This study examines how infant temperament, particularly fear, influences physiological improvements in infants following maternal postpartum depression (PPD) treatment. Forty infants of birthing parents with major depressive disorder and 40 healthy controls were recruited. Parents with PPD participated in a nine-week cognitive-behavioral therapy intervention. Infant emotion regulation was assessed using high-frequency heart-rate variability (HF-HRV) and frontal alpha asymmetry (FAA) at baseline (T1), immediately post-treatment (T2), and three months later (T3). Birthing parents also reported on their infant’s temperamental fear using the Infant Behavior Questionnaire-Revised Short-Form at these times. A significant increase in HF-HRV was observed immediately after treatment in the PPD group which persisted at T3. While no Group × Visit × Fear interaction emerged from repeated measure models, follow-up regression analyses within the PPD group revealed that higher baseline fear was associated with smaller increases in HF-HRV from T1 to T2 or T3. Although FAA shifted leftward over time, fear did not significantly predict FAA changes. No associations between fear and physiology were observed in the control group. The study suggests that infant fear may reduce the physiological benefits of maternal PPD treatment for infants, underscoring the importance of considering infant characteristics when assessing the impact of maternal PPD interventions.

I offer a critique of the method of analysis employed in Carl-Johan Palmqvist’s article The Mirror Account of Hope and Fear when arguing against the co-variation thesis (CVT). I show that the analysis of CVT—which uses the notational convention of representing a hope as “p’ and its supposed corresponding fear as “¬p’—is problematic in that it potentially obscures the divergent propositional content of hopes and fears. As an antidote, I suggest representing the propositional content of hopes and fears with distinct placeholders p, q, and etc. and I show how this refinement in method allows us to make progress on the issue of co-variation.

Threat sensitivity, an individual difference construct reflecting variation in responsiveness to threats of various types, predicts physiological reactivity to aversive stimuli and shares heritable variance with anxiety disorders in adults. However, no research has been conducted yet with youth to examine the heritability of threat sensitivity or evaluate the role of genetic versus environmental influences in its relations with mental health problems. The current study addressed this gap by evaluating the psychometric properties of a measure of this construct, the 20-item Trait Fear scale (TF-20), and examining its phenotypic and genotypic correlations with different forms of psychopathology in a sample of 346 twin pairs (121 monozygotic), aged 9–14 years. Analyses revealed high internal consistency and test-retest reliability for the TF-20. Evidence was also found for its convergent and discriminant validity in terms of phenotypic and genotypic correlations with measures of fear-related psychopathology. By contrast, the TF-20’s associations with depressive conditions were largely attributable to environmental influences. Extending prior work with adults, current study findings provide support for threat sensitivity as a genetically-influenced liability for phobic fear disorders in youth.

The relationship involving the unknown other has so far been exclusively translated into the language of fear as part of the securitised response to migration. The fear of the unknown other divides people into those who are associated with illegality and chaos and those who need to be protected from such ‘danger’. In contrast, the humanitarian approach to migration challenges the securitised response to the unknown other: it refuses to separate the self from the other and instead appeals to the idea of common humanity. This paper draws on the idea of the gothic to develop a humanitarian way of embracing the fear of the unknown. In the gothic framework, the other is feared not because of categorical differences between the self and the other, embodied in the securitised response to migration, but categorical ambiguity between the two. Using UK-based welcome activism as an example, I argue that gothic-inspired humanitarianism embraces the fear of the unknown other through the sharing of not knowing oneself. This offers a new basis for solidarity, in the language of fear, without resorting to the securitised relationship between the self and the other.

This paper reports three experiments with triadic or dyadic designs. The experiments include the moonlighting game in which first-mover actions can elicit positively or negatively reciprocal reactions from second movers. First movers can be motivated by trust in positive reciprocity or fear of negative reciprocity, in addition to unconditional other-regarding preferences. Second movers can be motivated by unconditional other-regarding preferences as well as positive or negative reciprocity. The experimental designs include control treatments that discriminate among actions with alternative motivations. Data from our three experiments and a fourth one are used to explore methodological questions, including the effects on behavioral hypothesis tests of within-subjects vs. across-subjects designs, single-blind vs. double-blind payoffs, random vs. dictator first-mover control treatments, and strategy responses vs. sequential play.

