This chapter summarizes the aims, scope, and contents of the book. Both science and humanism have evolved over hundreds of years, and both are associated with influential forms of inquiry into the world. Throughout this evolution, humanism and science have been intimately connected, in ways that are crucial for thinking about whether, as a significant strand of humanist thought contends, the sciences can (or can be relied upon to) enhance the welfare of humans, other life, and the environment. It is clear that there is no necessary connection between scientific inquiry and social or moral progress; the sciences have facilitated both significant goods and significant harms. Faced today with pressing challenges to the well-being of people and the planet, our attitudes toward science call for renewed scrutiny. With chapters spanning the history of entanglements of forms of humanism and science up to the present, and case studies of the value implications of the sciences, this book asks us to think about what relationships between science and humanism we should build for the future.

The rediscovery that the Vienna Circle’s neopositivist philosophy of science was not an exercise in theory for theory’s sake, but regarded by some of its most prominent practitioners as closely related to ongoing struggles for the social, economic, and political transformation of society (in his North American exile Rudolf Carnap spoke of “scientific humanism”), has attracted the attention of feminist and anti-racist philosophers. This chapter seeks to establish that two doctrines also associated with neopositivism (and shared by Carnap and Otto Neurath) need not prove as rebarbative for contemporary activist scholars as they may appear initially. It is argued, first, that understood as a qualified adoption of Max Weber’s position their conception of scientific value freedom (better: scientific value neutrality) does not undermine their ambition that science and its philosophy serve their sociopolitical engagement, and, second, that their conception of value noncognitivism does not at all render discussions of nonepistemic normative matters meaningless, but only bars deciding them as intersubjectively binding on a priori philosophical or empirical scientific grounds. Joint deliberation is needed.

Humanism, conceived as a worldview concerning, among other things, how we understand ourselves and our relationships with others, and science, conceived as a family of forms of inquiry into the world, are deeply interwoven over our intellectual and cultural histories. This chapter considers their co-evolution as a prelude to the present, reviewing formative aspects of Renaissance humanism and deepening associations of values central to the Enlightenment with precursors to modern science, en route to an arguably peculiar situation today. While some past, humanist conceptions of the aim of science seem intimately connected to the idea of making a better world – one featuring better and more widespread human and planetary flourishing – contemporary thinking seems largely devoid of normative discussions of what science itself is for. This chapter offers reflections on a possible return to a humanist conception of the role and promise of science.

This chapter examines first the gradual infiltration of logical empiricism into British philosophy during the 1930s, mainly through lectures by Schlick and Carnap, and not necessarily in accordance with Neurath’s ideas. L. Susan Stebbing played an important role as mediator, although she reflected on differences between the Viennese and the British analytical approaches. A. J. Ayer’s bestselling book Language, Truth, and Logic prepared the ground to some extent, but, by the time Neurath arrived to give a series of lectures at Oxford University, philosophers were mostly absent serving in the war. Neurath’s lectures are reconstructed from his notes, and the changes and developments in his philosophy of science are examined, also with reference to his monograph Foundations of the Social Sciences. We show that Neurath’s late work adapted to British sociological and anthropological thinking, often at the cost of bitter debates with old friends, such as Rudolf Carnap.

It is no secret that various versions of logical empiricism argued for the importance of unified science. Carnap was a proponent of unity of science views, although he expressed this in different idioms at different times. In the Aufbau (1928) he spoke of the unity of the object domain secured through definability in the constitutional system, in his physicalist period he argued that a physicalist language could serve as the universal language of science, and in his mature philosophical work he investigated a variety of meanings that might be attached to reductionist projects for unifying various scientific fields. Our essay focuses less on Carnap’s several proposals than on a prior interpretive question: what was philosophically at stake for Carnap in the question of the unity of science? We begin with some suggestions in Carnap’s 1963 Intellectual Autobiography, where he calls unity of science “one of the main tenets of our general philosophical conception” and one in which Neurath’s emphasis on the “interdependence of all decisions … made a strong impression” on him. We follow Carnap in the suggestion that an account of his approach to unity of science does not take us into questions of unity of nature but rather of the scientific attitude and the unity of reason.

This chapter analyses the careers of two distinct narratives about Mach’s philosophical legacy that prevailed among German-speaking physicists and philosophers for more than a generation. Planck’s polemic against Mach sired the idea of a Machian philosophical system that was irreconcilable with modern physics, Boltzmann’s legacy foremost. But Planck also bereaved Mach’s positivism of its naturalist foundation and identified it straight with phenomenalism. In contrast, many Austrians considered the epistemologies of Mach and Boltzmann as even mutually supportive for a defence of empiricist indeterminism. Taking positivism in its original, more general understanding, they underscored Mach’s broader anti-metaphysical and empiricist stance, eventually adopting him as a standard-bearer for the new movement of Logical Empiricism. While these understandings were not necessarily tied to a positive or negative assessment, they often amounted to simplifications, transformations, or even contortions of Mach’s thinking, which made it increasingly difficult to declare oneself in Mach’s footsteps and simultaneously to advocate scientific modernism.