How do secular and religious national role conceptions (NRCs) influence interstate rivalry? To explore this, we examine the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, two theocratic states. Drawing on scholarship that integrates power politics and religion, we examine how instrumental motivations shape religion-based policymaking. Using semantic network and regression analyses on data from eight official Twitter/X accounts of Iranian and Saudi foreign policy officials (2015–2021), we find that both states’ officials strategically use secular and religious NRCs in response to foreign policy roles adopted by their rival. Our findings underscore the coexistence of these NRCs and their selective application in managing rivalry. Methodologically, the study contributes to foreign policy analysis research by employing quantitative semantic analysis of social media data. It also offers a novel lens for understanding Iran-Saudi competition and the broader intersection of religion and foreign policy.

Moments of heightened violence and war in Palestine have often elicited extraordinary regime and opposition reactions in Arab states, including large-scale popular protests that are otherwise rare in such authoritarian contexts. This article examines how foreign policy influences domestic political opposition under authoritarianism. We approach this relationship combining classical insights from foreign policy analysis (FPA) with our own theorization of opposition as a tri-dimensional political space – as the dynamic product of intersecting institutional, practical and discursive spaces. Empirically, we capture such complexity through an exploratory, in-depth case study focusing on Morocco and, specifically, on the expressions and reconfigurations of its opposition movements in response to Israel’s wars on Gaza (2008–2009 and 2023–2025). Drawing on interviews conducted between 2007 and 2024 as well as official statements and press releases, these two episodes shed light on the consequences of both time-bound foreign policy shocks and more gradual, structural foreign policy transformations.

Despite ongoing affective polarization in the United States, support for Taiwan has somehow remained unscathed; Democrats and Republicans unanimously endorse US-Taiwan foreign policy. This is reflected both in public opinion surveys of American voters and support for Taiwan from elected officials. Theories of foreign policy and public opinion suggest that whether voters take top-down or bottom-up cues on foreign policy, we should expect some level of polarization on a salient issue like Taiwan. Utilizing two preregistered survey experiments in the United States, this study tests how robust bipartisan support for Taiwan persists when Taiwan is framed as either a Republican or Democratic issue. When presented as a partisan issue, do American voters still support Taiwan? Contrary to theoretical expectations, Taiwan presents a complex reality. Some foreign policy issues related to Taiwan can become partisan when framed along party lines while others remain bipartisan. Specifically, support for diplomatic and military policy may be affected by partisan framing, but support for economic policy remains bipartisan. This study contributes to theories of public opinion and foreign policy, particularly for scholars focused on US-Taiwan and US-China relations.

This article contributes to the literature on religious soft power by considering how non-Muslim-majority great powers – China, Russia, and the US – use Islam as a foreign policy resource in their soft power strategies. We argue that these states have deployed Islam to present positive self-images on the international stage, at the same time as using negative-other strategies via soft disempowerment to construct competitor states as unfriendly and/or dangerous to Muslims. We conclude by arguing that the use of Islam by non-Muslim great powers is a potentially dangerous game. While instrumentalising Islam may provide immediate benefits, it also opens the possibility for critique, particularly around perceived inconsistencies between domestic religious practices of a state and its internationally promoted narratives. These tensions can invite accusations of illegitimacy and hypocrisy, especially when leveraged by competitors or transnational religious actors.

This article explores the role of ideology in shaping Russia’s foreign and security policies, addressing whether it serves as a genuine guiding principle for the ruling elite or merely functions as a strategic tool to legitimise authoritarian rule and challenge the international order. Rather than focusing solely on Vladimir Putin, this study highlights the plurality of elite groups engaged in the production and contestation of strategic ideas. It highlights two key dimensions of ideology’s influence: first, its structural role in shaping elite networks and defining their internal power struggles, particularly among hawkish groups seeking policy influence; second, its instrumental function as a resource exchanged between ideological actors and policymakers, where ruling elites actively promote or demote ideological groups to justify strategic shifts in foreign and security policy. By analysing both the bottom-up diffusion of ideological narratives and the top-down mechanisms of state sponsorship, this research advances a nuanced understanding of how ideology interacts with domestic power dynamics, social environments, and international constraints to shape policy outcomes.

