The scholarship on satisfaction with democracy has increased significantly in recent decades, with scholars investigating how democratic satisfaction influences political attitudes and behaviors as well as the individual and contextual determinants of citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. To our knowledge, however, scholars omitted to examine the democratic satisfaction of politicians. Making use of survey data from the Comparative Candidates Survey, this research note addresses this gap in the literature. As a first step in this endeavor, we pose two objectives. First, we want to compare levels of democratic satisfaction across citizens and politicians in different countries to evaluate whether mass-elite gaps are apparent. Second, we want to replicate core findings from the research on citizens but with politicians. As such, we examine two hallmark findings in the literature on democratic satisfaction with respect to the role of ideological extremism/nicheness and the winner-loser gap at elections. Our study contributes to the growing literature on elites’ attitudes and behaviors and identifies some of the conditions that favor and undermine politicians’ satisfaction with democracy. This is a crucial research endeavor given elites’ influence on public opinion and democratic stability.

Why do governments ban some extremist organisations and not others? To answer this question, this article investigates the banning of far-right groups in Germany, the archetype of ‘militant democracy’, where there are laws and institutions that protect a state’s democratic order through selective and qualified restrictions of certain political rights. The study draws on data about far-right organisations mentioned in federal security agency reports since 1990. Two-step fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) reveals that situations of high far-right visibility are necessary to take banning action. Within such situations, there are four sufficient combinations of organisational conditions that lead to banning action: Germany has imposed bans on neo-Nazi groups, longstanding organisational hubs in the far-right scene, aggressive militant organisations, and neo-Nazi sham parties. Two follow-on case studies identify related causal mechanisms underlying these sufficiency patterns. The article shows that Germany’s militant democracy practices are not applied as a matter of principle to every far-right organisation susceptible to a ban, but rather are used more pragmatically. This pragmatic approach implies that state actors should be especially attentive to the efficacy of using bans to disrupt and diminish extremist threats. Although there is some evidence of state actors considering efficacy, there are also indications that banning is sometimes a tool of politics rather than a targeted response to threats.

The relationship between populist attitudes and ideological orientations remains an area of considerable academic interest, yet much is still unknown about the ideological inclinations associated with populist attitudes. While many scholars acknowledge the link between populist attitudes and political ideology, existing studies often treat this relationship as either a given or a peripheral concern. This paper represents an initial exploration into the association between populist attitudes and political ideology. Utilizing data from the fifth wave (2016–2021) of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, which encompasses 43 countries and 52 elections, this study aims to uncover how this relationship manifests cross-nationally. By employing a variety of rigorous methodological models, including the Generalized Additive Model, our results reveal a nonlinear relationship between populist attitudes and political ideology. Specifically, we find that political ideology and populist attitudes exhibit a U-shaped nonlinear relationship and that ideological extremism and populist attitudes demonstrate an exponential nonlinear relationship. These findings emphasize the nuanced interplay between ideological positions and populist attitudes, providing a deeper understanding of how they intersect.

Research on extremism has increasingly incorporated a gender perspective, revealing how the politics of extremism and gender fuel one another. Yet most evidence of the gendered politics of extremism is on far-right and Islamist non-state actors, neglecting other forms, including state-sanctioned extremism in which the state is complicit with the violent effects of extremism. This article investigates a type of state-sanctioned extremism, wherein nationalist movements, supported to varying degrees by governments, seek to “protect” Buddhism across Asia. Gendered motives, forms, and impacts of political extremism can be observed in Buddhist Protectionism movements, manifesting in societal conflict, hate speech and other acts of violence and intolerance against ethnic and religious minorities. We ask to what extent gender norms and structures affect the motives, forms, and impact of Buddhist extremism using an original dataset encompassing nationally representative surveys and qualitative research in selected communities in Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. We find that extremist discourses and practices exist on a Buddhist Femonationalist Continuum across the three cases with misogyny and anti-Muslim threat narratives played up, both affirming the power of masculine hegemony and justifying the use of violence to control minority populations and women.

It is widely agreed that politicians are prone to hyperbole, proposing platforms that no one expects them to fully accomplish. We develop a theory of electoral competition focusing on politicians who differ in terms of both ideological preferences and in their capability to “get things done.” An imperfect ability to implement platforms introduces a novel role for status quo policies. We first show that the traditional left-right orientation of political competition arises only when the status quo is relatively moderate. Otherwise, an extreme status quo becomes the dominant dimension of electoral competition, providing a novel rationale for “populist” campaigns. Our second set of results address when campaign platforms can serve as effective empirical proxies for policies. We show that when there is a shock to voter preferences, the effect on platforms and policies is qualitatively the same, hence platforms are good qualitative proxies for policy implications. But when shocks are to the platform-policy linkage, platforms and policies respond in qualitatively different ways.

Political discourse is a persuasive device used to gain public support, and official counterterrorism narratives are no exception. Drawing on theoretical convergence between Critical Terrorism Studies and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in their understanding of discourse as a persuasive tool, this research aims to demonstrate the utility of discourse analysis in deciphering the political ideology sustaining official counterterrorism rhetoric. Through quantitative diachronic observation of key terms (terrorism, separatism, and extremism) and the systematic codification of Xinjiang White Papers (2003–2019), this research applies van Leeuwen’s (2008) model of social practice analysis, participant representation, and legitimation categories to reveal the specific rhetoric tools ultimately aimed at securing the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) political legitimacy. This article builds on CDA theory by linking discourse and political practice, reflecting on the pragmatic consequences of implicit power structures within official counterterrorism discourse, involving in this case the CPC and ethnoreligious groups in Xinjiang.

When are far right parties punished for their extreme positions? We argue that the punishments of deviant position-taking are conditional on the degree to which a far right party is normalized or stigmatized in the party system. When the far right is treated as normal, the costs suffered from these parties’ extreme positions decrease, as moderate voters discount the authenticity of their commitment to such positions. We use a survey experiment to test this argument in Spain, finding evidence for discounting on the far right’s extreme anti-LGBTQ+ statements, but not on its embrace of authoritarian history. This study thus shows that normalization and stigmatization of the far right can change how its extreme positions are interpreted by voters.

How should we respond to extremist views that we know are false? This paper proposes that we should be intellectually humble, but not open-minded. We should own our intellectual limitations, but be unwilling to revise our beliefs in the falsity of the extremist views. The opening section makes a case for distinguishing the concept of intellectual humility from the concept of open-mindedness, arguing that open-mindedness requires both a willingness to revise extant beliefs and other-oriented engagement, whereas intellectual humility requires neither. Building on virtue-consequentialism, the second section makes a start by arguing that intellectually virtuous people of a particular sort—people with “effects-virtues”—would be intellectually humble, but not open-minded, in responding to extremist views they knew were false. We suggest that while intellectual humility and open-mindedness often travel together, this is a place where they come apart.

The UK has seen an outbreak of riots after the death of three children in a knife attack. Misinformation about the suspect's heritage and religion was spread by social media, which was then used to incite violence and racism resulting in damage to property, terror and injuries. We put forward arguments that this was an extremist act and draw on the literature on terrorism, extremism and identity to put forward a deeper analysis of how this happened and what can be done to prevent future riots. We bring an interdisciplinary perspective drawing on research from social, cultural, psychological and political perspectives.