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The final chapter reiterates the challenges posed by totalitarianism. By conducting coherent theoretical and empirical research into the origins and expansion of totalitarianism, this work strives to address these significant challenges that Mises warned about decades ago. This chapter summarizes the key insights drawn from both the empirical evidence and the theoretical framework of institutional genes that constitute a comprehensive methodological approach. The literature review distinguishes this book from other works in the fields of China studies, institutional analysis, and social science methodology. The two most extensive sections of the chapter examine the institutional genes and their evolution in Taiwan and in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (FSU-EE). The former section sheds light on the pivotal role the institutional genes played in Taiwan’s transition from authoritarian rule to constitutional democracy, while the latter section explains the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in the FSU-EE countries and their divergent institutional transformations. The chapter also highlights the implications of the transitions in Taiwan and the FSU-EE countries for China’s future transformations.
We provide the first direct test of how the credibility of an auction format affects bidding behavior and final outcomes. To do so, we conduct a series of laboratory experiments where the role of the seller is played by a human subject who receives the revenue from the auction and who (depending on the treatment) has agency to determine the outcome of the auction. Contrary to theoretical predictions, we find that the non-credible second-price auction fails to converge to the first-price auction. We provide a behavioral explanation for our results based on sellers’ aversion to rule-breaking, which is confirmed by an additional experiment.
Azrieli et al. (J Polit Econ, 2018) provide a characterization of incentive compatible payment mechanisms for experiments, assuming subjects’ preferences respect dominance but can have any possible subjective beliefs over random outcomes. If instead we assume subjects view probabilities as objective—for example, when dice or coins are used—then the set of incentive compatible mechanisms may grow. In this paper we show that it does, but the added mechanisms are not widely applicable. As in the subjective-beliefs framework, the only broadly-applicable incentive compatible mechanism (assuming all preferences that respect dominance are admissible) is to pay subjects for one randomly-selected decision.
This is an investigation into the design of a market-based process to replace NASA's current committee process for allocating Shuttle secondary payload resources (lockers, Watts and crew). The market-based process allocates budgets of tokens to NASA internal organizations that in turn use the budget to bid for priority for their middeck payloads. The scheduling algorithm selects payloads by priority class and maximizes the number of tokens bid to determine a manifest. The results of a number of controlled experiments show that such a system tends to allocate resources more efficiently by guiding participants to make resource and payload tradeoffs. Most participants were able to improve their position over NASA's current ranking system. Furthermore, those that are better off make large improvements while the few that do worse have relatively small losses.
This paper experimentally investigates the provision of real-time feedback about school assignments during the preference reporting period in three widely employed mechanisms: deferred acceptance, top trading cycles, and the Boston mechanism. Adaptive models predict that greater sensitivity to tentative assignments during the reporting period will produce more equilibrium assignments in all three mechanisms. Consistent with adaptive predictions, real-time assignment feedback consistently increased equilibrium assignments but did not increase truthful reporting. These findings suggest that providing feedback about assignments during the preference reporting period could help student assignment mechanisms more reliably achieve policy goals.
In this paper we propose and test a contracting mechanism, Multi-Contract Cost Sharing (MCCS), for use in the management of a sequence of projects. The mechanism is intended for situations where (1) the contractor knows more about the true costs of various projects than does the contracting agency (adverse selection), and (2) unobservable effort on the part of the contractor may lead to cost reductions (moral hazard). The proposed process is evaluated in an experimental environment that includes the essential economic features of the NASA process for the acquisition of Space Science Strategic missions. The environment is complex and the optimal mechanism is unknown. The design of the MCCS mechanism is based on the optimal contract for a simpler related environment. We compare the performance of the proposed process to theoretical benchmarks and to an implementation of the current NASA ‘cost cap’ procurement process. The data indicate that the proposed MCCS process generates significantly higher value per dollar spent than using cost caps, because it allocates resources more efficiently among projects and provides greater incentives to engage in cost-reducing innovations.
