In this chapter, the focus is on negative states of affairs, on their corresponding judgments, and on the connection of these with Reinach’s jurisprudence – something that has not yet been done in the extant literature on him. The position advanced is that it is because the law frequently turns on what appears to be negative states of affairs; Reinach’s legal training may have contributed to his insistence on their very being and their having the same ontological status as positive states of affairs. Reinach was rather unique in the Munich and Göttingen phenomenological circles because he was a law student in addition to being a student of descriptive psychology and phenomenology; the ways he combined the various teachings from these fields opened up for him distinctive ways of seeing the world – in all its modes of being and not being. Consequences of the position include restoring these entities to their rightful place in his ontology (negative states of affairs have received far too little attention and serious inclusion in his work) and the potential for making Reinach whole again – by bridging his early law education with his phenomenological ontology.

Chapter 6 highlights a few implications for political legitimacy and the theory of legitimacy that can be derived from some of the key points that I have touched upon in Chapters 4 and 5. The implications include the following: (1) the character of a theory of political legitimacy is at the same time conservative and progressive, albeit more progressive than conservative; (2) the scope of evaluation and judgment that a theory of political legitimacy entails must avoid two dangerous paths: the first one is thinking that it is not possible to produce valid evaluations and judgments of legitimacy, and the second one is evaluating and judging all political situations from one’s own perspective; (3) evidence—that is, what people think and feel—can be called upon and mobilized for the evaluation and judgment of legitimacy; and (4) contemporary politics is especially relevant to the discussion of legitimacy.

This chapter completes the act of setting the stage for the rest of the book by stressing the significance of the relationship between legitimacy and law, at the national level as well as at the international level. Legitimacy and law do not have a simple and straightforward relationship—far from it. Highlighting four features of this relationship helps shed light on the complexity of their relationship and serves as a preview of some of the issues that will be addressed throughout the book. These four features are the paradoxical character of the relationship between legitimacy and law; the unavoidable, yet at times, problematic role of values in the legitimacy–law nexus; the need for legitimacy and law to not be entirely captive of the power on which they depend; and the nature of these features for legitimacy and law at the international level.

This chapter examines the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s capital drug law and its application, using the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as the normative framework. The 2017 amendment to Iran’s capital drug law is examined against the aims and likely motivations behind the amendment. Judicial legitimacy is assessed by examining how judges apply drug laws in capital cases and the extent to which fair trial guarantees are observed, and by assessing the structure of the judiciary in which these judgments are delivered. We use 10 judgments – rarely available in the public domain – handed down by the judiciary during 2014–2020 to argue that there have been positive developments in improving fair trial guarantees. Nonetheless, capital drug cases fall below the standard required under the ICCPR. The amendment sought to limit the application of the death penalty to major drug syndicates, but our analysis shows serious issues that may hamper the realisation of the amendment’s objective.

Political legitimacy entails a process of evaluation and eventually of judgment concerning whether or not, and to what extent, the exercise of political power (institutions, leadership, policies, and results) meets the conditions required by legitimacy. Despite the importance of the contribution of law to legitimacy, legitimacy cannot be purely and simply identified with and reduced to law. This is, in part, the case because law functions as an expression and vector of two other components of political legitimacy: values and consent. As such, this chapter is organized into three parts. First, I examine the meaning of values and consent and of their relationship in general. Second, I refer to the challenges that can be associated with values and consent. Third, I show how values and consent, provided that they are not the captives of these challenges, can operate as sources and criteria of evaluation and judgment of political legitimacy.

This chapter argues that beliefs are causally effective representational states. They admit of two main kinds: episodic and semantic forms of memory. These are argued to be distinct, although they have overlapping origins. The chapter also discusses the states often described as beliefs that result from one making up one’s mind (forming a judgment), but many of which are really commitments (a type of intention). The relations between episodic memory and imagination are also discussed. The chapter then examines the idea that moral judgments can be directly motivating, showing that it contains an element of truth. Finally, the chapter critiques a claim that has become popular among armchair-philosophers, that knowledge is a basic kind of intrinsically factive mental state.

