Chapter 1 considers dual transformations – how cadets at West Point became officers, and how immigrants enlisted to become soldiers – and follows these groups to war in Florida. It argues that officers graduated from the military academy with deeply held beliefs regarding what it meant to be a leader in the army family – a stern father to enlisted men and the Native peoples whom the army considered its wards, and a committed protector of supposedly harmless women. Soldiers, many of whom joined up soon after arriving in New York City from places throughout Europe, had other ideas and asserted their privileges as white men, often resisting officers’ efforts to impose discipline.

Chapter 2 shows how officers and enlisted men related to one another. Both groups were white, but where many officers were middle class, enlisted men were often poor immigrants with unstable access to white men’s privileges in the Jacksonian Era. Officers had to hold the army together to fight a war, and they could not do it by punishment alone. Much as officers sought to tame the Florida wilderness and the Seminole people, they sought to gentle their soldiers. As the regulars fought their enemies and struggled with each other, a shared culture emerged, premised on the common ideal that regulars should protect women. Hierarchical white male unity – based on the concept of the army family in which all military men protected and subordinated all women – helped the army function. This framework appealed to paternalistic officers because it allowed for intense distinctions (of rank) between white men. In this climate, although rhetoric rooted in the need to protect women could bolster army cohesion, it could also serve as a weapon. Soldiers used such language to rebut officers’ claims of superiority.

This chapter argues that corporate law is unique in a way that is not widely recognized, and is not unique in the way it is widely thought to be. First, unlike other fields of law where fiduciary obligations play a key role, in corporate law, not one, not two, but three distinct actors owe fiduciary duties—executive officers, directors, and controlling shareholders. The beneficiaries of those actors' duties, the reasons for imposing duties, and the scope and demands of fiduciary duties differ for the three actors. Thus, there is not a singular duty of care and loyalty in Delaware corporate law, but multiple variations of those duties owed by multiple actors. Delaware has a law of fiduciaries, not a fiduciary law. Second, this chapter challenges the supposed standard of conduct-standard of review divergence first hailed in 1993 by Professor Melvin Eisenberg as unique to corporate law.The construct was descriptively inaccuratewhen Professor Eisenberg first wrote, it has been little used by the Supreme Court since then, and the standards often converge rather than diverge.