Misinformation has emerged as a key threat worldwide, with scholars frequently highlighting the role of partisan motivated reasoning in misinformation belief. Yet the mechanisms enabling the endorsement of misinformation may differ in contexts where other identities are salient. This study explores whether religion drives the endorsement of misinformation in India. Using original data, we first show that individuals with high levels of religiosity and religious polarization endorse significantly higher levels of misinformation. Next, to understand the causal mechanisms through which religion operates, we field an experiment where corrections rely on religious messaging, and/or manipulate perceptions of religious ingroup identity. We find that corrections including religious frames (1) reduce the endorsement of misinformation; (2) are sometimes more effective than standard corrections; and (3) work beyond the specific story corrected. These findings highlight the religious roots of belief formation and provide hope that social identities can be marshalled to counter misinformation.

We introduce the “Fork Game,” a graphical interface designed to elicit higher-order risk preferences. In this game, participants connect forked pipes to create a final structure. A ball is then dropped into the top opening of this structure and follows a downward path, randomly turning left or right at each forked joint. This construction is effectively isomorphic to the apportionment of binary-outcome lotteries, allowing participants to construct complex gambles. Furthermore, the game is easily comprehensible, highly modular, and provides a flexible means of assessing risk aversion, prudence, temperance, and even higher-order risk preferences.

We study experimentally contests in which players make investment decisions sequentially, and information on prior investments is revealed between stages. Using a between-subject design, we consider all possible sequences in contests of three players and test two major comparative statics of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium: The positive effect of the number of stages on aggregate investment and earlier-mover advantage. The former prediction is decidedly rejected, as we observe a reduction in aggregate investment when more sequential information disclosure stages are added to the contest. The evidence on earlier mover advantage is mixed but mostly does not support theory as well. Both predictions rely critically on large preemptive investment by first movers and accommodation by later movers, which does not materialize. Instead, later movers respond aggressively, and reciprocally, to first movers’ investments, while first movers learn to invest less to accommodate those responses.

Our study contributes to the literature on choice shifts in group decision-making by analyzing how the level of risk-taking within a group is influenced by its gender composition. In particular, we investigate experimentally whether group composition affects how preferences ‘shift’ when comparing individual and group choices. Consistent with hypotheses derived from previous literature, we show that male-dominated groups shift toward riskier decisions in a way that is not explained by any simple preference aggregation mechanism. We discuss potential channels for the observed pattern of choice shifts.

Why do some politicians face greater backlash for using insensitive language against identity groups while others do not? Existing explanations focus either on the content of speech or the context in which it occurs. In this article, we propose an integrated framework that considers both and test it using a preregistered conjoint survey on a national U.S. sample. Our findings provide partial support for our expectations. Subjects react most negatively to insensitive speech when the target belongs to their own identity group, when aggravating circumstances exist, and when politicians are of an opposing political party. Our article extends growing scholarship on speech scandals, which has largely explained the fates of politicians as a function of a small number of causative variables in isolation.

We conduct an economic experiment to examine the causal impact of social ties on the preference for competition. Participants decide whether to engage in a competition or not. Across four treatments, potential competitors vary based on their relationship with the decision-maker: whether they had a conversation with the decision-maker prior to the competition, whether they are expected to chat after the competition, or both, or neither. We find that the process of chatting increases social closeness. This increase in social closeness tends to reduce the preference for competition when participants are expected to meet again after the competition. However, it does not change the likelihood of opting for competition if there is no prospect of further interaction. Through this experiment, we thus uncover previously unknown implications of managerial practices, such as team-building exercises and remote work options, that influence the formation of social ties.

Efficient coordination is a major source of efficiency gains. We study in an experimental coordination game with 727 children and teenagers, aged 9 to 18 years, the strategies played in pre-adulthood. In our one-shot, experimental coordination game, we vary the incentives for reaching the more efficient equilibrium and the number of subjects within a group. Looking at strategy choices dependent on age, we do not find robust age effects in the aggregate. Yet, we see that smaller group sizes and larger incentives increase the likelihood of choosing the efficient strategy. The larger strategic uncertainty in larger groups is obviously harmful for overall efficiency. Regarding incentives, we find that increasing the profits in the efficient equilibrium seems to work better than providing a cushion in case of miscoordination. Beliefs play an important role as well, as subjects are more likely to play the efficient strategy when they expect others to do so as well. Our results are robust to controlling for individual risk-, time-, and social preferences.

This study investigates the integration of literal completions of idiomatic multiword expressions (MWEs) into two linguistic contexts: one promoting a literal interpretation and the other a figurative one, requiring reinterpretation to align with figurative bias. Sixteen Italian idioms were distributed in two groups by their Potential Idiomatic Ambiguity (PIA) score, an index of literal plausibility, decomposability and transparency. Using experimental dialogues, the study tested whether high-PIA idioms receive higher acceptability ratings across both contexts than low-PIA idioms. Eighty-four Italian-speaking participants rated idiom literal completions within literal and figurative contexts. Results show that literal completions of high-PIA idioms integrate better across contexts, while those of low-PIA idioms receive lower ratings and have longer combined reading and rating times. This supports hybrid models of idiom processing, emphasizing the role of idiomatic features and context in balancing figurative and compositional interpretations. This study also marks an initial effort to experimentally trace systematicity within idiomatic wordplay, challenging the idea that it lacks relevance for linguistic research while outlining limitations and directions for future work.

