Chapter 4 traces a rising market of professional consultants and think tanks in policymaking and political activity. Upper-caste and elite-educated men have long filled positions of power, including parliamentary seats, administrative services, business groups, advisory boards, and chambers of commerce. Despite some shifts towards caste-based affirmative action since the 1980s, the political classes remain predominantly elite (Verniers and Jaffrelor 2020). In 2014, anti-incumbent sentiment led to widespread distrust in existing experts, such that elite intellectuals and Western-educated economists holding political and policymaking positions were replaced by technical professionals: engineers, business managers, and consultants. As an alternative to intellectual and insular elites, this group of professionals projects itself as politically agnostic, rational, and a practical source of business-minded knowledge. This group, however, is no less insular or exclusionary: one set of intellectual experts has merely been replaced by a more elite, deracinated group of professional consultants situated in global management consulting firms.

Chapter 3 identifies the numerous strategies the contemporary liberal states have pursued to navigate the cross-pressures engendered by the migration trilemma during the post-Cold War period, and especially since September 11th. Contesting scholarly claims that the liberal states cannot avert unwanted immigration, its main argument is that they have considerably reconciled the tensions inherent in the trilemma by enlisting and coopting non-central state actors at the intersection of human mobility and security. Specifically, they have forged bilateral and multilateral policy agreements and devolved many of their responsibilities for implementing immigration and human mobility policy to international, subnational and private sector actors. In pursuing this multifaceted course, the immigration policies of states have converged, and their burdens in managing their immigration-related responsibilities have been partially alleviated. But in doing so, the liberal norms inspiring their once steadfast commitments to maintaining relatively open borders and safeguarding citizen and immigrant rights have been compromised.

This chapter examines UK welfare reforms. The strategy of ‘quasi-markets’ in welfare was a New Labour innovation, and this chapter sets out why even intentionally ‘progressive’ neoliberal state reforms succumb to the flaws in neoclassical reasoning. The ‘choice and competition’ agenda was conceived in arguments about the relative benefits for ‘end-users’ of publicly funded but privately provided welfare services. As a closed-system argument about a marketplace, it thus wished away the actual terrain of education policy in which the state becomes the disempowered, and yet still responsible planner of outsourced educational enterprises, now governed through contract. The chapter investigates how quasi-market theory played out in the Academy Schools programme in England. It demonstrates why outsourcing complex welfare provision will tend create the worst of public and private regimes: the exploitation of incomplete contracts by producers, informational fragmentation, a loss of public accountability, financial corruption and increasingly Kafkaesque efforts at bureaucratic remedy, all reminiscent of Soviet enterprise planning failures.

This chapter applies the GVC framework in order to progress our understanding of the global TV system. Among the drivers that are changing the TV industry, three stand out: digitisation, consolidation, and vertical disintegration (also known as de-verticalisation). While the first two trends have long been identified as driving forces, the same cannot be said about the third. The phenomenon of segmentation is less known and associated with the formation of GVCs. The chapter expands on its prevalence in television and explain its role in globalising the industry. The final section provides an introductory outline of the TV GVC and its segments.

New product development processes need to be compliant to regulatory requirements, and this chapter highlights the salient processes and quality systems to put into place to achieve success. Project management is made simple with specific tools provided here. Customer feedback is channeled into specific product characteristics, and the right tools are shown in this chapter. The biopharma industry has statistics showing less than 10% of starting compounds succeed in reaching market approval, and this chapter explains what causes these failures. The key issues that have repeatedly caused failure during device and diagnostic product development are also pointed out. Ethical decisions have to be made during product development as shown in this chapter. Outsourcing is a real option due to the availability of many contract research and manufacturing organizations, and judicious use of this option is discussed in this chapter. Key milestones that reduce risk and show transition from early stage to preclinical prototype stages are reviewed here. Does the popular concept of minimum viable product in software development apply in biomedicine prototyping? Other similar questions that help the reader understand pitfalls and best practices are answered here.

