinity. However, this did not end with the emasculation of male household heads in terms of their preexisting authority; instead, they shifted to a type of masculinity involving collusion between two or more household heads and colonial judges, undermining efforts to address women’s difficulties after the 1920s.
At the same time as some gays and lesbians were fighting for domestic partnership recognition, others were demanding the right to create families through foster care and adoption. In the 1980s, social workers who were struggling to find homes for foster children increasingly turned to same-sex couples. Those placements proved controversial, leading several states to institute bans on gay and lesbian foster parenting. But the debates they generated helped to make queer families increasingly visible. Adoption out of foster care was only one way in which same-sex couples had children. In the 1980s, lesbian couples increasingly began forming families through donor insemination. To create a legal relationship between the nonbiological mother and the child, the couples petitioned courts to grant second-parent adoptions, analogizing their situations to stepparent adoptions. Over the course of the 1990s, courts increasingly authorized these types of adoptions, which helped entrench queer families in American life.
Chapter 1 argues that parenthood aspirations, including those reliant on novel reproductive techniques, have started to evolve into justiciable rights. It challenges the view that human rights law cannot adequately address bioethical issues and examines commonalities and mutual influences between human rights and bioethical discourse. The chapter first analyses international case law establishing (predominantly negative) obligations in relation to natural procreative capacity. As regards medically assisted procreation, it observes that, perhaps counter-intuitively, most of the claims raised in Strasbourg litigation have been assessed by the European Court of Human Rights as involving active interferences as opposed to lacunae. The chapter provides a catalogue of (alleged) negative and positive obligations as they emerge from the case law; it examines the rationale for the Court’s treatment of a claim through the lens of negative or positive obligations while suggesting that that classification does not have a significant practical impact on the outcome of the case.
In the United States, emphasizing their families and talking about parenthood can be a potent strategy for political candidates as voters use information about a candidate’s family life to make assessments of the candidate’s personal attributes and issue competencies. We nonetheless know little about how a candidate’s race affects these assessments. We thus consider how Black women use and benefit from politicizing motherhood, and we argue that the unique intersectional identities of Black women shaped jointly by their race and gender can give Black women a stronger strategic advantage from highlighting motherhood compared to white women. Using both observational and experimental data, we apply this intersectional framework by examining motherhood messages. We identify the extent to which Black women rely on messages about motherhood and how voters respond. Our results show that Black women are just as likely to use motherhood messages relative to white women, and that Black women receive positive evaluations from voters from a message emphasizing motherhood. White and minority voters are equally likely to positively rate Black women who emphasize motherhood.
This chapter considers the child’s right to identity. It is for good reason that the Convention on the Rights of the Child requires that core aspects of a child’s legal identity are in place soon after birth. A legal identity secures the child’s place in society, nation and family, providing the foundations for the child’s sense of self and relationships with others. The fact that these crucial aspects of identity are put in place when the child is an infant means that particular care must be taken to ensure that the child’s interests are not lost; not least because adults often have powerful interests in the way in which a child’s identity is determined and recorded. This chapter considers the formation of a child’s legal identity through recognition of parenthood and the challenges posed by changing reproductive technology and social norms such as the growth of international surrogacy arrangements. Further, a child’s knowledge of their genetic origins and the circumstances of their birth may be important to their sense of self and personal identity. The extent to which the right to identity incorporates a right to knowledge of origins is also considered.
Some responses to analogies between abortion and infanticide appeal to Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument for the permissibility of abortion. I argue that these responses fail because a parallel argument can be constructed for the permissibility of infanticide. However, an argument on the grounds of a right to choose to become a parent can maintain that abortion is permissible but infanticide is not by recognizing the normative significance and nature of parenthood.
Today’s parents are subject to strict rules about how to raise their children. Some rules focus on parents’ emotions: Parents are bound by emotional display rules, according to which “ideal parents” should be “emotionally perfect” – showing positive emotions and refraining from negative ones while interacting with their children. This chapter introduces Lin and colleagues’ pioneering efforts in borrowing the emotional labor framework to shed light on the consequences for parents of their subjection to these emotional display rules. The emotional labor framework, initially proposed by sociologists, holds that employees must consciously align their feelings with emotional display rules when interacting with customers. This framework provides insight into the mechanisms underlying the relation between emotional labor performed by employees and their well-being. This chapter presents the application of the emotional labor framework to the parenting context and outlines future research directions that this approach opens. We believe that extending the emotional labor framework to the context of parenting opens a promising research avenue in the parenting field.
This chapter examines how early relationships become established relationships. It reviews varying relationship trajectories (e.g., ascent, peak, and descent) and then describes the three key components of the relationship that develop over time: love, intimacy, and commitment. First, the chapter defines and differentiates the various forms of love (e.g., passionate love, companionate love, compassionate love) and reviews how love develops and changes over time. Second, this chapter explores how interpersonal intimacy develops through repeated instances of self-disclosure and perceived partner responsiveness and how developing intimate relationships change the self. Third, this chapter reviews how people make and communicate their commitment decisions, as well as how social network members shape commitment. Finally, it provides an overview of common major transitions (cohabitation, marriage, parenthood) and some key challenges therein.
