The Physics constitutes a fruitful starting point for our study of Aristotle’s metaphysics of artefacts. This chapter shows that we can glean from Aristotle’s Physics an account of artefacts that is not only compatible with, but also directly related to the account offered in the Metaphysics. This account chiefly consists of: (1) the art analogy and (2) the fundamental distinction between artefacts and natural beings. Another Aristotelian conceptual tool I discuss in this chapter and is provided by the Physics is the distinction between ‘artificially caused’ and ‘artefact’. This survey will accomplish two tasks: it will present typical artefacts (i.e. generally accepted members of artificial kinds that are brought about by art) and it will open space for the conceptual possibility that art might be able to bring about things that are not artefacts proper. By identifying the building blocks presented in the Physics and presupposed in the Metaphysics, this chapter also lays the foundations for the remainder of the book.

The first five chapters of the book examine the relation of creation to creator in terms of Aristotle's 'four causes' (or four aspects of causation): that God is the efficient, formal (or exemplar), and final cause of creation, but not the material cause. In this chapter, we consider further what it would mean to describe God as a cause, and relate the three of Aristotle's aspects of causation that can be applied analogically to God to the three Persons of the Trinity.The history of speaking in this way – of 'appropriating' divine acts or aspects of divine acts to Persons of the Trinity – is considered. Also discussed here are ways in which the language of participation has been used to talk about inter-Trinitarian relations.

In the first of five opening chapters on participation and divine causation, we look at 'efficient' or 'agent' causation: what it means, from a participatory perspective, for God to be the cause and agent of creation. The chapter situates the idea of participation within the foundational doctrine, common to the Abrahamic faiths, of creation as being ex nihilo. Nothing is coaeval with God; nor did God rely upon anything else for creation: on eternally existent matter, for instance. Creation is not some past event, now over, but should rather be seen as a relation of dependence upon the creator. This is explored in terms of gift and of the relation of the doctrine of creation to the doctrine of God. This leads on to a discussion of theological apologetics.