Walking mechanisms offer advantages over wheels or tracks for locomotion but often require complex designs. This paper presents the kinematic design and analysis of a novel overconstrained spatial a single degree-of-freedom leg mechanism for walking robots. The mechanism is generated by combining spherical four-bar linkages into two interconnecting loops, resulting in an overconstrained design with compact scalability. Kinematic analysis is applied using recurrent unit vector methods. Dimensional synthesis is performed using the Firefly optimization algorithm to achieve a near-straight trajectory during the stance phase for efficient walking. Constraints for mobility, singularity avoidance, and transmission angle are also implemented. The optimized design solution is manufactured using 3D printing and experimentally tested. Results verify the kinematic properties including near-straight-line motion during stance. The velocity profile shows low perpendicular vibrations. Advantages of the mechanism include compact scalability allowing variable stride lengths, smooth motion from overconstraint, and simplicity of a single actuator. The proposed overconstrained topology provides an effective option for the leg design of walking robots and mechanisms.
Philosophical arguments about government contracting either categorically oppose it on legitimacy grounds or see it as largely anodyne. I argue for a normatively distinct kind of contracting – the advance market commitment, or AMC – and show that it is justified by the same liberal values that justify the welfare state.
This paper presents a concurrent optimization approach for the design and motion of a quadruped in order to achieve energy-efficient cyclic behaviors. Computational techniques are applied to improve the development of a novel quadruped prototype. The scale of the robot and its actuators are optimized for energy efficiency considering the complete actuator model including friction, torque, and bandwidth limitations. This method and the optimal bounding trajectories are tested on the first (non-optimized) prototype design iteration showing that our formulation produces a trajectory that (i) can be easily replayed on the real robot and (ii) reduces the power consumption w.r.t. hand-tuned motion heuristics. Power consumption is then optimized for several periodic tasks with co-design. Our results include, but are not limited to, a bounding and backflip task. It appears that, for jumping forward, robots with longer thighs perform better, while, for backflips, longer shanks are better suited. To explore the tradeoff between these different designs, a Pareto set is constructed to guide the next iteration of the prototype. On this set, we find a new design, which will be produced in future work, showing an improvement of at least 52% for each separate task.
Chapter 3 links context-dependent choice with what has recently been called in economics the “reconciliation problem” between positive and normative economics, and argues that efforts to solve that problem have led to a number of different strategies for reconstructing economics’ individual conception. It first reviews the mainstream’s “inner rational agent” attempt to preserve Homo economicus and then contrasts two broad strategies for reconstructing economics’ individual conception based on opposing views of individual autonomy: an “internalist” view that makes it depend on private subjectivity, and an “externalist” view that makes it depend on economic and social institutions. The chapter reviews four, recent strategies in the literature which take the “externalist” view and move toward a socially embedded individual conception. All four make ability to adjust part of what people are, but all four remain attached to the idea that individuals are only made up of preferences. Thus, I argue they fail to explain how people are autonomous individuals able to choose and act freely.
What is generally true about all models of crisis bargaining? Answering a question like this seems daunting because there are infinitely many ways states could negotiate with one another. Fortunately, this chapter introduces a new tool to address the question: mechanism design. We see that types with higher war payoffs will always fight more often than types with lower payoffs, and they will receive better payoffs overall. Meanwhile, it is possible to have negotiations end with guaranteed peace under uncertainty over costs, but no such solution may be possible with uncertainty over power.
This appendix explains the fundamental principles behind mechanism design, why it works, and how we can use the revelation principle to describe what must be true for equilibria within certain classes of games.
In this paper, the design and experimental validation of a knee exoskeleton are presented. The exoskeleton can capture the negative work from the wearer’s knee motion while decreasing the muscle activities of the wearer. First, the human knee biomechanics during the normal walking is described. Then, the design of the exoskeleton is presented. The exoskeleton mainly includes a left one-way transmission mechanism, a right one-way transmission mechanism, and a front transmission mechanism. The left and right one-way transmission mechanisms are designed to capture the negative work from the wearer’s knee motion in the stance and swing phases, respectively. The front transmission mechanism is designed to transform the bidirectional rotation of the wearer’s knee joint into the generator unidirectional rotation. Additionally, the modeling and analysis of the energy harvesting of the exoskeleton is described. Finally, walking experiments are performed to validate the effectiveness of the proposed knee exoskeleton. The testing results verify that the developed knee exoskeleton can output a maximum power of 5.68 ± 0.23 W and an average power of 1.45 ± 0.13 W at a speed of 4.5 km/h in a gait cycle. The average rectus femoris and semitendinosus activities of the wearers in a gait cycle are decreased by 3.68% and 3.40%, respectively.