Chapter 4 examines the relationship between Giovanni Amendola and Nelia Pavlova, born 1895. This complex love story has been all but entirely ignored by Italian scholarship on Giovanni and in the national memory. Apparently, the couple had a son who died of meningitis at the age of six in 1929. In Giovanni’s papers there is evidence of the love affair but no acknowledgement of the child. Since Nelia also claims on occasion to have been ‘married’ to Giovanni, some doubt must remain about the veracity of her account. She was a young woman who resembled Eva Kühn in quite a few ways: foreign, multilingual, independent, from her country’s leading political classes, intellectually able. Nelia was one the three people at Giovanni’s deathbed in Cannes (Giorgio was another). Over time, however, the Amendolas, as they put it, ‘lost contact’ with her. Yet she made for herself a distinguished career as a Paris journalist, an expert in Eastern Europe. While the Amendola sons became communists, she remained a liberal democrat, as well as a woman who always remembered Giovanni as her man. Her death probably occurred in 1940. She should not have been forgotten as easily as she has been.
Our understanding of what it means to be a parent in any given context is shaped by our biological, social, legal, and moral concepts of parenthood. These are themselves subject to the influence of changing expectations, as new technologies are produced, cultural views of the family are transformed, and laws shift in response. In this book Teresa Baron provides a detailed and incisive overview of the key questions, widespread presuppositions, and dominant approaches in the field of philosophy of parenthood. Baron examines paradigm cases and problem cases alike through an interdisciplinary lens, bringing philosophy of parenthood into dialogue with research on family-making and childrearing from across the social sciences and humanities. Her book aims to answer old questions, draw out new questions, and interrogate notions that we often take for granted in this field, including the very concept of parenthood itself.
In the final chapter of the book, I argue that future research in philosophy of parenthood should take either a significantly broader or significantly narrower view of parenthood (or parental rights/obligations). We should not assume that we can use any of these four key concepts of parenthood independently, without taking into account their interrelations with others. We may therefore move forward either by considering problem cases in light of these concepts as an interrelated web (or ‘family’) or by stripping back the questions being asked to investigate more specific concepts. For example, the latter approach to moral parenthood might involve putting aside the widespread presupposition that parental rights and obligations are a concomitant ‘package’ and instead focusing on isolated issues, such as the right not to be separated from one’s biological offspring. The rights and obligations with which philosophers are chiefly concerned should, on this approach, be stripped away from the myth of ‘the parent’ as one straightforward entity with clear and consistent characteristics.
This book delves into the four concepts of parenthood – social, biological, legal, and moral – at play in our understandings of parental rights and obligations, reproductive ethics, governance of parenthood, and ontologies of kinship. Our view of what it means to be a parent in any given context is shaped by all of these concepts, which are themselves subject to the influence of changing expectations, as new technologies are produced, cultural views of the family are transformed, and laws shift in response. These changes give rise to questions: who has the right to raise a child? What do we owe our children? Who should the law recognise as a parent, and what is the meaning of that recognition? Many of these questions are not questions about some independent notion of ‘parenthood’ but about the relationships between different concepts of parenthood. In doing so, I highlight newer but no less important questions for philosophical attention, including the scope of rights to become a biological parent (or to avoid that state), the impact of gendered norms on the social role of ‘parent’, and the legal difference between having a child and acquiring one.
This book delves into the four concepts of parenthood – social, biological, legal, and moral – at play in our understandings of parental rights and obligations, reproductive ethics, governance of parenthood, and ontologies of kinship. Our view of what it means to be a parent in any given context is shaped by all of these concepts, which are themselves subject to the influence of changing expectations, as new technologies are produced, cultural views of the family are transformed, and laws shift in response. These changes give rise to questions: who has the right to raise a child? What do we owe our children? Who should the law recognise as a parent, and what is the meaning of that recognition? Many of these questions are not questions about some independent notion of ‘parenthood’ but about the relationships between different concepts of parenthood. In doing so, I highlight newer but no less important questions for philosophical attention, including the scope of rights to become a biological parent (or to avoid that state), the impact of gendered norms on the social role of ‘parent’, and the legal difference between having a child and acquiring one.
In paediatric nursing, families are central to the care of children – in fact, the patient is considered to be both the child and their whole family. In this chapter, you will begin to explore current approaches to the care of the woman and family during pregnancy, birth and parenting.
Becoming a parent is a life-changing transition for women and their partners, resulting in a range of changes during pregnancy and after birth that can present challenges to parents, and impact their babies. In addition to the profound physical changes that take place during pregnancy, women and their partners experience changes in their roles and relationships with each other as well as others in their social networks. In this chapter, preconception health, and antenatal and postnatal care will be discussed, including considering factors that influence maternal and infant health and wellbeing.
Disgust is derived from evolutionary processes to avoid pathogen contamination. Theories of gender differences in pathogen disgust utilize both evolutionary psychological and sociocultural perspectives. Drawing on research that suggests that masculine and feminine gender identities are somewhat orthogonal, we examine how gender identity intersects with pathogen disgust. In addition, building on evolutionary psychological and sociocultural accounts of how caregiving and parental investment affect pathogen disgust, we present a new measure of caregiving disgust and compare its properties across gender, parental status, and political ideology with those of a conventional pathogen disgust measure. This registered report finds that how masculinity and femininity affect disgust varies by gender, disgust domain, and their intersection; that parental status effects vary by disgust domain but not gender; that reframing disgust in terms of caregiving eliminates the gender gap in disgust; and that the caregiving frame unexpectedly strengthens the relationship between disgust and political ideology.