Preparing for scale-up in commercial manufacturing is far away from the thoughts of companies involved in product development, but this chapter shows when to start planning and how to plan a practical budget for this activity. For companies with their first product in commercial development, the build vs buy decision is never an easy one and the examples and key points for consideration simplify that process. The biggest challenge in scaling up is the gap in culture between R&D production for experimental testing in preclinical stages and the control and quality oriented culture in the manufacturing location. The case studies and content in the chapter specifically highlight how to achieve a successful technology transfer into commercial GMP manufacturing. The chapter content also gives practical guidelines on what it takes to put GMP and quality systems in place.

This chapter probes the borders of the public supervisory jurisdiction by looking at a parallel private law supervisory jurisdiction under which the courts judicially review decisions by "domestic tribunals". This comparative exercise gives pause for reflection on the deeper conceptual and normative foundations of judicial review, especially for questions of amenability to review. In the modern administrative state, many apparently "public" functions are performed by private, profit-oriented or charitable bodies and the review of these bodies has been an important testing ground in which theories of judicial review have been formulated and defended. Stopping short of suggesting a grand, unified theory of all the supervisory jurisdictions, I argue that an appreciation of the deep, structural parallels helps us to understand the common law roots of judicial review and that office could provide some intellectual resources to advance the province of administrative law judicial review in a principled fashion.

This chapter evaluates the unique obligations governments have when they commit citizen data to cloud service providers. In particular, the chapter focuses on how the responsibilities of governments are different than other types of cloud computing users focusing on specific procurement obligations, and other legal requirements.

The chapter also evaluates issues related to “data sovereignty”, outsourcing of government functions, and the potential risk to citizens from outsourcing critical infrastructure. Further, barriers that governments face when procuring cloud computing services including data localization restrictions, difficulties in comparing costs to traditional IT services, and ill-suited contract templates designed for traditional IT-outsourcing being applied to cloud computing services.

The chapter also explains that since operations or services are outsourced to cloud, governments must have the means to monitor them in order to retain a certain level of control over the operations they are outsourcing. The chapter examines government procurement programs in the United States, United Kingdom, and European initiatives to adopt cloud computing at the government level.

The relationship between corruption and privatization is a complex one. In some cases, they are conceived as polar opposites, with privatization touted as a strategy to combat corruption. In others, they are synonyms: privatization is perceived as a product of or a mechanism to enable corruption. In this chapter, I argue that there are particular circumstances in which each of these hypotheses may prevail, suggesting that the answer to the question “who gains from privatization?” is largely dependent on context. An accurate picture needs to consider the multiple phases of the privatization process, the unique institutional framework in which decisions are made, and the particularities of the sector(s) involved. To develop this argument, I organize the vast literature on the political economy of privatization according to three key moments: the decision to privatize (before privatization), the privatization process (during privatization), and the dynamics governing the privatized structures (after privatization).

Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between SORN laws and law enforcement. Since the inception of SORN laws, proponents of registration and notification have viewed them as tools for effective law enforcement. The significant financial costs to maintain and enforce these laws, however, may outweigh any usefulness they offer to law enforcement in terms of reducing sex offense victimization. The chapter first describes how states implement SORN laws. State and local law enforcement agencies are charged with the initial registration of covered individuals. Thereafter, these agencies monitor registrants and facilitate community notification. They conduct unannounced visits, maintain online registries, and inform community groups. These tasks impose substantial costs on the police, diverting resources from other criminal justice priorities. Many agencies form specialized units for SORN enforcement; others outsource aspects to private, for-profit companies. The chapter next analyzes how law enforcement personnel perceive SORN laws – in particular, their effectiveness. Studies show that individuals in law enforcement often doubt the efficacy of registration and notification, despite consistently supporting them. Law enforcement agents also recognize the costs SORN laws carry for their agencies and priorities. Ultimately, this chapter questions whether SORN laws are worth the costly burdens they impose on law enforcement.

A brief assessment of how artificial intelligence (AI) will change negotiation and the way in which we learn about it in the near future, and a note of optimism to conclude.