The personal experience of events such as financial crises and natural disasters can alter economic preferences. We administered a repeated cross-sectional preference survey during the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak, collecting three bi-weekly samples from participants recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. The survey elicits economic preferences, self-reported fear of the pandemic, and beliefs about economic and health consequences. Preferences varied over time and across regions, and self-reported fear of the pandemic explains this variation. These findings suggest caution about the generalizability of some types of experimental work during times of heightened fear.

The importance of interactions between child temperament and parenting has been accepted ever since Thomas and Chess (1977) proposed their “goodness-of-fit” construct, but over the last three decades, pertinent research has grown exponentially. Researchers examining child characteristics that can moderate the effects of socialization have tested increasingly complex, nuanced, and sophisticated models, largely inspired by the highly influential frameworks of child plasticity or differential susceptibility (Belsky & Pluess, 2009). Yet, multiple questions remain unsettled. We addressed four such questions as applied to predicting children’s observed disregard for rules at age 4.5 in a study of 200 community families from the US Midwest. (a) We examined children’s observed negative emotionality at 16 months, most commonly seen as a plasticity “trait,” but separating anger and fear proneness, which may differently moderate effects of socialization. (b) We examined two separate aspects of observed parental socialization at age 3, mutually responsive orientation and power assertion. (c) We distinguished analytically diathesis-stress from differential susceptibility. (d) We examined all effects in mother– and father–child relationships. We supported both diathesis-stress and differential susceptibility, depending on the facet of negative emotionality, the aspect of socialization considered, and parental gender, highlighting the nuanced nature of the processes involved.

Why do organised criminal groups (OCGs) resort to dismemberment – a costly and resource-intensive practice – rather than simpler targeted killings? This article challenges the notion that such brutal violence is solely a byproduct of inter-criminal rivalries or efforts to conceal violence. Instead, we argue that dismemberments serve to entrench criminal governance regimes. By publicising these acts and/or the reasons behind them, criminal groups are demarcating the boundaries of acceptable behaviour and reinforcing their system of norms and punishments. Dismemberments serve as communicative violence targeting three audiences: rivals, group members and civilians. We demonstrate the logic of this argument through an original qualitative dataset of dismemberment cases in Barranquilla, Colombia, and multiple interviews gathered during over five years of fieldwork. This article contributes to understanding the mechanisms of extra-lethal violence that sustain criminal governance in Latin American cities.

Game riskiness is an index to describe the variance of outcomes of choosing cooperation relative to that of choosing defection in prisoner’s dilemmas (PD). When the variance of cooperation is larger (smaller) than that of defection, the PD is labeled as a more-risky PD (less-risky PD). This article extends the previous work on game riskiness by examining its moderating role on the effect of expectation on cooperation under various PDs. We found across three studies that game riskiness moderated the effect of expectation on cooperation such that the effect of expectation on cooperation was larger in more-risky PDs than in less-risky counterparts. This effect was observed in N-person PD (Study 1), PD presented in both gain and loss domains (Study 2), and PD where expectation was manipulated instead of measured (Study 3). Furthermore, we found that participants cooperated more in PDs presented in the gain domain compared to those presented in the loss domain, and this effect was again moderated by game riskiness. In addition, we illustrated mathematically that game riskiness is related to other established indices of PD, including the index of cooperation, fear index, and greed index. This article identified game riskiness as a robust situational factor that can impact decisions in social dilemmas. It also provided insights into the underlying motivations of cooperation and defection under different expectations and how game riskiness can be utilized in cooperation research.

I provide a unified account of hope and fear as propositional attitudes. This “mirror account” is based on the historical idea that the only difference between hope and fear is the conative attitude involved, positive for hope and negative for fear. My analysis builds on a qualified version of the standard account of hope. The epistemic condition is formulated in terms of live possibility and the conative according to a non-reductive view on desire and aversion. The account demonstrates the theoretical fruitfulness of accepting Jack M. C. Kwong’s distinction between hope and fear as propositional attitudes and experiential states.