This article explores Turkey’s exclusion from enlargement scenarios in European political discourse in the new geopolitical era, which imposes important external pressures on European integration. It utilises the concept of “Geopolitical Othering,” which concerns the discursive constructions of the European identity through boundary-drawing practices that portray the Other as a threat to European security and stability. By doing so, the article aims to complement recent studies on Turkey’s growing role as a third country rather than an enlargement candidate, while clarifying another facet of the complexities in EU–Turkey relations, which extend beyond the persistent normative obstacles to Turkish accession. The article illustrates its theoretical arguments with two case studies on EU–Turkey relations, focusing on the 2016 EU–Turkey Statement on irregular migration and the 2018–2020 Eastern Mediterranean Crisis. It demonstrates how Turkey’s specific foreign policy choices over the past decade, including certain cooperative arrangements with the EU, paired with its geopolitical rivalries with the Union, have caused the EU to associate Turkey with certain existential threats. This perception, in turn, has contributed to Turkey’s discursive dissociation from the EU enlargement process, especially during the last Commission term, which coincided with the intensification of a geopoliticised identity discourse within the EU.

Scholars have identified several temporal challenges in foreign policymaking, such as variable time horizons and maintaining commitment or resolve over time. While the behavioural turn has emphasised leaders and their subjective perceptions, research often relies on rationalist conceptions of objective and linear time and struggles to assess leaders’ subjective perceptions of it. This paper theorises time as an intrinsic aspect of narrative reasoning in foreign policy, introducing a ‘temporal definition of the situation’ (TDoS) framework to capture leaders’ situation-specific subjective time perceptions. I then operationalise the TDoS framework’s key temporal features and show how it can be empirically examined. The value of the TDoS is illustrated by assessing the temporal perceptions of Bush and Obama regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, showing how their distinct definitions of the foreign policy situation shaped their subjective time perceptions and their corresponding responses. I conclude by discussing how this advancement can enhance behavioural research, provide insights into the ‘why now?’ questions surrounding leaders’ actions, and challenge existing understandings of time’s impact on foreign policymaking.

Can states improve their international image by apologizing for past wrongs, or do apologies hurt countries’ reputations? We argue that apologizing can boost a country’s international image by providing reassurance about future behavior and conveying appropriate values. Yet apologies could also signal weakness, and their international effects could depend on reactions in the sending and receiving countries. To test these arguments, we pair large-scale US-based survey experiments involving Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with the historical case of Germany’s 1951 Holocaust apology. In our experiments, respondents learned whether a foreign state apologized for past offenses, how the target of the apology responded, whether key domestic groups in the sender opposed the apology, and whether the sender was democratic or not. We found that apologies boosted foreign favorability and willingness to cooperate, and did not indicate weakness. These effects persisted even if the target rejected the apology or the apology provoked backlash inside the sender, and did not depend on whether the sender was described as democratic. The case of Germany’s 1951 Holocaust apology corroborates these patterns. Together, our findings suggest that apologies may be a powerful tool of public diplomacy.

One century ago, US Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes made the first official statement regarding US policy toward Antarctica by declaring it would not recognise sovereignty in areas that could not actually be settled. The Hughes Doctrine formalised US opposition to countries dividing Antarctica into sovereign territory, a doctrine that has become the bedrock upon which subsequent US decisions toward the region were built. This paper gives a broad overview of the development of US policy toward Antarctica, starting with the Hughes Doctrine, including the period when the United States secretly considered making its own claim to sovereign territory before deciding to champion then maintain the multilateral, sovereign-free region based on the Antarctic Treaty in order to achieve its national goals. This paper also reviews how the policies are working today and considers the significant challenges and costs the United States would incur if it altered its century-old policy toward Antarctica.

Intergroup attitudes and identity ties can shape foreign policy preferences. Anti-Muslim bias is particularly salient in the USA and the UK, but little work assesses whether this bias generalizes to other countries. We evaluate the extent of anti-Muslim bias in foreign policy attitudes through harmonized survey experiments in thirteen European countries (N=19,673). Experimental vignettes present factual reports of religious persecution by China, counter-stereotypically depicting Muslims as victims. We find evidence of anti-Muslim bias. Participants are less opposed to persecution and less likely to support intervention when Muslims, as opposed to other religious groups, are persecuted. However, this bias is not present in all countries. Exploratory analyses underscore that pre-existing intergroup attitudes and shared group identity moderate how group-based evaluations shape foreign policy attitudes. We provide extensive cross-national evidence that anti-Muslim bias is country-specific and that social identity ties and intergroup attitudes influence foreign policy preferences.

Shortly after the Meiji government assumed administrative responsibilities in 1868, the Iwakura Mission left Japan to circumvent the globe, searching for information on institutions that could centralize a divided archipelago. In so doing, it encountered a world embarking on a new phase of imperial expansion. While the majority of the Mission's participants returned with visions of a large, expansion-oriented Japan, others saw their country's future as a small, neutral state. Debates over the suitability of either vision continued throughout the Taisho period, especially as Japan incorporated territories at its peripheries, including Ezo (Hokkaidō), the Ryūkyū Islands (Okinawa), Taiwan, and Korea. This paper examines the impact of the Mission participants' perspectives, which were informed by their first- and second-hand experience of American and European amalgamation of peoples of diverse cultural, ethnic, and racial origins. How did the participants' experiences influence their views on Japan's future as an expansionist state? What did their experiences teach them about the assimilation of peoples of diverse backgrounds? This paper identifies the legacy of these debates as extending to the present, where Japan seeks to rescind postwar restrictions against extending military powers beyond its borders.

