This article is focused on uncovering how authoritarian legal scholars in interwar Poland dealt with the issue of the ‘sovereign’. In most democratic constitutions, the ‘people’ are said to be sovereign. In a monarchy, the monarch is the sovereign. However, in an authoritarian system, the source of power can be much more vague. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Polish legal scholars and politicians began designing a constitution that would solidify power gained after a 1926 coup d’etat. The ultimate result was a constitution ratified in April 1935 using strong-arm tactics. I argue that the 1935 constitution’s main authors used a unique combination of neo-monarchism and ‘social solidarism’ to justify a legal revolution. The first replaced democratic sovereignty with monarchism, embodied in a president who metaphysically represented the Polish nation. The other justified a socio-political system based on the principle that unity of the whole was more important than individual freedom. Thus they arrived at an authoritarianism that was both legal and ‘legitimate’. At the end of the article, I show the legacies of this thinking in the post-World War II communist era. Stalinist legal scholars in Poland used precisely the same language from the 1930s to justify the introduction of a new constitution in 1952.

With the Liberal International Order (LIO) in decline, scholars have focused increasingly on the possible return to a Westphalian great power system marked by sovereigntist claims and balancing among states. The actions of the Trump administration, however, raise a number of significant puzzles for such accounts—the US seems willing to sign deals with traditional adversaries including Russia and China, while targeting long-standing allies like Canada and Denmark. At the same time, transactional politics often serve narrow personalist interests rather than national objectives. In short, a Westphalian lens focused on states and sovereignty may generate intellectual blinders that misreads the emerging international order. To overcome these limitations, we propose an alternative account, which we label neo-royalism. The neo-royalist order centers on an international system structured by a small group of hyper elites, which we term cliques. Such cliques seek to legitimize their authority through appeals to their exceptionalism in order to generate durable material and status hierarchies based on the extraction of financial and cultural tributes. This short paper lays out the key elements of the neo-royalist order, differentiating it from the Westphalian and Liberal International Orders, and applies its insights to better grapple with the emerging system being promoted by the United States under Donald J. Trump. For policymakers and scholars, the neo-royalist approach clarifies recent events in US foreign policy. Theoretically, the field should take contending ideas of international order seriously, and establish a research agenda beyond a backward looking view to the Westphalian moment.

This article argues that the role of surrender in shaping international legitimacy has been largely overlooked – particularly its symbolic dimension. Challenging dominant views that reduce victory and defeat to moments of rupture, it adopts a long-term, relational perspective, reframing surrender as embedded in ongoing processes that shape and reshape legitimacy over time. It explores how symbols that become central during surrender – including foreign and domestic leaders – can mediate tensions between coercion–consent, pride–stigma, autonomy–dependence, while fostering social cohesion across domestic and international societies. Drawing on case studies, process sociology, complexity theory, the English School, and Thucydides, it demonstrates how the symbolic management of surrender can lead to path dependencies that influence state-formation, a defeated state’s identity, and regional integration. Emphasising the fluidity and political weight of symbolic meanings, it advances a relational understanding of hegemonic legitimacy. In doing so, it links the origins of legitimacy to its continuous development and critiques both simplistic victor’s peace narratives and process-reductive histories. Ultimately, it illuminates not only the challenges but also the symbolic opportunities for constructing legitimacy in an interdependent world – underscoring that power endures through its symbolic anchoring in meaning and, with it, the hope for reconciliation despite defeat.

‘Democratic innovations’, which enhance citizen participation in decision-making processes, have been proposed to address challenges faced by many democracies. Only recently has research studied these innovations’ legitimacy among the public, which is of importance if innovations are to be viable remedies for democracy’s problems. This paper advances this literature with survey experiments conducted in Ghana. Ghanaians ascribe higher legitimacy to citizen deliberative bodies (mini-publics), open participatory processes, and citizen-elite deliberation processes relative to the status quo. These processes generate more legitimacy among those who do not favor the process outcome. Ghanaians were most favorable towards citizen-elite deliberation, viewing it as more fair, democratic, and likely to ameliorate partisan tensions. I suggest that this is because citizen-elite deliberation is most consistent with Ghanaian understandings of democratic accountability. This highlights the importance of context in shaping democratic reforms’ legitimacy, with implications for theory and reform design.

Within the UN, there is a divide between NGO networks with differing stances on gender equality and women’s rights. Feminist and feminist-informed NGOs push for extensive women’s rights, including reproductive rights and protection against discrimination. In contrast, conservative NGOs uphold traditional gender roles and family structures, strongly opposing reproductive rights like abortion. Studies have examined these NGOs’ stances and advocacy tactics, but a detailed comparative analysis of their views of the UN – their key battleground – is missing. The paper addresses this gap by assessing how each group evaluates the UN’s legitimacy and identifying the underlying sources of legitimacy beliefs. By combining computational and qualitative text analysis, it reveals several trends: the UN is central in the discourse of both groups of NGOs, although it appears more in feminist NGOs’ communications, and feminist groups generally evaluate the UN’s legitimacy more positively. This positivity peaks when the UN actively supports feminist objectives and collaborates with these NGOs. Conservative NGOs, on the other hand, positively evaluate the UN when they can align the UN’s foundational texts with their views and when they garner support from conservative states. Their most negative evaluations occur when they believe the UN uses deception to promote progressive policies.

