To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The article looks at instances of specialisation for specific linguistic contexts in ‘command’ and ‘inference’ uses of will and must. It tests the feasibility of different motivations for this specialisation, such as statistical and construal pre-emption. It also proposes a new motivation for specialisation, polysemous pre-emption, i.e. whether a strongly entrenched polyseme of a given expression might pre-empt the use of an expression with a less strongly entrenched polyseme. The investigation uses corpus analysis and distinctive collexeme analysis to test the three motivations (statistical, construal, and polysemous pre-emption). The results show that all instances of specialisation with will and must could be explained through construal pre-emption and/or polysemous pre-emption, thus making recourse to statistical pre-emption unnecessary.
While literature on English modality has usually focused on traditional modal and semi-modal verbs, to our knowledge, no attention has ever been given to the emerging be having to (BHT) construction. Through corpus analysis conducted on GloWbE, ICE, BNC and CLMET, this article investigates the semantic differences between have to and BHT that make them distinct in the English constructicon. We demonstrate that BHT conveys meanings of contingency, reluctance and inchoativity, and propose that its recent emergence may stem from a specific functional gap within the English modal system. While have to appears to be gradually grammaticalizing with future-oriented functions, BHT seems to be renewing the original (and less grammaticalized) dynamic functions of have to. Finally, we explore the productivity of the construction across different English varieties and the reasons for its lower frequency in postcolonial varieties. The hypothesis of negative retentionism proposes that a feature that was absent in the lexifier language at the time of contact may indeed be found to be less frequently used in the contact variety at a later stage due to colonial lag.
This article takes up a philosophical examination of the Latter-day Saint theological conception of the eternal significance of sex. I first argue that the straightforward way of interpreting the theological claims about the eternal significance of sex appear to be incoherent. The main worry has to do with certain commitments Latter-day Saints take up with respect to the nature of disembodied spirits. Disembodied spirits don’t have bodies. As such they lack the characteristic features of embodied things. And sex is as bodily a feature as any we confront in the course of our lives. I will argue that these conceptual obstacles can be overcome by attending to distinctive aspects of the Latter-day Saint conception of divine creation. Doing so offers an interesting alternative way of conceptualizing the essences of premortal (disembodied) spirits. In particular, it motivates explicating their essences in terms of what Plantinga calls world-indexed properties. With the explication in hand, I show that not only are charges of incoherence avoided, but the new perspective gives a unified account of a variety of apparently disparate aspects of Latter-day Saint theology.
Consciousness is an intriguing mystery, of which standard accounts all have well-known difficulties. This book examines the central question about consciousness: that is, the question of how phenomenal features of our experience are related to physical features of our nervous system. Using the way in which we experience color as a central case, it develops a novel account of how consciousness is constituted by our neural structure, and so presents a new physicalist and internalist solution to the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness, with respect specifically to sensory qualia. The necessary background in philosophy and sensory neurophysiology is provided for the reader throughout. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in the problems of consciousness.
Chapter 6 treats Balkan convergence involving morphology and morphosyntax more generally, focusing particularly on inflectional morphology. Attention is given to categories and to forms, as well as the special, and often nuanced, functions and semantic range of particular items. Convergence involving nouns and noun phrases is documented, with regard to case, deixis, definiteness, gender, number, and adjectival modification. Particular attention is given to the development of analytic structures. Regarding verbs and verb phrases, convergence is discussed in the categories of tense, aspect, mood, evidential marking, voice, and valency.
This article argues that there are two different types of ‘past potential’ relevant to the Classical Greek tense and mood system. First, the past-tense indicative with ἄν can signal that a designated past event was once possible but not realized (retrospective root potential: ἐποίει ἄν ‘could have done’). Second, the optative with ἄν can express uncertainty about whether a designated past event actually occurred (retrospective epistemic potential: ποιοȋ ἄν ‘may have done’). While such usages are recognized in the traditional grammars, they have been dismissed in modern discussions. The article presents a detailed theoretical argument, backed up by both close readings of individual passages and broader discussions of corpus data, in favour of establishing these past potential usages as an integral part of Classical Greek grammar.
Modality – the ways in which language can express grades of reality or truth – is the subject of a vast and long-established body of research. In this book, field-leader Jan Nuyts brings together twenty years of his research to offer a comprehensive, fully integrated view on areas of contentious debate within modality, from a functional and cognitive perspective. The book provides an empirically grounded, conceptual reanalysis of modality and related categories including evidentiality, volition, intention, directivity, subjectivity and mirativity. It argues for the dissolution of the category of modality and for an alternative division of the wider field of semantic notions at stake. The analysis also reflects on how to model the language faculty, and on the issue of language and thought. It is essential reading for researchers interested in the semantics of modality and in the implications of this domain for understanding the cognitive infrastructure for language and thought.
