According to modal panentheism, God encompasses all possible worlds, and a substantial number of concrete possible worlds exist. This article builds on previous work that has grounded modal panentheism in perfect-being theology, which holds that God possesses all great-making properties to the highest possible degree. These great-making properties are said to include power, knowledge, consciousness, goodness, and encompassment.

To date, scholarly discussion on modal panentheism has focused exclusively on divine goodness and encompassment. The aim of this article is to explore modal panentheism with respect to divine power, knowledge, and consciousness. By extending the existing discussion beyond goodness and encompassment, I hope to show how modal panentheism can offer coherent accounts of the divine attributes. In doing so, I develop and address numerous problems. These include the problem of distinct perspectives, the problem of contradictory perspectives, the problem of divine unity, the problem of contradictory indexicals, the problem of evil knowledge, and the problem of evil powers. I argue that none of these challenges are insurmountable.

The view that emerges is a coherent and highly promising concept of God that is not at a significant disadvantage relative to traditional theism.

Modal panentheism claims that God encompasses all possible worlds and that a substantial number of possible worlds exist. This article defends a version of modal panentheism that is grounded in perfect-being theology, which maintains that God holds all great-making properties to the highest possible degree. In addition to goodness, modal panentheists consider encompassment to be a great-making property, and therefore, God (a maximally encompassing being) is said to encompass all possible worlds.

Nagasawa argues that modal panentheism faces a significant problem: the modal problem of evil. The argument states that if modal realism is true, then there exists a substantial number of possible evils that contradict God’s perfect goodness. Nagasawa proceeds to claim that modal evil poses a greater threat to modal panentheism than actual evil does to traditional theism.

This article develops two responses to the modal problem of evil. The first response (maximal-panentheism) argues that God need not be all-good or all-encompassing. The second response (no evil worlds) argues that worlds contradicting God’s perfect goodness are not possible worlds. In the light of these responses, I claim the modal problem of evil for modal panentheism is no more intractable than the problem of evil for traditional theism.