Since 2020, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh has intensified, culminating in a 44-day war in 2020 and an Azerbaijani military offensive in September 2023 when Azerbaijan reclaimed control over the Nagorno-Karabakh territory. This has ushered in a new phase of the Karabakh peace process amidst a transformed security landscape in the Caucasus. Against the background of a more general reconceptualization of Armenia’s role in the region, shifting away from its traditional alliance with Russia towards closer ties with the West, the article examines the role of women in Armenia in this peace process and their postwar opportunities for agency. The analysis reveals that women’s substantive inclusion in Armenia’s peace process remains limited due to (1) elite-dominated hard power negotiation structures and militarized discourses, (2) societal and economic factors, and (3) “self-exclusion” of women and the need for empowerment. Despite these challenges, the article identifies opportunities for women to assert agency in Armenia’s new security environment, contributing to a more effective, sustainable, and inclusive peace process.

Do external threats increase American bipartisanship? We subject this question to an experimental test. Leveraging the Biden and Trump administrations’ similar characterization of the China threat, we exposed American respondents to real-world primes about security threats from China, while randomizing the messenger of such primes. We find that the threat primes—regardless of the partisan identity of their messenger—boosted Democrats’ and Republicans’ support for assertive foreign policy in a largely parallel manner, thereby failing to reduce preference polarization. Importantly, there were no measurable changes across multiple indicators of affective polarization. These findings clarify the limits of external threats in uniting Americans, while also challenging recent perspectives that external threats—often colored by elite rhetoric—will further polarize the American public.

The nature of Indonesia’s foreign policy has long been understood as non-aligned. It has been associated with the basic tenet of bebas aktif (being independent and active) and the evolving international relations of the state, which demonstrated continuity in its non-side-taking position in the Cold War. However, recently, new trends in Indonesia’s regional and global conduct have emerged, including the diversification of multilateral engagements beyond ASEAN, the strengthening of various forms of strategic partnerships with major Indo-Pacific powers, and the adoption of normative hedging policies in response to sensitive international issues. What explains these developments? The conception of Indonesian foreign policy as being defined by non-alignment is no longer appropriate. This article argues that Indonesia now employs a partial multi-alignment strategy. Nevertheless, limited national power and persistent threat perceptions prevent the state from pursuing a fully multi-aligned strategy.

Leaders decide to engage diplomatically with their foreign peers for various reasons but, given their limited time and resources, they have to choose which peers to prioritize. As such, the study of international diplomatic visits helps shed light on a government's foreign policy approach and better understand its priorities in how it conceives and builds foreign relations. While the literature on diplomatic engagements has largely debated its drivers and effects, the role of domestic influences, in particular of party politics, has remained understudied. We address this gap and investigate the party politics of diplomatic engagements leveraging a new dataset on Italy's high-level international bilateral diplomatic visits in 2000–2023. Our findings show that partisan differences influence not only the overall frequency of such engagements, following curvilinear left–right patterns, but also the political regimes that left- and right-wing governments prioritize in such endeavours, exposing the lower importance right-wing parties assign to democratic principles when managing their countries' foreign relations, as these governments are systematically more likely to interact with authoritarian regimes than with democracies.

In this paper, I examine the factors associated with public attitudes toward foreign policy among white Americans and argue that racial attitudes play an important role. To test this hypothesis, I perform quantitative studies across four iterations of the American National Election Survey (ANES)—(1) 2012, (2) 2016, (3) 2020, and (4) the Cumulative Survey (1986–2020). While the results include white public opinion across several different areas of foreign policy across several decades of data, the findings are consistent: American foreign policy opinion among white Americans is highly racialized—meaning that their views on foreign policy are strongly associated with their views on race and racism. This study contributes to our knowledge of a relatively poorly understood phenomenon in American politics: how the American public forms their attitudes on foreign policy. Overall, I find strong evidence that racial attitudes play an important yet understudied role in the foreign policy attitudes of white Americans. This study also extends our knowledge of the role of racialization in public opinion and reminds us that while racism is one of the most central problems for U.S. domestic politics, we should also be wary of how these hierarchies of domination extend beyond our borders through its foreign relations.