This paper focuses on the developmental tendencies and mechanisms underlying the unfolding of mood systems in Romance complement clauses. In view of the fact that the subsequent dynamics of change can be better understood and motivated against the backdrop of the Latin system, we take the basic structure of the Latin mood system as the reference and necessary starting point of our analysis. After briefly discussing the basic approaches to the mechanisms of mood change in the relevant research literature that puts forward notions like ‘modal harmony’, ‘regrammation’, ‘lexicalization’, and ‘conventionalization’, the article develops a modal–semantic perspective that casts a different light on the convergent and divergent developments of mood in the complement clause domain of Romance languages. The modal–semantic approach allows, apart from a coherent description and analysis of the developments, recasting the question of whether mood, especially the subjunctive, also comes with its own semantic value(s) in complement clauses. This modal–semantic approach not only provides a coherent description and analysis of the developments but also allows for a re-examination of the abstract semantics of the subjunctive mood (in complement clauses), spelling out its basic semantic features.
The chapter explores viewpoint across various topics and genres of political discourse. Viewpoint is defined as a pervasive property of language and conceptualisation which is exhibited across a broad range of linguistic and conceptual phenomena. The chapter starts by looking at deixis and deictic shifts in media discourses of immigration and political protests. The ideological role of viewpoints evoked by transitive versus reciprocal verbs is also considered in the context of media coverage of political protests. Subjective versus objective construal is further analysed as a viewpoint phenomenon and the role of objective construals in official communication around Covid-19 is highlighted. Viewpoint as an inherent feature in the mental spaces networks configured in response to modal and conditional constructions are considered in the context of Brexit discourse. Finally, conducted within the framework of discourse space theory, an analysis is given of distance and proximity (relative to a deictically specified viewpoint) in the discourse of the far-right organisation Britain First.
As stylistics developed, it became increasingly clear that a purely formalist approach to identifying elements of style would not be adequate for explicating the functions of particular textual choices. Consequently, stylisticians began to integrate insights from linguistics concerning the relationship between form and function, paying ever greater attention to the role of context in the interpretative process. This chapter traces the development of stylistics from its origins as an application of linguistics to (mainly literary) texts, informed by concepts from Russian formalism, to a fully formed subdiscipline of linguistics as it began to draw on these functional approaches to language description and developed more of its own theories and analytical frameworks.
In this chapter we consider aspects of phonology for bimodal bilinguals, whose languages span distinct modalities (spoken/signed/written). As for other bilinguals, the primary issues concern the representation of the phonology for each language individually, ways that the phonological representations interact with each other (in grammar and in processing), and the development of the two phonologies, for children developing as simultaneous bilinguals or for learners of a second language in a second modality. Research on these topics has been sparse, and some have hardly been explored at all. Findings so far indicate that despite the modality difference between their two languages, phonological interactions still occur for bimodal bilinguals, providing crucial data for linguistic theories about the locus and mechanisms for such interactions, and important practical implications for language learners.
Using data from the understudied language Gιsιɖa Anii, we provide a formal analysis of irrealis that builds on the framework of modality proposed in Giannakidou and Mari. In particular, we propose that Anii has an irrealis modal morpheme whose meaning is that the speaker does not believe that the proposition is true at a particular time. This gives irrealis, at least in Anii, a negatively biased meaning. Giannakidou and Mari propose that the subjunctive in European languages is a positively biased modal but find no evidence in their data for a corresponding negatively biased one. However, in expanding their approach to a completely unrelated language, we show that modal bias can also be negative, filling in the paradigmatic gap left open by Giannakidou and Mari’s work. We also illustrate the utility of analyzing irrealis (in relation to the concept of veridicality) as a morphosyntactic and semantic category with a status similar to tense and aspect. Our formal analysis accounts for the obligatory realization of irrealis in a wide range of semantic contexts in Anii, including future tense, negation, and wishes, and shows how irrealis can be composed with other clausal elements. We suggest that reality status, which we analyze as (non)-veridicality, is obligatorily present in the Anii clause and discuss the implications of this for other languages.