Although much has been written on legislative reciprocity, rarely have scholars had an opportunity to leverage a randomly assigned asset to assess whether and how legislators reciprocate when their colleagues assist them. Using the lottery that allows Canadian Members of Parliament (MPs) to propose bills or motions, we examine whether MPs’ priority numbers affect their proclivity to second motions made by other MPs, which would be expected if MPs sought to build support for their own proposals by supporting proposals by others. Although MPs almost always make a proposal if their priority number allows them to do so, we find a weak relationship between MPs’ priority numbers and their probability of seconding others’ proposals. Moreover, when we look at successive parliaments, we see only faint indications that those who, by chance, won the right to propose in the previous session (and who therefore were eligible to attract seconds) are more likely to second others’ proposals in the current session. Although subject to a fair amount of statistical uncertainty that will gradually dissipate as future parliaments are examined, this pattern of evidence currently suggests that correlated seconding behavior among legislators is more the product of homophily than reciprocity.

This paper investigates the collusive and competitive effects of algorithmic price recommendations on market outcomes. These recommendations are often non-binding and common in many markets. We develop a theoretical framework and derive two algorithms that recommend collusive pricing strategies. Utilizing a laboratory experiment, we find that sellers condition their prices on the recommendation of the algorithms. The algorithm with a soft punishment strategy lowers market prices and has a pro-competitive effect. The algorithm that recommends a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy increases the range of market outcomes, including more collusive ones.

We provide the first large-scale statistical investigation of the role of the saliency of (dis)honesty on future behavior in a multi-wave experiment with 1,260 subjects. In the first wave, we vary the saliency of subjects’ past dishonesty and explore the impact on behavior in tasks that include the scope to lie. In the second wave, we vary the degree of competitiveness in one of our core tasks. In a real effort task with individual incentives, being asked to recall experiences that involve honesty, or dishonesty reduces dishonesty in the task. This effect persists, albeit with a smaller effect size, when we purposefully introduce competitive incentives to this task in wave 2. On the other hand, in a competitive environment in which subjects could earn more by lying to their counterparts, inducing them to think more about (dis)honesty pushes them toward becoming more dishonest.

In the United States, the public does not view all refugee groups with equal favorability. Why do individuals express more support for some refugee groups compared to others? We argue that some Americans are more supportive of certain refugee groups when they share a racial identity because it is easier for them to empathize with them. While recent research points to empathy as a useful tool for cultivating supportive attitudes toward refugees and immigrants, the political science literature lacks a nuanced understanding of the conditions under which empathy drives pro-social attitudes toward refugees, specifically with regard to racial dynamics. Does empathy allow people to overcome their racial ingroup preferences, or does it magnify them? With an original web experiment administered to a 50/50 Black and white sample of Americans, we prime half of the sample to associate refugees with their racial ingroup and prime the other half with their racial outgroup. We find that refugee race only affects support for refugees among white individuals with low group empathy. For high-empathy whites and Blacks of all levels of empathy, the race linked to refugees does not condition their support for refugees. Rather, group empathy is a strong, independent explanation for variation in attitudes toward refugees. We also find modest evidence that the positive association between empathy for refugees and support for this group is driven by partisanship, particularly for whites. The direct effect of partisanship on support for refugees is much stronger. This study contributes to research on the dynamics of race, empathy, and attitudes toward refugees.

Social interactions frequently take place under the shadow of the future. Previous literature explains cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma as driven predominantly by self-interested strategic considerations. This paper provides a causal test of the importance of social preferences in such contexts. In a series of pre-registered experiments, we show that high levels of cooperation can be sustained when prosocial individuals interact in segregated groups. By comparing their behavior with that of mixed and selfish groups, we highlight the conditions under which other-regarding motivations matter in repeated interactions.

Over the last four decades, a broad stream of experimental literature has been published using the Common Pool Resource (CPR) game to study how people react to congestible resources, and how to keep such resources from socially harmful overexploitation. With the goal of providing guidance to future work on this still-important paradigm, we provide a narrative review of the literature, summarizing the results for several key aspects of the experimental operationalization. We classify these aspects into two broad categories. The first describes ‘environmental’ assumptions on the modeled resource problem itself. This refers to aspects of the experimental environment reflecting factors such as group size, resource size and asymmetry of access, which generally constitute the nature of the dilemma. The second category involves ‘institutional’ issues related to how people might solve the problem, such as user communication between subjects, information about previous subjects’ choices, and regulatory measures.

Disappointment aversion has been suggested as an explanation for non-truthful rankings in strategy-proof school-choice matching mechanisms. We test this hypothesis using a novel experimental design that eliminates important alternative causes of non-truthful rankings. The design uses a simple contingent choice task with only two possible outcomes. Between two treatments, we manipulate the possibility for disappointment aversion to have an effect on ranking. We find a small and statistically marginally significant treatment effect in the direction predicted by disappointment aversion. We therefore conclude that disappointment aversion is a minor contributor to non-truthful rankings in strategy-proof school-choice matching mechanisms.