To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter discusses laws and arrangements that impose obligations upon intermediaries to achieve some protection of clients involved in financial product transactions. We have already encountered some intermediaries who provide financial services in Chapter 17—the brokers who participate in the ASX markets. However intermediaries are usually involved in transactions involving financial products, so the range of people who are involved in, or who can influence financial product transactions is much wider and clearly includes financial advisers. Now we examine how the activities of some people in this diverse group are regulated to achieve a measure of investor protection.
The question of regulation of financial advice and financial services has been contentious in Australia over the last two decades. Following several large financial collapses, it is now recognised that the quality of financial advice in Australia is often poor, particularly to retail and other non-professional investors.
The widening inequality and discontent concern every economy irrespective of any measure of economic prosperity. The contest and debate centred around the notion of private property, assumes the premise that property is a legitimised unfettered accumulation with a right-based justification. On the contrary, the Gandhian conception of property, tries to reframe the premise that property is social and needs to be justified over its obligatory commitments. I argue that Gandhi’s engagement with property relations reflects the individual pursuit by socialising property. From problematising the individual property rights within the Anthropocene world, the article mapping a Gandhian theory of property identifies the normative structure of property. The individual as the custodian with normative obligatory commitments can foster pluralistic interest while anchoring the ethical foundations of property rights reflecting social justice.
This chapter explores the intricate legal concepts of co-ownership and neighbour relations under Chinese property law. The first section delves into co-ownership, explaining its categories: co-ownership by shares and common ownership. It discusses the rights and obligations of co-owners, the management of co-owned property and the legal remedies available for disputes. The chapter highlights how co-ownership can be established through contracts, partnerships and familial relationships, and examines how these relationships influence the management and division of property.
The second section focuses on neighbour relations, covering the concept and content of neighbour rights. It outlines the principles governing these rights, such as facilitating production and ensuring convenient living while balancing fairness and reasonableness. The chapter discusses the impact of civil customs on neighbour relations, providing case studies to illustrate how local practices influence legal decisions. By examining these elements, the chapter provides a comprehensive overview of how co-ownership and neighbour relations are regulated, emphasising the importance of harmony and co-operation in property management and dispute resolution.
This chapter focuses on the 1970s and 1980s during which MacCormick confronted and developed his political philosophy, with a special focus on the essays that were collected in Legal Right and Social Democracy (1982). This includes how MacCormick crafted a middle space between liberalism and socialism, which he called ‘social democracy’. It also includes MacCormick’s work, in this period, on obligations and rights. This chapter discusses the sense in which this conceptual work can be read with character, e.g., how his concepts of obligation and rights relate to his basic commitment to respect for persons (including a concern for the temporally-extended quality of relations between persons). It also places this philosophical work in the context of the politics of the period, e.g., the SNP’s own eventual endorsement of a social democratic platform, and it discusses how MacCormick’s political interventions in this period (e.g., his actions with respect to the’79 Group) can also be understood as expressions and negotiations of his character. Overall, the chapter explores how MacCormick’s character is expressed and negotiated in his role as a jurist, making law as morally intelligible as he could, seeking to limit executive power legally, and also diffusing and decentralising power as much as possible.
In recent years, there has been increased interest in a variety of ways that private actors, especially actors in the business world, broadly understood, can contribute to addressing important social problems and persistent injustices. In this essay, I aim to articulate and begin to answer what seem to me to be some of the most important and challenging normative questions arising with regard to social entrepreneurship as a mode of economic activity aimed at addressing social problems or promoting justice. I focus on questions about the relationship between the pursuit of social entrepreneurial activity, the satisfaction of obligations to promote justice, and claims to income and wealth produced by successful social entrepreneurial ventures. I argue that there are reasons to think that social entrepreneurial activity can be a way that individuals (attempt to) satisfy at least some of their obligations of justice, but note that there are moral risks involved in attempting to satisfy these obligations in this way. And I suggest that there are at least some reasons, including recognition of the grounds on which we might sometimes prefer that people in a position to take these risks do so, to think that only those who accept broader moral views that are very demanding can consistently deny that social entrepreneurs who successfully generate substantial profits are morally entitled to retain them.