Necessity, but not possibility, is typically thought to be rare and suspicion-worthy. This manifests in an asymmetry in the burden of proof incurred by modal claims. In general, claims to the effect that some proposition is impossible/necessary require significant argumentative support and, in general, claims to the effect that some proposition is possible/contingent are thought to be justified freely or by default. Call this the possibility bias. In this article, I argue that the possibility bias is not epistemically justified. We should regard possibility with at least as much suspicion, that is to say as incurring at least as much of an explanatory demand, as necessity. In fact, I suggest that we might even be justified in reversing the burden of proof asymmetry and adopting a necessity bias. This has quite radical implications for philosophical methodology and hence for many first-order philosophical concerns.
I argue that Charles Travis’s interpretation of Frege, in Frege: The Pure Business of Being True, as consistent with Travis’s conception of occasion-sensitivity does not in fact require any modal notions, and so is consistent with the amodalist interpretation of Frege I elaborate in Necessity Lost.
Despite its apparent complexity, our world seems to be governed by simple laws of physics. This volume provides a philosophical introduction to such laws. I explain how they are connected to some of the central issues in philosophy, such as ontology, possibility, explanation, induction, counterfactuals, time, determinism, and fundamentality. I suggest that laws are fundamental facts that govern the world by constraining its physical possibilities. I examine three hallmarks of laws-simplicity, exactness, and objectivity-and discuss whether and how they may be associated with laws of physics.
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus deploys modal vocabulary, especially “possibility.” Some readers take this to signal commitment to substantive modal theories. For others, it is metaphysical nonsense to be thrown away. We steer a middle path. We uncover the central role of possibility in Wittgenstein’s philosophical development from criticism of Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment to the conception of propositions as pictures in the Tractatus. In this conception, modality is not the subject matter of theorizing but an ineluctable aspect of picturing of reality whose showing forth Wittgenstein aims to help us see by operationalizing the construction of propositions.
Published just over a century ago, Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the only book-length work to have been published during his lifetime and it continues to generate interest and scholarly debate. It is structured as a series of propositions on metaphysics, language, the nature of philosophy, and the distinction between what can be said and what can be shown. This volume brings together eleven new essays on the Tractatus covering a wide variety of topics, from the central Tractarian doctrines concerning representation, the structure of the world and the nature of logic, to less prominent issues including ethics, natural science, mathematics and the self. Individual essays advance specific exegetical debates in important ways, and taken as a whole they offer an excellent showcase of contemporary ideas on how to read the Tractatus and its relevance to contemporary thought.
Do bilinguals have similar bilingual control mechanisms in speaking and writing? The present study investigated the patterns of switch costs (reflecting reactive language control) and mixing costs (reflecting proactive language control) between Chinese (L1) and English (L2) in spoken and written productions and whether these patterns could be modulated by response-stimulus intervals (RSIs). In two experiments, unbalanced Chinese–English bilinguals completed a cued language switching task in spoken naming (Experiment 1) and written naming (Experiment 2), respectively. The results revealed asymmetrical switch costs (i.e., the larger cost in L1 than in L2) in spoken and written productions in the short RSI condition. However, there were asymmetrical mixing costs in spoken production and symmetrical mixing costs in written production both in the short and long RSIs. These findings suggest that for spoken and written productions, reactive language control operates in similar mechanisms, while proactive language control operates in specific mechanisms.
Chapter 8 presents a new empirical study to illustrate how CL insights can help inform L2 teaching and learning of Chinese modal verbs. It offers a study that compared the effectiveness of a newly designed CL-based instructional method with that of the traditional instruction used in a mainstream Chinese textbook in the United States. The proposed CL-based instruction taps learners’ analytical abilities to see connections between the root and extended meanings of modal verbs as well as the subtle distinctions among them. The chapter suggests sample focus-on-form communicative tasks that simulate real-life scenarios. By following up these tasks with CL-based explicit explanation, teachers of Chinese can ensure long-term retention and automation in L2 acquisition of modal verbs.
Transcendental arguments were prominent in Western philosophy, German idealism, phenomenological tradition, and P. F. Strawson's thinking. They have fallen out of fashion because of their associations with transcendental idealism and verificationism. They are still invoked by important figures in the analytic tradition even if the very same tradition has cast doubt on such arguments. The nature of transcendental arguments remains unclear: Are they supposed to be deductive? Are they synthetic or analytic? If they are a priori, how are they supposed to be about the empirical world? What are their relations to necessity, conceivability, and essence? This Element takes up the challenge of elucidating the nature of transcendental arguments, embedded in the wider context of transcendental epistemology. It will be argued that the key premise 'transcendental conditional' is synthetic, necessary, and a posteriori.