Researchers assessing the nature of bicameralism have traditionally focused on the powers of upper chambers and potential (in)congruence with a lower chamber. Recently, the perceived legitimacy of upper chambers has been recognized as a vital third factor. However, previous studies measuring the upper chambers’ perceived legitimacy have (1) not considered whose perceived legitimacy is determinative (members of the institution vs. the general public) and (2) over-emphasized the input legitimacy. To explore the problems of the perceived legitimacy conceptualization, the qualitative content analysis of semi-structured interviews with Czech senators and Czech ‘ordinary citizens’ was used. It shows that perceptions among senators and the general public differ significantly. The results demonstrate that perceived legitimacy can be significantly influenced by factors such as the characteristics of senators, the apolitical nature of the institution’s processes, or the institution’s outputs. These may even overshadow the importance of input legitimacy in general, and democratic legitimacy in particular.

Joseph Raz’s service conception of legitimacy says citizens must obey the state when its directives allow them to comply with reason better than they would by deciding independently. Yet citizens’ capacity to decide for themselves is endogenous to state authority: the more they defer, the less competent they might become. Consequently, a state might secure its legitimacy through a self-fulfilling dynamic whereby citizens need state authority only because they have grown dependent upon it. This article diagnoses the problem and explains how the service conception can guard against it. Besides Raz's account, its argument applies to any theory of legitimacy with a “service” component.

Under what conditions citizens accept public institutions as legitimate authorities is a key question in political science. Recent accounts suggest that populist citizens reject international organisations (IOs) as distant, elitist, and undemocratic. Conversely, technocratic citizens should favour IOs as they represent the pinnacle of depoliticised, expertise-driven decision-making. In this article, we provide the first joint analysis of technocratic and populist attitudes as drivers of attitudes towards IOs. We analyse a unique survey conducted in five European countries that covers four IOs and ask how individual populist and technocratic attitudes influence attitudes towards IOs. We find only conditional evidence for a structural association between technocratic and populist and IO attitudes, and credible evidence that country-specific experiences with populism in power moderate these associations. Our contribution has important implications for our understanding of citizen attitudes towards various forms of political representation and the legitimacy of IOs.

Le régime québécois d’encadrement du lobbyisme exclut actuellement de son champ d’application les lobbyistes travaillant au sein d’organismes à but non lucratif (OBNL). Cette exception fait l’objet de critiques de la part de plusieurs acteurs du milieu. Le Commissaire au lobbyisme du Québec suggère d’ailleurs au législateur de modifier la loi afin d’inclure plus de lobbyistes dans son champ d’application, ce à quoi s’opposent plusieurs OBNL. La récente initiative médiatique du Commissaire au lobbyisme visant à promouvoir le droit à la transparence et à proposer une réforme de l’encadrement du lobbyisme au Québec constitue une occasion propice pour analyser l’idée d’assujettir tous les OBNL à la Loi sur la transparence et l’éthique en matière de lobbyisme. Pour éclairer cet enjeu, l’analyse vise à déterminer les impacts potentiels d’une modification législative sur la légitimité des OBNL en tant que groupes d’intérêt. L’article offre ainsi une nouvelle perspective sur le débat relatif à l’inclusion des lobbyistes travaillant au sein d’OBNL dans le champ d’application du régime québécois d’encadrement du lobbyisme.

Strong constitutionalism usually conceives rights as instruments for protecting people. The problem with this conception is that it generates legal alienation, since it views people as passive recipients of protection, which is an exclusive matter for the state and, ultimately, for judicial review. In contrast, deliberative constitutionalism gives people an active role in deliberating about rights, among themselves as well as between them and the state. However, despite the development of deliberative constitutionalism, it is not yet clear what this view of rights requires of judicial review. Accordingly, this contribution to the Federal Law Review’s symposium issue on deliberative rights theory argues for deliberative judicial review, which is a form of judicial review that, by respecting and promoting democratic deliberation, offers better protection of rights, as well as greater impartiality and legitimacy. In support of this argument, the article first makes explicit that the guide that should orient judicial review is not deference or activism but rather democratic deliberation. Next it states that, from this guide, a form of judicial review should be inferred that is not merely substantial or merely procedural, but rather semiprocedural. It then argues that, notwithstanding contextual turns, weak constitutionalism combined with channels of social dialogue offers a better institutional basis for deliberative judicial review than strong constitutionalism. Lastly, it concludes that deliberative judicial review respects and contributes to articulating rights without legal alienation, i.e. through dialogue among all potentially affected persons.