Chapter 5 analyzes acquisitive prescription, a broader concept than adverse possession, and argues that registration-based acquisitive prescription with title and good-faith requirements can be justified by efficiency under certain conditions—Possession, however, is redundant, and may even give rise to undesirable outcomes. Given that boundary disputes can be left for another doctrine, possession-based acquisitive prescription—no matter whether possessors act in good or bad faith—can hardly be justified on an economic basis in countries with well-functioning registrars if possessors do not have title. The possession-based acquisitive prescription can only be justified in jurisdictions with dysfunctional registrars.
This paper focuses on the design, analysis, and multi-objective optimization of a novel 5-degrees of freedom (DOF) double-driven parallel mechanism. A novel 5-DOF parallel mechanism with two double-driven branch chains is proposed, which can serve as a machine tool. By installing two actuators on one branch chain, the proposed parallel mechanism can achieve 5-DOF of the moving platform with only three branch chains. Afterwards, analytical solution for inverse kinematics is derived. The 5$\times$5 homogeneous Jacobian matrix is obtained by transforming actuator velocities into linear velocities at three points on the moving platform. Meanwhile, the workspace, dexterity, and volume are analyzed based on the kinematic model. Ultimately, a stage-by-stage Pareto optimization method is proposed to solve the multi-objective optimization problem of this parallel mechanism. The optimization results show that the workspace, compactness, and dexterity of this mechanism can be improved efficiently.
While the mechanisms that economists design are typically static, one-shot games, in the real world, mechanisms are used repeatedly by generations of agents who engage in them for a short period of time and then pass on advice to their successors. Hence, behavior evolves via social learning and may diverge dramatically from that envisioned by the designer. We demonstrate that this is true of school matching mechanisms – even those for which truth-telling is a dominant strategy. Our results indicate that experience with an incentive-compatible mechanism may not foster truthful revelation if that experience is achieved via social learning.
In recent years there has been a great deal of interest in designing matching mechanisms that can be used to match public school students to schools (the student matching problem). The premise of this chapter is that, when testing mechanisms, we must do so in the environment in which they are used in the real world rather than in the environment envisioned by theory. More precisely, in theory, the school matching problem is a static one-shot game played by parents of children seeking places in a finite number of schools and played non-cooperatively without any form of communication or commitment between parents. However, in the real world, the school choice program is played out in a different manner. Typically, parents choose their strategies after consulting with other parents in their social networks and exchanging advice on both the quality of schools and the proper way they should play the “school matching game”. The question we ask here is whether chat between parents affects the strategies they choose, and if so, whether it does so in a welfare-increasing or welfare-decreasing manner. We find that advice received by chatting has proven to have a very powerful influence on decision makers, in the sense that advice tends not only to be followed but typically has a welfare-increasing consequence.
This paper presents a study on the effect of design parameters of an underactuated hand on its grasp performance. Three kinds of grasp performance characteristics are considered: grasp range, grasp strength, and immobilizing grasp range. Grasp strength is defined as the stiffness of the grasp. Immobilizing grasps are those in which the object cannot be moved for a force up to a certain threshold. In general, underactuated hands cannot produce immobilizing grasps. However, we show that immobilizing grasps can be created by including joint limits in the hand design. We consider the effect of two design parameters on the grasp performance: torque ratio and finger-base distance. Results show that an optimal finger-base distance and torque ratio exists that maximizes the grasp range and grasp strength. Also, the immobilizing grasp range is increased by decreasing the finger-base distance and increasing the torque ratio and joint limits.
Climate change has often been analyzed as a tragedy of the commons, a social dilemma where cooperation could make everyone better off but incentives induce individuals, businesses, and nations to keep on emitting greenhouse gasses. However, the simple game theory model of tragedy of the commons, Prisoner’s Dilemma, is just one of many possible models for climate conflict and cooperation. The topology of payoff swaps in 2 x 2 games shows relationships between games, including their potential transformations. Changes in the ranking of outcomes can transform Prisoner’s Dilemma into a Stag Hunt with the potential for win-win cooperation or Chicken with a shared fear of catastrophe, and then create convergent incentives that yield the best for both in Concord. Models of climate negotiations about whether to abate or pollute can be compactly displayed in a table based on how payoffs from symmetric games combine to form asymmetric games. Maps for transforming climate dilemmas reveal symmetric and asymmetric pathways to climate cooperation through fear of catastrophe, or assuring cooperation that is best for both, or adjusting incentives even if a polluter always want to avoid abating while the other pollutes. Maps for transforming climate games show the diversity of climate dilemmas and potential pathways to cooperation.