This paper focuses on the epistemic significance of disagreement for a specific kind of contractualist (not contractarian) moral theory. I argue that a purely hypothetical version of contractualism excludes a prima facie attractive conciliationist view of disagreement simply because of the way it constructs the moral point of view. There is no room, in such an approach, for rational, hypothetical peer disagreement within the monological deliberative procedure itself. Attempts to supplement this monological procedure with a kind of post hoc appeal to actual disagreement undermine the basic rationale for adopting a hypothetical approach in the first place. An actual agreement approach to contractualism, by contrast, is well-positioned to take disagreement seriously. For such an approach, moral disagreement signals a failure to fully validate or constitute a binding norm, one that may produce – rather than merely result from – genuine moral indeterminacy. Furthermore, as each of our positions within contractualist discourse reflects a defeasible conviction about what could be the subject of genuine, intersubjective agreement among all affected, when we encounter disagreement that is not subject to clear defeaters, we do indeed have grounds to think our convictions may be mistaken, or that we must modify our credences in ways that reflect the risks we consciously run in defending and acting on convictions that do not enjoy justificatory completion.

The specificity of acts of reference emerges from their indexical nature, not from any fixed denotation inherent in referring expressions. Referential indeterminacy is generally not an issue or is easily corrected. But it can be taken advantage of when hierarchic relations are in play: people can deploy the semiotic potential of indeterminacy in ways that covertly index advantageous alignments based on shared values, while seeming to make the same acts of reference as participants in (apparently) the same discourse who are not angling for such alignments. The indexicality of such alignments provides ethnographic insight into the importance of these fields of discourse for those involved, how social actors exercise control or authority, for whose benefit, toward what desired outcome. To this end, I have coined strategically deployable shifter (SDS) as an analytic term for such discursive action, examining its use in higher education as linked to the financial and corporate spheres. I further explore how SDSs can figure into the processes of indexicality and rhematization (as proposed by Gal and Irvine) that are central to the modeling of those status-driven worlds.

This paper presents an algorithm for simulating multiple equilibria in otherwise-linear dynamic models with occasionally-binding constraints. Our algorithm extends the guess-and-verify approach of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) to detect and simulate multiple perfect foresight equilibria, and allows arbitrary “news shocks” up to a finite horizon. When there are multiple equilibria, we show how to compute expected paths using a “prior probabilities” approach and we provide an approach for running stochastic simulations with switching between equilibria on the simulated path. A policy application studies a New Keynesian model with a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and multiple equilibria, including a “bad” solution based on self-fulfilling pessimistic expectations. A price-level targeting rule does not always eliminate the bad solution, but it shrinks the indeterminacy region substantially and improves stabilization and welfare relative to more conventional interest rate rules or forward guidance.

It is argued that the generalizability theory interpretation of coefficient alpha is important. In this interpretation, alpha is a slightly biased but consistent estimate for the coefficient of generalizability in a subjects x items design where both subjects and items are randomly sampled. This interpretation is based on the “domain sampling” true scores. It is argued that these true scores have a more solid empirical basis than the true scores of Lord and Novick (1968), which are based on “stochastic subjects” (Holland, 1990), while only a single observation is available for each within-subject distribution. Therefore, the generalizability interpretation of coefficient alpha is to be preferred, unless the true scores can be defined by a latent variable model that has undisputed empirical validity for the test and that is sufficiently restrictive to entail a consistent estimate of the reliability—as, for example, McDonald’s omega. If this model implies that the items are essentially tau-equivalent, both the generalizability and the reliability interpretation of alpha can be defensible.

It was investigated whether commonly used factor score estimates lead to the same reproduced covariance matrix of observed variables. This was achieved by means of Schönemann and Steiger’s (1976) regression component analysis, since it is possible to compute the reproduced covariance matrices of the regression components corresponding to different factor score estimates. It was shown that Thurstone’s, Ledermann’s, Bartlett’s, Anderson-Rubin’s, McDonald’s, Krijnen, Wansbeek, and Ten Berge’s, as well as Takeuchi, Yanai, and Mukherjee’s score estimates reproduce the same covariance matrix. In contrast, Harman’s ideal variables score estimates lead to a different reproduced covariance matrix.

A summary and interpretation of the recent literature on the indeterminacy of factor scores is given in simple terms. A good index of factor score determinacy is the squared multiple correlation of the factor with the observed variables.

The subject of factor indeterminacy has a vast history in factor analysis (Guttman, 1955; Lederman, 1938; Wilson, 1928). It has lead to strong differences in opinion (Steiger, 1979). The current paper gives necessary and sufficient conditions for observability of factors in terms of the parameter matrices and a finite number of variables. Five conditions are given which rigorously define indeterminacy. It is shown that (un)observable factors are (in)determinate. Specifically, the indeterminacy proof by Guttman is extended to Heywood cases. The results are illustrated by two examples and implications for indeterminacy are discussed.

A construction method is given for all factors that satisfy the assumptions of the model for factor analysis, including partially determined factors where certain error variances are zero. Various criteria for the seriousness of indeterminacy are related. It is shown that Green's (1976) conjecture holds: For a linear factor predictor the mean squared error of prediction is constant over all possible factors. A simple and general geometric interpretation of factor indeterminacy is given on the basis of the distance between multiple factors. It is illustrated that variable elimination can have a large effect on the seriousness of factor indeterminacy. A simulation study reveals that if the mean square error of factor prediction equals .5, then two thirds of the persons are “correctly” selected by the best linear factor predictor.

In Europe, the integration process has domesticated international relations, safeguarded member-states’ democracies, and enabled collective action and supranational problem-solving. It has brought about the European Union (EU) and a democratic ‘surplus’. How has this been possible when the binding effect of EU law is grounded neither in the sovereign’s monopoly on power at the European level nor in the final decision-making authority of the EU? An answer to this puzzle is found in the fact that a public coercive framework has been established, which aims at solving the indeterminacy and assurance problems facing international cooperation. The enabling condition of sovereignty is replaced by those of co-legislation and a binding judicial process. The latter creates reasons for deference to legitimate authority and hence a compliance condition. However, since the Union falls short of meeting certain democratic standards, oversteps competences, and is plagued with inertia, there is a call for constitutional reform.

The International Law Commission has allegedly been in crisis from its first day of existence. Its own (former) members have been critical about its working methods, the topics it chooses to discuss, its relationship with other UN bodies, and even its aura. At the same time, the International Law Commission also paints more positive pictures of itself. This article aims to make sense of this dynamic without explaining, accepting or refuting any doubts or critiques. Instead, in an attempt to take these discussions to a new place, the article analyses the debates of the Committee of 17, which recommended the establishment of the International Law Commission in 1947. By combining literary, socio-legal and historical methods, it is argued that the ILC is founded on an embracing of uncertainty. As such, the Commission’s ambivalence towards itself is revealed as structural rather than illustrative of the institution being in crisis.