In this paper, I argue that there is an inconsistency between the content of some of the labour-related human rights articulated in documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the obligations ascribed to various actors regarding those rights in the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), in particular those ascribed to corporations. Recognizing the inconsistency, I claim, can help us see some of the moral limitations of both familiar public responses to exploitative labour practices and influential philosophical accounts of the wrong of exploitation. In light of these limitations, I argue that there are reasons to accept a more expansive account of the human rights-related obligations of corporations than that found in the UNGPs, and in particular that we should accept that corporations have obligations to actively contribute to lifting people out of poverty.
Chapter 11 focuses on ancient ‘contracts’, with specific reference to commerce, property and other economic activities for which there is relevant evidence. The chapter begins with urbanization in southern Mesopotamia in the fourth millennium bce, bringing together archaeological, material and written evidence in order to introduce a broad working idea of ‘contracts’. The next section moves on to a discussion of technical ancient terms and concepts, noting the ‘considerable terminological instability in the common English translations of the original terms’. The following section turns to ‘contracts’ between states, whilst the next develops a comparative analysis of ‘oaths in interpersonal agreements’. The following two sections analyse specific questions surrounding the use of writing and ’the contract of sale’, noting that there is surviving evidence for the use of (different forms of) contacts of sale across every ancient legal system. The chapter concludes by drawing together a set of generalized conceptions of ‘contract’ and briefly suggesting that long-distance trade - among other factors - may lie behind some of the similarities - for example the use of seals - evident across the extant ancient evidence.
This Handbook brings together a global team of private law experts and computer scientists to examine the interface between private law and AI, which includes issues such as whether existing private law can address the challenges of AI and whether and how private law needs to be reformed to reduce the risks of AI while retaining its benefits.
Whether AI should be given legal personhood should not be framed in binary terms. Instead, this issue should be analysed in terms of a sliding-scale spectrum. On one axis, there is the quantity and quality of the bundle of rights and obligations that legal personhood entails. The other axis is the level of the relevant characteristics that courts may include in conferring legal personhood.
“Constitutional values” is a term which appears to relate to concepts of what is now called public law. By constitutional values, I mean the basic ideas and interests which structure relations between the individual and the state, and the obligations to which they give rise, which underlie the common law and to which it gives recognition in more or less articulated forms. These are ideas and interests such as liberty, private life, freedom of expression and access to justice. Constitutional values and human rights overlap, but they are not necessarily and always the same, either in content or in effect. In exploring this topic I hope to retrieve and bring to the surface an important aspect of the common law in terms of both private law and public law.
The theory of law put forward in this book is founded on the idea of interdependence. Interdependence generates goods taking the form of a community. In law a community involves common legal obligations pertaining to goods. The WTO Agreement establishes a “club good.” Its essence is the equality of opportunity for economic operators in members’ markets. These legal arrangements have given rise to enormous networks of global supply and value chains. At the same time, however, they have generated unease at de-industrialization and exposed critical vulnerabilities. Whereas at the time of the WTO’s founding in 1995 the unconditional interdependence called for in the WTO Agreement might have been regarded as beneficial, today it is seen as less so. Consequently, the club good of the organization appears to be splintering into individual goods composed of specific trading relationships. Consequently, support for the organization and its dispute settlement system has ebbed. Nevertheless, there appears to be recognition of residual worth in the WTO Agreement and its dispute settlement system, which may continue to serve as a locus for transformative solutions.
We seek to be both loving and just. However, what do we do when love and justice present us with incompatible obligations? Can one be excessively just? Should one bend rules or even break the law for the sake of compassion? Alternatively, should one simply follow rules? Unjust beneficence or uncaring justice - which is the less problematic moral choice? Moral dilemmas arise when a person can satisfy a moral obligation only by violating another moral duty. These quandaries are also called moral tragedies because despite their good intentions and best effort, people still end up being blameworthy. Conflicting demands of compassion and justice are among the most vexing problems of social philosophy, moral theology, and public policy. They often have life-and-death consequences for millions. In this book, Albino Barrera examines how and why compassion-justice conflicts arise to begin with, and what we can do to reconcile their competing claims.
