Immigrants in the United States without proper documentation face the risk of being subject to deportation (“removal”) proceedings and being detained. Decisions about deportation and immigration detention are made by immigration judges (IJs) in immigration courts (ICs) around the country. Some applications are also decided by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and are characterized as “benefits” rather than relief. Psychological evidence is a key component of many forms of removal relief and benefits (e.g., asylum applications, hardship, competency). Decisions made by IJs, immigration attorneys, and mental health professionals in IC can have serious consequences for immigrants, including deportation and detention. This chapter reviews some of the psychological issues involved in immigration law and the legal decision-making involved in removal relief applications. It also outlines the ways in which forensic mental health assessments can aid IJs in their decision-making process and offers recommendations for research and policy in this area.

Chapter 3 starts with a history of disability discrimination in the workplace and beyond, leading up to the current protections we now have—most notably, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The chapter then turns to the difficulty of defining and conceptualizing disability, both legally and normatively. Courts, legislatures, scholars, and society in general do not agree on how broadly or narrowly to define disability. This chapter then discusses one of the primary reasons courts and employers have leaned toward a narrow definition of disability—the reasonable accommodation mandate in the ADA. I will first provide a conceptual analysis and defense of the accommodation obligation before turning to the law surrounding the reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA, including the employer’s defense to the accommodation mandate—the undue hardship provision.

Arbitration is known as an adjudicative process whose outcome is a binding decision on pre-existing rights. At the same time, arbitration is characterized by party autonomy and the arbitrators’ considerable discretion regarding the conduct of the proceedings. That raises the question whether arbitral tribunals, first, can be empowered and, second, can rely on their procedural or remedial powers to go beyond the boundaries of adjudication. This entry will deal with the two most prominent examples of such additional tasks assumed by arbitrators: their efforts in searching a settlement and the adaptation of contracts.In the entry’s first part, the authors outline the different approaches adopted in various national laws and arbitration rules on the role of arbitrators in the process of facilitating a settlement. Against that background, the authors discuss whether frequently used methods of settlement facilitation are authorized under different types of rules. In the second part, the authors examine the concept of adaptation either as an adaptation by interpretation or an adaptation as a process of creating wholly new provisions. In the following, adaptation clauses in the context of arbitration as well as contracts without such clauses are discussed.

One distinguishing feature of equitable remedies is their discretionary nature. Common law remedies accrue as of right once the plaintiff has made out her cause of action. However, equitable relief is not automatic. Equity acts to correct the defendant’s conscience and sometimes this may not lead to full recovery, or indeed any recovery, for the plaintiff. Because the court weighs factors from both the plaintiff’s and defendant’s perspectives ‘that tend towards the justice or injustice of granting the remedy that is sought’, there is some unpredictability involved in equitable remedies. There is a set of well-identified grounds that inform the court’s exercise of discretion. Because these grounds are used to reduce or deny the plaintiff’s remedy, they are often referred to as ‘equitable defences’. They are merely factors relevant to the exercise of remedial discretion. They include the doctrines of laches and acquiescence, unclean hands, and hardship to the defendant. These are by no means the only cases in which equity will deny a plaintiff a remedy. Another highly relevant matter, which is discussed in this chapter, is the effect of the order on third parties.

In 1914 the home front in all countries greeted the war with an outpouring of patriotic support, but only Germany saw significant support for war before it was declared. Everywhere the advocates of peace were quickly overwhelmed, in particular the Marxist Socialist movement, which struggled to balance the coordination of international pacifism with hopes for political revolution, as reflected in a conference at Zimmerwald in neutral Switzerland in 1915. By then, the early rush to volunteer in Britain and the Dominions, where no military service requirements existed, had begun to dissipate. The home fronts were forced to respond when the anticipated short war dragged on into a second year. When heavy casualties created an ongoing need for fresh manpower, and the exhaustion of the initial stockpiles of munitions placed unprecedented demands on industry, women assumed an increasingly important role either as workers or as noncombatant volunteers, including under the Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations. The war revolutionized labor relations as well as gender relations. As the war entered a third year, censorship and propaganda assumed a growing role in sustaining the home fronts, especially for the Central Powers once the Allied naval blockade began to affect food supplies.

The chapter focuses on an important part of contract law, namely the law of excuses, in the context of smart contracts development. Smart contracts are supposed to secure actual performance, but to be able to do so appropriately, they need to take into account the possibility that a contract party may raise a valid excuse for non-performance of his obligations. Smart contracts should be able to deal with the possibility of at least some excuses; hence, this analysis may test the suitability of smart contracts for actual contracting. The chapter provides a comparative overview of excuses and hardship, culminating in a “common core” of the rules of various jurisdictions, and investigates whether and how excuses can be dealt with in smart contracts. This analysis shows some limitations of smart contracts, which leads to a more general discussion about possibilities and limitations of smart contracts.