This chapter considers what mental actions are, and how they are best explained. Mental actions are shown to include mental rehearsal of actions, prospective imagining, inner speech, attention, memory search, and (perhaps surprisingly) the spontaneous thoughts that occur while mind-wandering, as well as creative ideas that seemingly occur to one “out of the blue.” The chapter also discusses how controlled sequences of mental action can be explained, and discusses events like judgments and decisions that armchair-philosophers have been apt to claim are mental actions, but really are not.

Having shown how conflict belongs to the goodness of creaturely life and can be generative of human social flourishing, this chapter revisits the question of political community. “Agonistic community,” as I delineate it, incorporates the creative use of conflict in order to forge collectivity across difference, thereby reconceptualizing political community and difference in mutually constitutive terms. I begin the chapter by considering two neglected figures in the history of Christian political thought: the early modern Calvinist Johannes Althusius and the twentieth-century Catholic social philosopher Yves Simon. Both Althusius and Simon, I show, approach politics by theorizing the distinct features of creaturely action and relation, and so center the work of politics on the activities of shared judgment and action. The remainder of the chapter takes up the subject of democratic judgment, showing how agonistic democracy generates shared judgment and action without transcending or effacing conflict and difference. I conclude by examining the community organizing practices of the Industrial Areas Foundation as an instance of agonistic democratic community.

The conclusion summarizes the book’s arguments concerning the influence of polarization and the fracturing of norms on the judicial process, and also its remedial suggestions.

This chapter argues that because judging inevitably requires the exercise of judgment, one of our most critical concerns should be ensuring that the people we select as judges have good judgment. It explores what good judgment might mean and draws on work in both law and philosophy exploring the nature of judicial character. It further explores two components of judicial character, specifically practical wisdom and intellectual humility, and in the case of the latter, surveys a growing body of work in philosophy and psychology that investigates humility’s nature and benefits. It briefly outlines ways in which a renewed emphasis on judicial character might be implemented.

Introduces the book through a discussion of two cases. The first is Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which overturned Roe v. Wade, and in which the dissenting justices suggested that the majority’s decision to do so was unwise. The second is Rucho v. Common Cause, in which the Court concluded that courts lack the capacity to resolve claims concerning excessive partisanship in gerrymandering. Together, the cases help illustrate the book’s themes: the inescapable role of judgment in judicial decision-making and the accumulation of ways in which changes in courts, the legal profession, and the culture more broadly have come to undermine judgment’s role.

One of Isaiah’s most forceful messages concerns justice, and the sociopolitical conditions necessary to support it. In “The Ethical and Political Vision of Isaiah,” M. Daniel Carroll R. looks at the fundamental themes and vocabulary of the book’s moral vision and surveys approaches that seek to better understand the socioeconomic injustice and politics it condemns. These sins include the greed and malfeasance of governing elites in ancient Judahite society, systemic socioeconomic abuses of agricultural and trade systems, and decisions leading to catastrophic war. At the same time, this prophetic text looks forward to a messianic age of justice and peace under a Spirit-filled king/servant. In closing, Carroll R. looks at how Isaiah’s ethical messages have been received (and resisted) in the pursuit of justice, peace, and ecology.

Diplomacy skills matter, and the widespread perception that anyone with common sense can be trusted with a diplomatic position, even without proper qualifications, is misguided and dangerous. Diplomacy is a serious business. The matters that diplomats deal with are too important to be left to amateurs. There are careers that do not require a new hire to possess any special skills on day one; diplomacy is not such a profession. Diplomats must have most basic skills so that they can hit the ground running. In fact, they are expected to have them before joining a diplomatic service, because most governments do not provide much substantive training to new officers. Although different career tracks–political, economic, consular, management and public diplomacy–require some specialized knowledge and abilities, most diplomatic skill sets are universal. This chapter covers the key aspects of diplomatic tradecraft, on which the rest of the book will elaborate and expound.