This chapter provides an introduction to Swiss contract law. It discusses the Code of Obligations as the main source of law, the fundamental principles of Swiss contract law, the notion of an obligation as the effect of the contract, the formation of contracts, including pre-contractual liability, as well as the notions of offer and acceptance. This chapter then turns to the principles applicable to the interpretation of contracts and the principles governing the validity of contracts. This chapter further discusses the notion of agency, general terms and conditions as well as the various categories of contracts found under Swiss law. This chapter moreover explores the significant issues of the performance of the contract and breach of contract. Finally, this chapter analyses the extinguishment of obligations as well as the concepts of the assignment of a claim and the assumption of debt.
In the past two decades, scientists, think tanks, international organizations and NGOs have highlighted how climate change may lead people to migrate internally and across international borders. The International Organization for Migration has sought a role in understanding and responding to the issue of climate related migration. IOM staff began a series of workshops, conferences, research and reports on climate and migration, when most member states were reluctant to discuss, let alone finance projects, on the topic under the auspices of IOM. However, over time IOM staff successfully shifted member states’ understanding of the organization’s role to include work on climate change and migration. IOM staff worked with a few sympathetic states and other stakeholders (such as universities, NGOs and private funders) to initiate climate change projects, and over time convinced the IOM Council that climate change migration was a strategic priority for the organization. IOM reshaped its obligations to states, despite its projectized and heavily earmarked funding structure.
This introductory chapter sets the stage for the contribution advanced in this volume. First, it provides a brief overview of IOM’s history and structure. Second, it offers a primer on IOM’s entry into the UN system as a related organization in 2016. Third, it situates the book in relation to the core concepts underpinning it, including the obligations, accountability, and expansion dynamics of international organizations (IOs). Fourth, it draws out key themes running through the volume, particularly in relation to grounding assessments of IOM in international law; understanding IOM’s roles as a norm ‘breaker, taker and shaper’; analysing IOM as a protection actor; and developing more complex accounts of institutional change at IOM. Fifth, it maps out the structure, scope and limitations of book. Finally, it reflects on the legal and political implications of this volume, focusing on the need to recast the IOM Constitution to centre not only the organization’s obligations to its member states but also to the migrants it claims to serve.
Chapter 9 proposes a universal accommodation mandate, which would allow employees to request modifications to the structural norms of the workplace (when and where work is performed) and to request modifications to how the physical tasks of the job are performed. This chapter explains how the mandate would work, discusses various applications of the mandate, briefly addresses logistical issues, and then responds to the anticipated criticisms.
This chapter expands on the concept of reciprocity, looking at how it can be defined, its key characteristics, and the three key functions it plays: in norm creation, as a condition, and in execution of the law. It examines the defining elements of reciprocity: proportionality, relativity, equality, and interdependence. The chapter goes on to examine the nature of reciprocity, and its relationship to custom and general principles, two sources of international law. It illustrates how it is reciprocity’s relationship with the structural characteristic of sovereign equality in international law that explains many of its roles and defining characteristics.
The conclusion highlights some conclusions on the nature and role of reciprocity in public international law, on the basis of the analysis in foregoing chapters. It highlights the link between reciprocity and the principle of sovereign equality, before briefly outlining the functions, limits, and some of the specific meanings of reciprocity in public international law.
This chapter analyzes reciprocity in the social sciences, historical forms of law, and domestic contexts, including the law of contracts and in federal States, to shed light upon some of reciprocity’s fundamental characteristics. Reciprocity is not incompatible with the existence of a community, but necessarily requires a social relation, and one of its defining characteristics is its relationship with equality. Rather than being a negative concept, based on occasional and discontinued instances of interaction on the basis of reactions to conduct, reciprocity is a concept fundamental to the existence of social relations, and inherent to ideas of justice and fairness.